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Introduction 
 
 
 
It is a commonplace today that the actors of international relations had to face a 
qualitatively new context after the end of Cold War. The events of the last 20 years 
revealed the fact that the security architecture – which is characterized by the 
institutions that were built up due to the political realities of the Cold War – is out-of-
date. The increasing number of democratizing countries and failing states drew attention 
to the necessity of rebuilding this architecture. Simultaneously, the state-centered 
Westphalian system lost its credit, since new non-state actors appeared on the scene of 
international relations. We could ask provocatively whether the whole international 
system is in crisis or only the Western style of statehood failed.  
Due to the ideological antagonism, the Cold War hindered deeper understanding of 
the causes and consequences of state failure. In a certain point of view, state failure 
rooted even in the bipolar opposition, which gave rise to the paradox of decolonization. 
The anti-colonization policy of the United States and the forced spread of communist 
ideology by the Soviet Union in the newly independent countries overshadowed the 
importance of managing weak statehood. The contradiction also manifested in the 
United Nation’s practice. Due to the two superpowers and their decisive role in the 
Security Council, the United Nations recognized immediately all states disregarding 
their capacities. 
After the end of the Cold War, the Third World lost its strategic importance and the 
weak performing states lost their allies which pumped untied money in the rotten 
systems. Soon, the more or less stable dictatorships gave place to domestic anarchy in 
many parts of the world. The Hobbesian vision came true in the weak states. The last 
twenty years has witnessed two changes of systems, which were also characterized in 
the development of disciplines of international political theory. First, the events which 
carried the promise of “democracy’s final victory” at the end of the 1980s and the 
democratic transition of post-socialist countries after the fall of the Soviet Union had 
  
7 
 
enormous impact on transitology. Second, the intervention in Afghanistan proved a 
radical shift in the perception of international relations. 
Although the consequences of neglected problems are widely known, rebuilding 
weak states violates one of the basic pillars of the international law, the principle of 
non-intervention. The fundamentally changed international system and the altered 
conditions forced the transformation of the intervention’s practice, too. Several scholars 
(eg. Falk 2004, Kent 2005) attempted to justify interventions by arguing that the new 
conditions in the international system changed the meaning of the Article 51 of the 
United Nation’s Charter by expanding the scope of the right for preemptive self-
defense. After 2001, dealing with state failure eventually became security oriented, and 
even the humanitarian interventions have served security interests of the international 
community by intending to cut the spillover of state failure.  
Balancing between the respect for sovereignty and rebuilding states has become an 
important question of theory and practice. The key player is still the United Nations, 
which delivered several statements and reports, such as the “Brahimi Report” in 2000, 
or the “Responsibility to Protect” in 2005. However, the reports could not open legal 
space for statebuilding operations. In theory, the reports call for codification of a “ius 
post bellum” but they do not excess the manifests of the 1990s: the “Agenda for Peace”, 
the “Agenda for Development” and the “Agenda for Democracy”.  
Although, there are several ways to address state failure, most of them are 
ineffective. The conscious passivity and non-engagement with indirect security issues is 
a false strategy. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argued, the world is 
interdependent, and the national security can be interpreted only in terms of this 
characteristic. (Keohane et al 2001: 6) Thus, military power in itself is irrelevant to 
solve conflicts. The real power lies in the capacity of influencing processes of the 
international politics. The tactic of the Cold War, namely exerting influence and 
pressure on a country by assisting local forces, simply does not work under the anarchic 
conditions of a failed state. Robert Kaplan’s prophecy on “The Coming Anarchy” 
(1994) from the middle of the 1990s, namely increasing lawlessness and chaotic 
conditions in weak states has proved to be true. 
Restoration of order in weak states is in the interest of the entire international 
community. Today, military intervention seems to be a necessary and integral part of 
complex crisis management, as the military forces of weak states are incapable of 
  
8 
 
managing the anarchic situation and providing security for development; in many cases 
local military is the source of violence and insecurity. The role of modern armies is “to 
supply the global public good of peace in territories that otherwise have the potential for 
nightmare.” (Collier 2007: 125) The consequences of untreated state failure can be more 
expensive than the intervention, and the civilian deaths in developed countries can be 
higher than the lost of troops during the intervention because of for instance deadly 
epidemics or terrorists attacks. 
Although the problem of state failure is coeval with the first centralized system of 
polity, the phenomenon we refer to today has rather been present since the appearance 
of the modern states in the 19th century. After the end of the Cold War, the term state 
failure clamored for recognition in the political lexicons. Humanitarian claims for 
intervention in states which fail to perform necessary functions became stronger after 
the pictures of depressing events from Somalia to Cambodia perambulated the Western 
media at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, state failure, as a part of new 
researches with academic exigent, is to be connected with the study of Gerald Helman 
and Steven Ratner on the pages of Foreign Policy in January 1993, and with the volume 
edited by William Zartman in 1995. 
The shift towards a more (national) security oriented approach was forced by the 
regrettable events of the simultaneous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The 
attacks shocked the world, but more importantly woke up the world’s alone superpower 
from its strategic slumber. The events finally raised the attention of foreign policy 
scientists and researchers on the external consequences of state failure. After 2001, 
several studies addressed the relationship between the accumulated knowledge on failed 
states and the policy decisions. (see eg. Dorff 2005) Many theorists and policy advisors 
believed that statebuilding is a general cure. Multiple researches listed several common 
straits of state failure; however, they fell short in providing coherent definition on state 
failure. 
If we examine state failure in details we have to pose three basic questions: Why is it 
necessary to deal with failed states?; What should be done with failed states to diminish 
the negative effects?; How should be done it? Regarding these questions, it is possible 
to formulate several premises which may not lead to find the perfect answers but at least 
help understand the complexity of our topic. We have to recognize that the commonly 
used terminology reflects superficiality of the definition of state failure as it presumes 
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linear development, being the failed state on the negative pole and the Weberian ideal 
type on the opposite. As Charles Call notes in his recently published article (2008c: 
1495), the concept of failed states was the academic reaction to correct the experienced 
deficiencies in promoting peace, development or humanitarian assistance. The term 
statebuilding, however, is normative, and reflects culturally specific assumptions on a 
functioning state. The aim of statebuilding is necessarily penetrated by the “Western” 
norms of democracy. 
At the end of the Cold War, large scale system changes strengthened the hope for the 
final victory of democracy and free market. Growing consensus about unstoppable 
worldwide spread of liberal democracy was feed by several favorable factors of the 
1990s. The “third wave of democratization” spilled over the former socialist block and 
liberal democracy remained without real opposing ideological alternative. Later on, the 
“end of history” and the “third wave of democratization” met in the process of 
globalization. But, after the first flames of “democratic euphoria” everyday problems of 
emerging democracies fueled academic debates on the characteristics of democratic 
transitions. The revived intensity of academic scholarships blew new life in the science 
of transitology. However, there were influential works1 from the 1970s onwards which 
tried to reveal conditions, prerequisites and possible outcomes of democratization 
projects, the scholars after the Cold War faced qualitatively and quantitatively new 
problems because of the scope of the democratization and the embedded contradictions.  
Today, democracy is the dominant form of government and the only generally 
acceptable regime. Further confidence comes from recent global trends that democracy 
as a system is relatively stable in overall numbers, and maybe even in quality. However, 
at the beginning of the new century few reversals call for caution. The future of 
democratization depends on the integration capacity of the recent system and the ability 
of democracies to deepen the cooperation. An effective democracy needs not only 
institutions but new norms which are generally valued by the people. The new norms 
are essential principles of democracy: freedom, civil and political rights, rule of law, 
and accountability of rulers. Today, the idea of democracy is inseparably connected to 
liberalism, and it finally lies in the belief that the rights of citizens are best protected by 
a (constitutional) state whose power is limited. 
The “third wave of democratization” slowed down and the commonly mentioned 
“fourth wave” may have never begun, furthermore, and the global financial crisis began 
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in 2008 holds the threat of severe reversals in weak democracies. The unfortunate 
factors give inspiration for the academia to come out with new theories on the process 
of democratization. Simultaneously, we can witness the emergence of new 
authoritarianism which is a set of sophisticated illiberal policies that are contesting 
democracy in practical terms. The economic success and permanent development of 
China or Russia and their complex integration in the world economy challenge the 
traditional assumptions on the nexus between democracy and sustainable economic 
development and the inevitability of fundamental political change. The new 
authoritarians can easily reshape the understanding of democracy by using the label 
“Western” in a negative tone. The more and more followers of such ideas especially in 
Latin America and Africa are receptive to the new idea of “sovereign democracy”. The 
win-win relations of foreign trade, especially between China and Sub-Saharan countries, 
the no-strings-attached development aid, the popular principle of non-interference may 
create a new group of countries in the developing world which are hostile to the 
international efforts of complex statebuilding and democratic development. The new 
phenomenon is undercutting the efforts of the international organization, such as the 
United Nations, the Organization of Security Cooperation Europe, or the European 
Union, to promote human rights and democracy. 
The attractiveness of new authoritarianism rests on not only its real success in 
development policies, but on the complex features of the recipient states. The absence 
of horizontal and vertical accountability of the government or in general of the state 
institutions, the repressive governmental policies, rampant corruption are a better soil 
for the less complex system of authoritarianism than democracy. However, weak 
statehood is a determinant factor of final failure even if the surface shows quick 
development in economic terms. The lack of built-in corrective mechanisms, such as 
free and fair competitive elections, the rule of law, or independent civil society, put 
Damocles’ sword over the future of the state. 
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Hypotheses and methodology  
 
 
 
The dissertation aims at addressing three comprehensive and complex questions and 
approaching the answers through three hypotheses. Even if the problem of state failure 
is not a new phenomenon, there are no clear and comprehensive frameworks which 
could help analyze, explain and forecast the events and phenomena associated with it. 
Consequently, there is not a coherent model which could serve as clear advising schema 
for decisionmakers. Analyzing the ever growing literature of state failure, post-conflict 
development, democratization and development politics, three obvious questions can be 
separated which eventually come from each other. The nexus among them is even 
deeper because the second question gains substance only by answering the first; and 
accordingly, the substance of the third question follow from the second’s answer. First, 
before we could reach a comprehensive and final conclusion, we have to understand and 
explain why failed states are necessary to be dealt with. Second, after it becomes 
obvious that ignoring state failure is not an option in the 21st century, another question 
emerges, namely: what can the international community do with failed states? Third, no 
matter what solution is planned in theory as a cure for state failure, the reality is 
different and the actors which are involved need to have a clear vision on how the 
proposed solution should be implemented. 
The goal of the present work is to contribute to the international literature by re-
conceptualizing definitions and examining the three above mentioned questions. In 
order to achieve this we intend to construct a new theoretic framework by 
reconstruction of the achievements of respective sub-disciplines. The present work fits 
in the state failure discourse but it intends to expand the theoretic borders and to include 
arguments from transitology and development economics. However, the present work 
tries to avoid remaining a simple study on the quality of system transformations and it is 
not an economic evaluation of development opportunities for poor countries or of aid 
policies, either. We have to keep in mind that there is no absolute or dogmatic truth, id 
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est our goal should be reshaping the frames of thinking on state failure rather than 
finding answers to specific questions. 
It is easy to find answer to the first question. Per definition, failed states are not able 
to escape the trap of humanitarian and security threats by themselves, and the 
consequences of neglected state failure are clear. The humanitarian and security 
problems are not only the challenge of the given state but of the entire international 
community. 
Although, it is obvious that reaction is needed, the form of intervention is disputed. 
The debate is not completely settled whether the responsibility of the international 
community includes real actions or the provision of international development aid is a 
sufficient response. Of course, taking over all the responsibilities from the local actors 
in form of some kind of trusteeship, does not seem to be appropriate, either. It has 
become more and more accepted by the scholars and decisionmakers that the “aurea 
mediocritas” is statebuilding. Statebuilding is inherently complex and multidimensional, 
such as it would be impossible to limit the causes of state failure to one dimension. The 
process of statebuilding includes simultaneously the strengthening of state institutions, 
the reconstruction and development of economy and the reform of society, which 
together allow opportunity for a sound environment which can be the basis of future 
sustainable development. However, we have to keep in mind that statebuilding is 
contradictory even in theory and there are no perfect experiences with it in practice, 
either. 
The most ambiguous question is the implementation of statebuilding. Due to the fact 
that there is no widely accepted definition, the scholars on the field cannot agree even in 
the final aim of statebuilding, whether it is democracy, or it is simply a certain 
institutional structure. The reason is the high number of different suggestions which 
build on one aspect or dimension of state failure. The presumption of this work is that 
the final goal of the complex process is both. Namely, the outcome necessarily needs to 
be an institutional structure which is democratic. Eventually, we aim at drawing a 
comprehensive and comparative picture of different statebuilding models, and suggest 
an alternative way of thinking in which all the dimensions and steps, as well as the 
logical connections among them are taken into account.  
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1st hypothesis: State failure means per definition a trap of humanitarian and 
security threats. Failed states are unable to escape by themselves from this trap. 
Several lists of causes and consequences of state failure prove that neither 
humanitarian nor security challenges must be neglected. Due to domestic characteristics 
and inconvenient external pressures, failed states are unable to develop and elude from 
more severe consequences. In the 21st century, the consequences directly and indirectly 
affect the entire international community, which is why the problem cannot be handled 
as secondary. 
  
2nd hypothesis: Statebuilding is the logical answer to state failure. 
Without systematic statebuilding the promise of future development in a failed state 
will not be seen and the international community will suffer the consequences. The 
second hypothesis practically follows from the first one, namely, the fact that failed 
states are not able to develop by themselves does not necessarily mean that external 
actors cannot strengthen the basis of development. The international community has to 
intervene in the failed states in order to diminish the severity of the negative spillover 
effects. 
 
3rd hypothesis: Despite of skepticism in the literature and in practice, statebuilding 
has to be complex and sequenced. The alternative model helps understand, explain 
and forecast the success of statebuilding through six dimensions and four steps 
which are interconnected during the process. 
A necessary question comes from the second hypothesis: if we know that 
statebuilding is answer to state failure why is it possible that each statebuilding exercise 
had different outcome? The ultimate challenge in interpreting such a complex model is 
the enormous number of variables that influence each other and consequently change 
the final outcome of statebuilding. Accordingly, the goal of the present work cannot be 
the presentation of a blueprint for statebuilding, the aim is rather the introduction of a 
new and alternative schema of thinking which helps understand, explain and forecast 
the development of the state during the process. The model is necessarily normative2 
and builds on the existing knowledge on the field in a constructivist manner. To 
overcome the danger of being lost in the complexity of the matrix of six dimensions and 
four steps, the present work uses the analogy of the solution methodology of the 
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Rubik’s cube. The cube can be solved despite of the fact that the six faces and the 
“cubelets” can be oriented independently while each move affects all the faces and 
“cubelets” at the same time. Contrarily to most of other statebuilding models which 
evaluate specific cases and try to extrapolate the findings to other cases, the Rubik’s 
cube analogy is a schema for thinking about different cases at the same time. 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
The present work follows deductive formal logic because it aims at rethinking and 
reconstructing existing theories and models on state failure and statebuilding. It also 
intends to present an alternative model of statebuilding with empiric experiences as 
verification. For a long time, the philosophers were convinced that new knowledge can 
be attained only through inductive logic, because deduction meant in their point of view 
the reduction of the theoretic horizon because it indicates the goal of the research well 
in advance. (Bolberitz 1998)  
The complexity of reality also demands deductive logic, because a comprehensive 
inductive research on state failure and statebuilding would lead to the recognition that 
all variables are connected to each other. For this reason, the only effective way to 
conduct the research is using presumptions and hypotheses. The previously stated goals 
help avoid redundant information. Consequently, of course, some information and 
results will stay latent, but we have to make this sacrifice to achieve the final goal.   
The present work is similar to the eclectic constructivist researches and studies 
because it intends to point out that each of the existing models and theories on state 
failure and statebuilding contain elements which can be used in an alternative model. 
However, in our opinion, all the existing models comprise logical traps or deficiencies, 
which demand the revision of them. Our work is determined to collect verified theorems 
of the relevant theories and to give new meaning by re-aggregate them with each other. 
The most important added value of this work is the creation of a new theoretic outcome 
by reorganizing existing knowledge in a new model on statebuilding. The applied 
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method is also appropriate to expand the theoretic frames of certain sub-disciplines of 
international relations, and to use the democratization discourse or the achievements of 
development economics in the state failure literature. 
Comparing the outcome with the existing literature, the real novelty of the present 
work is that it helps understand, explain and forecast the challenges coming from failed 
states and propose alternative solution techniques. Consequently, the third hypothesis 
enjoys more attention. On the other hand, the first two hypotheses are not less important 
either because their verification is the proof why we need a new and alternative 
statebuilding model.  
We cannot agree more with the position, which were advocated for instance by René 
Descartes, Francois Bacon or John Stuart Mill, that syllogistic reasoning is a perfect 
mean for re-aggregating existing knowledge but it is not suitable for achieving new 
scholarly accomplishments because it necessarily narrows our thinking. However, the 
empiric verification of the alternative model cannot be the goal of the present work, 
because due to the complexity of the model, the number of variables, factors and 
dimensions are higher than the number of present and past statebuilding exercises. 
Undeniably, there are formidable methodological reasons behind the fact that synthetic 
attempts and comprehensive comparisons of different statebuilding exercises have not 
led towards a unified model and definitions. The universe of tractable cases of 
successful statebuilding experiences is in the inconvenient “small-N” range. The 
solution which has been used in other normative attempts to model statebuilding has 
been either the serious delimitation of the analysis to particular institutions, policy areas 
or other attributes of governance, or a restriction of the geographic scope. Advocates of 
large-N quantitative methodologies have proposed various strategies to increase the 
number of the units of analysis, sometimes also by restricting the scope to various 
policy domains. Ultimately the problem for the analysts is both the number of cases and 
the complexity of plausible causal chains in any rendering of the statebuilding process.  
The anticipated outcome of the present work and the introduced alternative model of 
statebuilding is a “theoretic crutch” for handling the interconnected dimensions and 
stages during the statebuilding process. The model is a good basis for further researches 
by serving as a method for analyzing the success or failure of statebuilding processes 
and by estimating the influence of different dimensions in certain situations. 
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Re-conceptualization of state failure and the 
answer to the first hypothesis 
 
 
 
Several studies (see eg. Call 2008a,b) pointed out that the generally accepted term of 
state failure is useless unless it refers to total collapse when authority disappears 
completely from the territory. In the reality, authority never evaporates from the 
territory, it only transforms into less institutionalized forms, for instance warlords, clan 
structures, or other non-governmental organizations fill the power vacuum. The term 
failed states is associated with several oversimplified assumptions, basically because the 
meaning of the state in the political science is normative and it was born in the “North-
Atlantic design center”3. First of all, elaborated lists (eg. Rotberg 2003, SFTF 2000; 
Fund for Peace 2008; African Studies Centre 2003) on the characteristics of failed states 
also demonstrate that the term tries to aggregate a very diverse group of states, which 
obviously leads to superficial suggestions on how to manage the problem. In addition, 
the search for definition has never revealed the logical relation among the different 
causes of state failure. It should not be forgotten that state failure is not a lower stage on 
a linear development line, and that the non-existence of the state in itself cannot explain 
the absence of peace either. Furthermore, the existing definitions cannot serve the goal 
to define what the role of the Western world is or should be in avoiding state failure. 
(Call 2008c: 1496-1500) 
Looking for a definition, with the goal to formulate policy recommendations, helps 
us catch the problem in a way that reflects on the reality better. The policy prescription 
for state failure is usually statebuilding. Nevertheless, it is clear that the international 
community is not able or willing to intervene in all states which fall under the broad 
category of failed states. Only cases will ever stimulate international action which are 
the interest of the intervening states. Every definition is inherently superficial, as all 
miss the complexity and the variety of failed states. However, broad lists of 
characteristics of failed states are not useless, as they help map individual situations, 
when the intervention is planned. Namely, the complexity of state failure is revealed in 
the individual cases when the intervention takes place. Having in mind the fact that 
failed states are very different, this is a practical way to grab the phenomenon. Using a 
  
17 
 
medical analogy, the different diseases are listed in the textbooks, but the choice of the 
individual cure is to be made by the physician. 
After 2001, terrorism was listed as the most important threat to the mankind 
according to the dominant political rhetoric. Terrorism is not solely the consequence of 
state failure, however, it is true that terrorist organizations can profit from the anarchic 
environment that is present in a failed state. In case the state is unable to satisfy the 
basic human needs, such as providing education, health care, economic development, 
the capacity of the government of the state will diminish significantly in mobilizing the 
citizens. Simultaneously, malign non-governmental organizations, such as terrorist 
organizations, find new followers. (de Mesquita 2005: 515-516) Terrorist organizations, 
just like other transnational enterprises, need safe headquarters, but unlike to profit 
oriented economic companies, the unstable and unpredictable environment, that a failed 
state provides is favorable for them. (Gvosdev et al 2003: 97) 
The security concerns connected to state failure also root in the phenomenon which 
is called ungoverned territories by Angel Rabasa (2008: 2-3). Ungoverned territories are 
characterized by the absent or unwillingness of the government to perform its basic 
functions, and the lack of penetration of the state institutions – most importantly the law 
enforcement – in the society’s deeper layers, which eventually gives space for civil 
conflicts, humanitarian crisis, arms and drug smuggling, piracy and uncontrolled 
refugee flows. (Paris 2004: 1-2) Harvey Starr and Zaryab Iqbal (2008) in their article 
referred to statistical data that mayor state failure events spill over very probably to 
other countries. The literature lists several other consequences, too, why weak states are 
dangerous for the entire international community: humanitarian catastrophes and mass 
migration, energy insecurity and environmental degradation, pandemics, organized 
crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. (Patrick 2006: 27; 
Rotberg 2003; Zartman 1995, Helman et al 1993) The appearance of clandestine 
transnational actors (Andreas 2003) increases the threat that comes from the state’s 
inability to control its borders. Border control is a primary state activity that serves the 
security of the state’s population and the outside world. Border control in this sense 
influences the humanitarian and the security situation, too. (Adamson 2006) However, 
as Pauline Baker (2007) mentions, not all failed states are linked to security concerns of 
the international community. However, those problems, which do not pose security 
challenge in the present, can and will lead to security problems in the future. 
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Humanitarianism and putting the security concerns in forefront are interconnected in 
the concept of human security. Roland Paris (2001) points out that specific elements 
associated with human security, economic-, food-, health-, environmental-, personal-, 
community- and political security, influence security in general. State failure leads to 
“complex crisis situations” which do not fall under the jurisdiction of the international 
community according to the orthodox approach. But on the other hand, the inherent 
possibility of escalation indeed makes even humanitarian problems a potential security 
issue. Vertical deepening of state failure, and horizontal spillover of it all prove that 
observation. (Törő 2004: 160-164) State failure is a vicious circle that spirals to more 
severe security problems. The governments in failed states do not have the resource and 
capacity to buy off the opposition forces that are interested in the failure of the state. 
It is highly understandable that an over politicized phenomenon, such as state failure, 
has as many different definitions as active actors on the field. The international 
organizations developed their own and different concepts on state failure. On the other 
hand, academic researchers also elaborated own categories contributing to the debate 
and trying to give advice to decision makers. Finally, the different think tanks and 
research groups also attempted to define state failure. 
Statehood underwent dramatic changes in the last two decades. The traditional 
system of nation-states rooted in the Peace of Westphalia and the international make up 
after the Second World War was based on the sovereignty and legal equality of the 
states. The failing of the nation-state is manifested in countries that proved to be unable 
to be member of the international community. This phenomenon is connected with 
another: “anarchy rules” (Helman et al 1993), that is anarchy penetrated from the 
international level to the internal segment of the state. The characteristic of the new 
international environment called for different explanations. Soon after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, competing views emerged on the field of political sciences. (eg. 
Huntington 1993, Fukuyama 1993) However, describing and explaining the new role of 
states in the frame of the new environment left space for new theories, too. For instance, 
Robert Cooper (2003) convincingly illustrated the different worlds of states in his book 
“Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century”. Instead of using the phrase 
failed states, he introduced the expression “premodern states” to demonstrate the 
problem of weak state performances. According to him, the premodern world is also 
integral part of the global structure of power. However, he assumes that the different 
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worlds, premodern, modern and postmodern, represent different stages of development, 
which inherently refers to linear development. Namely, premodern states are only at a 
lower stage of development and they will move towards modernity in the future. 
Disorder and internal anarchy which is typical for premodern states come from the 
inability of these states to maintain the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence on 
the territory of the state. Cooper’s categorization resembles to the work of another 
European political scientist. Georg Sorensen (2001) elaborated a typology that 
differentiates between the good and the bad performers. He labeled the states which are 
not able to execute some or all of their tasks “post-colonial states”. Sorensen, however, 
does not describe a linear development. Post-colonial states developed differently from 
the modern European nation-states. Furthermore, neither European colonization, nor 
decolonization movements contributed to the development of a functioning state. 
However, there were several attempts for building up a coherent nation and state, such 
as Nyenyere’s reforms in Tanzania, Kenyatta’s ideas in Ghana, or the mostly 
devastating project of Mobutu in Zaire. The common characteristic of post-colonial 
states is that they have heterogeneous society in terms of nationalities, ethnicities, 
religions or culture, and the population lives under the conditions of permanent 
insecurity caused by repression of patron-client network of the governing elite and/or by 
the groups that fight against it. The government in these states has no capacity or 
authority to make citizens follow the rules only by violent repression because of low 
legitimacy. The lost monopoly on the legitimate use of violence contributes to the 
“captured autonomy” of the government which goes hand in hand with weak 
administrative and institutional structures. “Captured autonomy” means in this sense 
that several destructive groups, exploiting the weak state capacities, appear on the 
territory but not under the jurisdiction of the state. The unfavorable conditions never 
allowed the emergence of cohesion inside of the society, and the predominance of local 
communities, like tribes, clans or families make the accommodation of societal conflicts 
even more difficult. The economy of such state, if it exists at all, is characterized by 
asymmetric dependence on the world market. Moreover, the structural heterogeneity of 
the economy has a negative effect on the prospects of future development. (Sorensen 
2001: 83-86) 
Before the above two theories, there were some works published that aimed to 
summarize state failure comprehensively such as the volume edited by William Zartman 
in the middle of the 1990s. Zartman defined state failure in the introductory chapter as a 
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phenomenon which “refers to the situation where the structure, authority, law, and 
political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.” 
(Zartman 1995a: 1) State failure characterizes a state that lost its identity, the control 
over its territory, legitimacy, and that is not able to produce public goods. Summing up, 
a failed state is a state that lost its ability to rule the people live on the territory. 
However, state failure is not an accidental event, compared to a natural catastrophe. It is 
rather a long term degenerative disease, that similarly other diseases, has warning 
symptoms. In case that the power of local authorities increases to an unhealthy level, the 
central government loses its power base, it has to rely on a certain ethnic groups, and 
the malfunctions in governance push the government in a defensive position, leading 
through postponed elections, repression and concession, to the final stage when the 
government loses control even over the own state agents. (Zartman 1995a: 10-14) 
Failed states are dangerous directly to their own populations and to the neighboring 
countries, as well. The three characteristics which easily spread from a country to the 
other are civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation. (Helman et al 
1993) 
Robert Rotberg, one of the most important experts on the field, provided a 
comprehensive list of factors that contribute to state failure. (2003) Working together 
with leading scholars, he later perfected the list, but the list still does not make clear 
how to compare different states and which of those are exactly ‘failed’. It is obvious that 
states that possess all the factors can be labeled as ‘failed states’, and others, that only 
fail in “some”, are “failing states”, but how much is “some”. Strictly speaking, in this 
sense only Somalia could be labeled as failed state. According to Rotberg and his 
colleagues’ research, the factors from which we can conclude to state failure are the 
following: domestic war, insurgency; lack of the state’s monopoly on violence; ethnic, 
religious or cultural tension; porous borders; crime; lack of public goods; weak 
institutions; collapsed infrastructure; corruption; growing gap between the rich and the 
poor; economic decline. (Rotberg 2003, 2004) States basically fail because of internal 
violence and/or because they are unable to deliver public services and goods. When the 
state loses legitimacy in the eyes of the people, the government gets on a “slippery 
slope” (Zartman 1995a: 9) which leads to failure very quickly. Moreover, when a 
violent conflict brakes out, especially when the final power is at stake, the failure is 
more possible. (Klare, 2004: 117) According to Robert Gurr (1994), the problems 
associated with state failure, especially domestic violence, are not new and they are not 
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the consequence only of failed statehood. For instance, domestic conflicts in Africa are 
natural continuum of tribal conflicts from the 1960s, when the power of the state was 
challenged by a revolution, insurgency, and different ethnic or religious groups. 
Elka Ikpe (2007: 87-95) used the term fragile states to describe the phenomenon of 
state failure and introduced two different groups among these states. The first group 
consists of the most fragile states which are on the verge of collapse and a minor 
external pressure, such as a natural disaster, emigrational wave, or internal challenge, 
like strikes, can generate total failure. The second category includes those countries 
which are unable or unwilling to guarantee welfare for the citizens. Furthermore, those 
which are unable to adapt to the changing the international sphere, however, the 
collapse is not an immediate danger. The most severe deficiency of these states is the 
lack of responsiveness to human needs. 
One of the leading scholars of the State Failure Task Force, Jack Goldstone (2008) 
criticizes the literature, that there is no clear definition of state failure, however, 
uncountable suggestion are born on how to deal with the above mentioned problems. 
Goldstone notes that, although, every states are different there are two factors that have 
predominance: effectiveness and legitimacy. Soon, the published findings of the task 
force mentioned that state failure is to be measured on the effectiveness-legitimacy axis. 
(SFTF 2000) Effectiveness of the state depends on how well it can carry out its basic 
functions in providing security, economic growth, law and policy, and social services. 
On the other hand, a government and the state are seen legitimate if the population and 
the elite perceive them just. Failed state refers to the situation when a state lost both 
legitimacy and effectiveness. Several causes can be behind that: long term problems in 
the society, increasing inequality, ethnic and religious fault lines, and unfavorable 
structural conditions. The most common pathways that lead to sate failure are the 
escalation of communal group conflicts; state predation, regional or guerilla rebellion; 
democratic collapse; succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states. 
International organizations and several think tanks also devoted energy and effort to 
elaborate a useful definition of state failure through attempting to map the causes and 
consequences of it. One of the earliest of these experiments was the above mentioned 
CIA funded State Failure Task Force that brought together the leading scholars of the 
topic at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management of the 
University of Maryland. The task force published the findings in 2000 after 6 years of 
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work, analyzing all countries between 1955 and 1998 and listing 114 “state failure 
events”. Each serious internal political crisis, such as revolutionary war, ethnic war, 
adverse regime change, genocides and politicides, was considered a “state failure 
event”. The task force also identified the generally important factors which increase the 
probability of a “state failure event”, these factors are: the quality of citizen’s life; 
regime type; international influences; ethnic or religious composition of the country’s 
population. Furthermore, there are other factors, like the patterns of development; types 
of ideology; number of years a political leader has spent in office, which can be 
significant, but not in all cases or regions. The findings demonstrated that among these 
factors the regime type influenced most significantly the occurrence of “state failure 
events”. In a partial democracy the failure is seven times more likely than in a liberal 
democracy or a stable autocracy. The low level of well being, the low openness to 
foreign trade, or the presence of major conflicts in two or more neighboring states also 
double the likelihood of failure. (SFTF 2000) 
Later in 2002 the World Bank set up a department and a task force to analyze state 
failure and to find answers to the problem. The Bank was already more cautious and did 
not use the static expression “failed states”. A new phrase was born: Low Income 
Countries Under Stress (LICUS). After the publication of the findings, the department 
changed the label of the concerned countries to fragile states. LICUS or fragile states in 
general share the common characteristics of having very weak policies, institutions and 
governance. In these countries, aid does not help because the government lacks the 
capacity to absorb financial resources and convert them into economic development. 
The task force concluded that poverty may contribute to the collapse of the state 
generating adverse regional and global consequences. LICUS or fragile states are to be 
divided into three categories: countries which are policy poor but resource rich, like 
Angola; countries that have exceptionally weak governance capacities, like Haiti; and 
post conflict countries.  
Not surprisingly, the United Nations also has its own definition and typology for 
weak performing states. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
prepares the list of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in every three years. All the 
countries fall under that category which satisfy three criteria: the yearly GNI per capita 
in a three years’ average is less than 750 USD; poor human resources, measured by the 
Human Assets Index that covers nutrition, health, education and adult literacy; and 
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economic vulnerability, measured by the composite Economic Vulnerability Index. The 
United Nations also pays attention to involve the question of governance when it 
prepares advice for development, furthermore created separated categories for countries 
that possess less favorable conditions for development due to geographical reasons: 
Landlocked Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) and the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDSs). 
The United States’ arm for development politics, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) does not use the expression “failed states”, except 
the case of referring to the unwished final outcome of state weakness. The USAID 
strategy for the period 2004-2009 talks about “troubled states”, not clearly defining the 
term. According to the strategy the greatest problem with troubled states is that they are 
the “failed states of tomorrow”.  
The African Studies Center (2003) differentiated between the terms failed states and 
collapsed states. The later refers to the situation where the state is absent, there is no 
rule of law, the institutional system is collapsed, the elite are corrupt to the quick, and 
the government does not have the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Failed 
states are similar to collapsed states but the fundamental difference is that state 
institutions do not disappear, rather they create power vacuum that draws various actors 
to compete for power. 
According to our opinion, the most comprehensive attempt to define state failure and 
categorize failed states is the project of the Fund for Peace. The Failed States Index 
(FSI), first published in 2005, summarizes yearly the changes in the position of weak 
performing states. The unconcealed goal of the FSI is to provide a comprehensive 
picture about the failed states and give advice for decision makers through the 
methodology that aims to present a framework for early warning and assessment of 
societies at risk of internal conflicts and state collapse. The FSI uses twelve indicators 
and 41 other subcategories to evaluate the countries’ performance. However, the Fund 
for Peace notes that there is a need for sustainable security for a country to become able 
to work toward development. Sustainable security is only possible if the “Core Five” 
institutions function adequately. These institutions are: competent domestic police force 
and correctional systems; efficient and functioning civil service or professional 
bureaucracy; independent judicial system that is the subject of rule of law; a 
professional and disciplined military that is accountable to a legitimate civilian 
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government; a strong executive/legislative leadership capable of national governance. 
Furthermore, the FSI incorporates other factors, like the role of surprise, individual 
events, as coup d’états, or the cultural traditions of a society in order to provide more 
accurate forecast for the future. The critics of FSI (eg. Call 2008c: 1495) mention that it 
is impossible to specify “which part of the body requires medicine” by examining only 
the very diverse indicators and categories without having a more accurate diagnosis. 
Additionally, the suggested solution overemphasizes the security sector without making 
clear how it is going to serve development in other sectors.  
Even if such initiatives as the FSI exist to serve as policy recommendations for 
decisionmakers, the biggest obstacle in front of humanitarian thinking is the sovereignty 
of states. (Bagaric 2005: 422; Eckert, 2001: 50; Elshtain 2002: 3; Donini 1995: 41; 
Nakhjavani, 2004: 36; Rogers 2004: 725) On the other hand, the international 
community is less reluctant to intervene in a situation when the failure of the state 
threats the international peace and security. However, the history of state practices 
demonstrates that states often referred to humanitarian reasons when they intervened in 
other countries which posed security threat for them, such as India did in East-Pakistan 
in 1971, Vietnam did in Cambodia in 1979 or Tanzania did in Uganda in 1979. It is 
ironic that the international community has been reluctant to intervene to encumber 
escalation of humanitarian crisis as long as it has not meant security threat. But on the 
other hand, each intervention on the basis of security concerns was attempted to be 
justified on humanitarian grounds. Nevertheless, the question is more complex, and as 
Francis Fukuyama (2004: 82) mentions, the single most important problem of the recent 
international order is the dilemma: who has the right to violate other states sovereignty. 
To overcome the above mentioned problem, Péter Marton (2008) summarized 
comprehensively and at the same time relevantly the problem of state failure. He 
differentiated two definitions, the humanitarian and the security oriented ones. Since, 
internal and external problems became inextricably intertwined in the 21st century; 
agreeing with Marton, we suggest using the composite of the two definitions. Before 
September 11, the humanitarian motivation of search for definition inspired the 
international community. However, as Marton points out (2008: 88) it is necessary to 
make normative statements when we use the humanitarian definition, as we have to 
define what the desired form of the state is. State is the framework and mean for the 
population to ensure stable and reliable life prospects. The problem is when the state 
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fails to fulfill this role. From the security point of view, state failure happens when the 
state loses the control over its internationally recognized territory. The state fails its 
primary function: sovereignty. “Cooperative sovereignty” according to Marton’s (2008: 
88) explanation means that each state is responsible for the control over its sovereign 
portion of world’s territory. In our recent world, the security of a state is deeply 
interconnected with the security of others, no matter how big is the difference in terms 
of population, political and economic power. The humanitarian and security motivated 
definitions meet at this point, as the humanitarian failure of the state is also the security 
concern of the international community. Summing up, we can talk about sate failure in 
case the state fails to satisfy the basic human needs of the people on the territory of the 
state, and fails to control that territory giving way to spillover of negative consequences 
of the failure. The world’s territory is a common good of the world’s population, and 
the states are only the agents which control certain parts of it. As a consequence, when a 
state is incapable or unwilling to practice that sovereignty it is the clear sign of failure. 
Per definition, an intervention will not violate the norm of sovereignty since the state 
already lost it. 
By answering the first hypothesis, the goal of the dissertation was to create or 
reshape the frame of thinking on state failure to facilitate the theoretic orientation in the 
complex question. The re-conceptualization of the definition is also the schema for 
answering the emerging question of statebuilding. In this sense, it is clear that the first 
hypothesis is directly connected with the second and both are conceptual questions. 
Accordingly, the verification of the first hypothesis was the evaluation of the definition. 
In searching for definition of state failure, it is unavoidable to express normative 
statements on the field of strict political theory of the state, because the considered 
problems are the oldest questions of the “Western” political thinking, thus, the complete 
mapping of the literature is unmanageable. Consequently, with the first hypothesis, the 
dissertation only intended to identify a set of functional disorders in the development of 
the state. 
The clear theoretical designation of the area of state failure studies is not easy 
considering the fact that the international politics is constantly changing. Thus, it is not 
surprising that there is no generally accepted definition of state failure. The relevant 
scholars on the field and the leading think tanks and international organizations all 
attempted to assess the conditions which refer to state failure. Consequently, the present 
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dissertation had to take a side in the debate, as well. By reviewing the literature on state 
failure, it is beyond doubt that neither the humanitarian nor the security consequences of 
state failure can be neglected. State failure refers to a situation where the central 
authority and the state institutions are unwilling, or unable to encumber the negative and 
destructive development in the security, institutional, economic, societal, domestic and 
external dimensions. The state cannot exploit the opportunity which is given by the 
sovereignty of its territory. It is not able to control this territory by which it poses threat 
to the development of this territory and to the development of other countries in the 
region, or in certain cases to the development of the international community. The states 
have to cooperate with each other to satisfy the criteria of sovereignty. After all, it 
means that a state is responsible for the development of its sovereign share of the 
world’s territory. Second of all, the states which got stuck in the trap and failed to prove 
the ability to escape from this trap are the subject of international assistance. State 
failure per definition is a trap, and the states which failed are only able to develop in the 
future if other states cooperate in rebuilding their capacity to use sovereignty. 
 
 
 
Addressing the problem of failed states and the 
answer to the second hypothesis 
The ambiguity of definitions of statehood and statebuilding 
 
 
 
In the modern political era, sovereignty is unbreakably attached to statehood. But in 
case the statehood is failed, why should sovereignty protect the façade? Nonetheless, a 
state should not be perfect rather sufficient to function. The core of a state lies in the 
legality and the bureaucracy. In this sense, the basic state functions are predictability; 
creation of confidence; lending credibility; provision of security; displaying resolve; 
control of resources. (Meierhenrich 2004: 156) 
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William Zartman (1995b: 270) argued that the reconstruction of the states 
necessitates not only the needed resources, but the participation of the society in the 
reconstruction efforts. Since this publication was published, several scholars agreed that 
local ownership is one of the key requisites for future success. The success highly 
depends on the possibility of elimination the internal anarchy by restoring or building 
up certain institutions. As we argued, one of the core state functions is to be responsive 
to the people’s demands. A weak state, however, certainly lacks institutions that would 
serve responsiveness, such as mechanisms that help increase the compatibility of 
colliding goals among different groups and between the society and the state. (Kashfir 
2004: 62) Evidently these mechanisms are only secured when the democratic 
institutional environment gives space for development of expressional opportunities of 
aggregated societal demands. It is in line with the effectiveness-legitimacy dimension 
described by Jack Goldstone (2008). The state is only able to preserve its legitimacy if it 
is responsive to the needs of the people. Moreover, the state is usually unable to meet 
these demands without effectiveness. There are of course cases when high legitimacy 
couples with low effectiveness, or vice versa, but they are not stable in the long term, 
because of the above mentioned reasons. 
The emerging question is why there are so many new studies in this field and why 
we experience it now and not directly after the end of the Cold War. It would be 
oversimplified answer to say that the simultaneous terrorist attacks in 2001 gave new 
recognition on the consequences of state failure, as there were several studies on this 
topic well before this date. The difference is the attitude of the political decision makers. 
The very aftermath of September 11, the politics became hungry for these studies, first 
about the consequences of state failure, giving explanation for the necessity of military 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the failures of the post-conflict 
missions in Afghanistan and more importantly in Iraq, gave place for emerging number 
of criticism that demanded growing attention to the complexity of statebuilding. As in 
Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk’s composition (2009b: 8), 2004 was the year that 
provided the clear moment when different authors using different perspectives arrived 
to the same conclusion. These studies represent a new cornerstone in the literature, as 
the conclusions have appeared in practical documents, such as of the United Nations, 
UNDP or the USAID. The common argument of Roland Paris, Francis Fukuyama, 
Simon Chesterman, Stephen Krasner and James D. Fearon and David Laitin is that the 
complex process of achieving peace shows the importance of the state, institutions and 
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governments in the long term. To sum up, these works attracted the attention to the 
complex consequences of state failure by stating that failed states per definition are not 
able to develop by themselves, they need the help of the international community. 
Without the help of the more stable and developed states they represent significant 
danger for the community of states, that is the intervention and reconstruction is not 
only the moral duty but the core self-interest of the international community. 
Robert Keohane wrote (2003: 278) that Westphalian sovereignty is indeed 
inappropriate under the conditions of the reality, and it needs to be gradated, to let more 
space for the external actors. Due to the fact that the state remains the principal unit of 
the international politics, the concept of the state has to be re-conceptualized. The new 
concept of the state should be used during the “efficacious humanitarian interventions” 
that create political structures in which external actors exercise substantial authority in 
the “troubled societies”. Re-conceptualization of state and statehood demands the 
definition of the state and examination of the basic functions that should be rebuilt. The 
international political theories have long debated about the role of the state. Neo-realists 
believe that, however, the state is the primary unit in the anarchic international system it 
is the passive object of the changes of the international structure. On the other hand, 
liberal thoughts envision the socially-adaptive state, that’s prime directive is to meet the 
economic and social needs of the individuals. The state in general is the “goodwill 
reality” behind the institutions that maintain the frame for governance. The state is 
simultaneously a power structure, as Max Weber defined, and the rule of law that 
maintains order through monopolizing the legitimate use of force. The state has several 
functions since the birth of monarchical power, such as maintaining defense, leading 
foreign affairs, law enforcement, legislation, judiciary, taxation and coinage, and 
improving infrastructure. In the modern era, the state functions and duties expanded to 
cover health care, education, urbanization, traffic, economic development and social 
policies, furthermore the preparation for the post-modern challenges, such as 
environmental protection. (Kende 2003) According to the international law, namely the 
Montevideo Convention from 1935, the sovereign states have to share at least four 
common characteristics: they have to possess a defined territory, rule over a certain 
population, have some form of government, and be recognized under the rules of the 
international law. This definition is fundamentally vague in the 21st century’s 
international political environment. The Convention makes no difference between a 
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state that maintains frames for sustainable development and one that fails to provide 
even the most basic public good: security. 
A new dilemma is whether the effects of globalization can undermine the role of the 
state? It is a fact that on several domains the power of the state is shrinking due to 
globalization, but it is significantly growing on others, such as organizing and 
enhancing research and development or increasing human capital. Despite of the fact 
that the globalization is more powerful process than a state could control, there is no 
evidence, as Stephen Krasner pointed out (1999: 223), that the role of the state is less 
important in development. 
Similarly to state failure, there is no clear definition of statebuilding. However, every 
scholar would agree that the process is fundamentally complex and it is not easy to 
cover all the dimensions and steps which are present. It is not surprising, that each study 
on post-conflict development with comprehensive ambitions has to begin with defining 
the core concepts of statebuilding. On the other hand, the lack of clarity gives freedom 
for scholars as they can redefine the phenomena according to their goals, which is 
eventually reflected in the different approaches of the same topic. It is a prerequisite for 
statebuilding studies to take a position in debates, such as, whether the process of 
statebuilding is sequenced or gradual; or it is simply the parallel existence of many 
interconnected and independent variables. Furthermore, it has to be made clear that 
statebuilding can represent the narrative of either broader or narrower goals, for instance 
the way towards sustainable peace, or for instance the tool for building up functioning 
governments and the attached and necessary institutions. 
Given the fact, that the interventions are responses to emergency situations in 
different contexts, the theoretical explanation and definition is also different according 
to the addressed problem. Robert Belloni (2008) tries to catch the differences of the 
definitions in his article. The interventions can be labeled as peacebuilding, nation-
building, or statebuilding, and main distinction is the scope that they represent. In 
Belloni’s opinion, the broadest category is peacebuilding that covers short term tasks as 
fostering civil society, enhancing economic development, protecting human rights, 
organizing elections, demobilizing soldiers, or reforming the police force. Moreover, 
peacebuilding necessarily represents the process that contains long term tasks, too. The 
long term goal in one word is peace, that is removing the root causes of conflict. The 
peacebuilding concept comes mainly from the general United Nations definition, which 
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was elaborated in Buthros Ghali’s manifesto, the Agenda for Peace. On the other hand, 
nation-building and statebuilding are similar, however, fundamentally different 
processes. They are similar as they intend to build up institutions that serve long term 
development, but they are different as the focus is necessarily different. State and nation 
are not complementary in the 21st century. Building up the state is not simply the (re-
)creation of national ties in the society, whilst the main goal of nation-building is to 
create mechanisms and institutions that reduce the occurrence of statehood problems 
through managing identity conflicts. The three different concepts of the complex 
process are obviously overlapping each other but represent different dimensions of the 
same process. Therefore, the argument of James Dobbins’ group (2008) about the 
definition is at least misleading. However, as there is no common definition in the 
literature, each scholar can use his or her own, but the meaning of phenomena behind 
the process are not as vague. Having in mind that, Dobbins’ argument on using the label 
of the process is lead by the practice can be accepted, but not supported from the 
academic point of view. He argues that the labels nation-building, peacebuilding used 
by the United Nations, stabilization and reconstruction used by the United States, and 
statebuilding used mainly by the European Union to cover the same phenomenon. 
(Dobbins et al 2008) That argument is rather a preventive defense from criticism that is 
a reasonable explanation why nation-building is the term that we should use. It is even 
more questionable if we analyze how Dobbins’ group defined it: nation-building is the 
“use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote durable peace and 
representative government.” (Dobbins et al 2008: XV) This definition rather covers a 
mixture of peace- and institution-building. The recent publication of the International 
Peace Institute defines the process more credibly: the goal of peacebuilding is to reach 
peace that is characterized by the “lack of recurrence of warfare, as well as some 
sustained, national mechanism for the resolution of conflict – signified by participatory 
politics. [Peace…] does not equate to liberal democracy […] but excludes stable, 
authoritarian and clearly illegitimate governments.” (Call 2008a: 6) 
The meaning of peacebuilding is clearly transformed since the end of the Cold War. 
From the 1990s the meaning has expanded to cover from conflict prevention, through 
conflict management to post-conflict reconstruction the entire process. The real 
challenge for peacebuilding is that the United Nations is clearly unable to force peace 
on failed states because of lack of ability to adapt the strategies to the local needs, and 
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the lack of capacities or the disagreement among the members on the mere fact of 
international intervention. (Tschirgi 2004) 
The common feature of post-conflict situations is that the local capacities of 
development are scarce and per definition these countries would probably decay in 
devastating anarchy and violent civil conflict without the help of external factors. In that 
sense, it seems to be quite general which was suggested by William Zartman (1995), 
that these situations are similar considering the necessary factors of how to reach peace. 
The generally considered necessary and basic factor is the existence of the state. In that 
sense, providing peace for the future has to begin with the reconstitution of central 
power and increasing the legitimacy of that. In most of the situations, the new authority 
and the institutions are simply not mature enough to bear the pressure represented by 
the different tasks, and only an international authority can secure that the country 
maintains the level of peace and development. Effective statebuilding needs effective 
and good strategy for development and adequate resources for the process. According to 
Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), the constellation of three different 
factors, level of hostility and violence, the local capacities for development, and the 
international involvement, will determine the outcome of the peacebuilding effort. 
Peacebuilding, however, is complex and there is a necessary sequence in the steps, 
which is interpreted in Doyle and Sambanis’ seven steps plan. (Doyle et al 2006: 338) 
First, the security is the sine qua non of peace, as the secure environment allows people 
to reconstruct their country. Second, regional security must complement the first step, 
that is the external factors are decisive in the final outcome. Third, the peacebuilders 
need to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the local stakeholders and the society by 
achieving “quick wins” through proving that the new situation is better than the life was 
before the process began. It is possible to achieve it by providing food, or basic public 
services that were absent in the previous period. Fourth, the new achievements are only 
sustainable if the institutions are stable. The necessary prerequisite for it is the existence 
of the rule of law. Fifth, protection of property rights gives the material security for the 
people to invest in their future and escape from the vicious circle of living by short term 
demands. Sixth, democracy and wider participation of the people is the pillar that 
provides the necessary information for the decision makers about the needs of the 
society. Finally, the seventh step is to conduct moral and psychological reconciliation 
that makes it possible to exceed the past and build the future together. 
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Compared with peacebuilding, the terms nation-building and statebuilding refer to 
the same process but they are narrower categories than peacebuilding; however, they are 
different at the same time. Usually, both are used to describe the process of institution-
building. Nation-building is rather used by American experts, whilst statebuilding is 
preferred by Europeans. In our view and definition, the two necessitate each other, since 
the lack of societal cohesion undermines the state’s capacity for development and 
identity conflicts give rise to statehood problems. (Belloni 2008: 100-101) European 
history of statebuilding proved clearly that nations can only take roots when states take 
at least minimum measures of response to the needs of the masses. (Ardant 1975: 169) 
As it was mentioned, nation-building is a widely used expression in the (American) 
literature; however, it is clear that the complex missions do not actually aim at building 
up a nation. Several scholars (Ottaway 2002; Fukuyama 2004; Talentino 2004; Etzioni 
2004 etc.) made complaints about the inaccurate use of the concept. On the other hand, 
the defensive phrasing by James Dobbins (Dobbins et al 2008: IV) is adequate, too. 
Namely, not the word is important but the meaning behind it. However, having in mind 
that the era of modern nation-states is challenged by the changes in international order it 
is especially important to differentiate between nation and state. It has to be made clear 
that the outcome of statebuilding will not be a functioning nation-state, rather, even in 
the best case scenario, the institutional frames that a functioning state structure can 
provide. It is true that modern states were born as nation-states, but nation is not 
synonymous to the state anymore. (Ottaway 2002:16) Nevertheless, it is true that pre-
existing nation is a favorable factor for the success of statebuilding. But in Europe, 
nations were forged by “blood and iron” through long wars, under circumstances that 
are not repeatable. On the other hand, the rhetorical message of the word nation-
building is understandable, too. Especially in case of post-colonial states, the 
independence meant also the heritage of weak or non-existent institutional state 
capacities, without the hope of development, which was usually explained by the ethnic, 
religious, and cultural heterogeneity of these entities. (Ottaway 2002:16) The negligent 
use of the term nation-building roots in the simplified Westphalian definition of nation-
state, that does not pay too much attention to the role of ethnic, religious or cultural ties 
in the society; the definition focuses only on the outcome of the process, which is the 
nation. Nation is a modern concept. It evolved from the pre-national relations among the 
different groups. The evolution of these relations also influenced the final characteristic 
of the state. (Smith 1996) 
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Contrary to the nation, the state is a territorial entity, which provides the institutional 
framework for the maintenance of public goods and for influence any event on the 
state’s territory. As a consequence, statebuilding by external actors does not seem to be 
as desperate as creating a nation. However, it is also clear that sustainable development 
of the state necessitates the loyalty of the society towards the state institutions, which is 
more probably present when the nation exists. (Townley 2005:358) Summing up, 
nation-building according to the narrow definition means the creation of linkages 
among the different ethnicities, religions and cultures, in order to make these groups be 
able to live together despite of the differences. Furthermore, nation-building focuses on 
common norms and values and on homogenization of societal approach. (Shah 2003: 
167) While statebuilding aims at reconfiguration of political, economic and societal 
institutions. Strictly speaking the two processes overlap each other, as the institutional 
and territorial frame of nation-building is necessarily the state; moreover the strong 
nation contributes to the stability of the state. Let alone the fact that the term nation-
building is pejorative as it wakes up colonial memories, statebuilding is the most 
adequate label to conclude the different dimensions and steps of complex post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
As the United States’ nation-building approach also puts emphasis on security as a 
sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction, the military presence have been the most 
dominant part of the recent American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
basics of the nation-building approach were laid down in the Winning the Peace Act, 
passed by the Congress and Senate in 2003. The document emphasizes that the leading 
nation of the intervention often needs to conduct de facto trusteeship for a certain period 
of time to be able to assist in defusing civil conflict, building state institutions, 
protecting the state from hostile external influences, or managing the regional spread of 
the conflict. (CSIS 2003) One of the main characteristics of American style nation-
building is that its important goal is to introduce democracy as soon as possible, because 
a representative and responsive government will establish the sound conditions for 
economic growth and general development. (Carson 2003: 2) In addition, in 2005 the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization prepared a 
comprehensive list of “Essential Tasks” in a post conflict situation to serve as basic 
strategy for the Department of State. The five different dimensions of reconstruction are 
security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, 
economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.  
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Similarly to the government of the United States, the relevant international 
organizations are also active in complex statebuilding operations. One of the “oldest” 
institutional tools considered as solution for state failure has been governance 
assistance. The World Bank used it for decades with limited success as the separate 
programs could not address the challenge that follows from the complexity of state 
failure and the necessary sequences and connections among the different steps remained 
unrevealed. Training judges, rewriting criminal codes, increasing fiscal transparency of 
the government, professionalizing the police, encouraging open media, or strengthening 
political parties and monitoring elections all are important part of promoting good 
governance but none of these can solve the problem in itself. Recognizing that, the 
World Bank established a task force in 2002 to elaborate a more complex strategy for 
addressing the special needs of weak states. According to the conclusions, one of the 
most important tasks is to respond extreme poverty during the reconstruction, as poverty 
is the main factor that contributes to the collapse of the economy and the state, which 
generates adverse regional and global consequences.  
The European countries, and most recently the European Union, became more active 
in post-conflict reconstruction projects, too. The European vocabulary prefers to label 
the task statebuilding, to express more the institutional characteristics of the process. 
Not surprisingly, the European countries’ interests have been mainly related to their 
imperial past, and they have been more willing to be engaged in situation in their former 
colonies, because of the felt responsibility or of the intense political, economic or 
societal ties. The European Union’s attitude towards statebuilding has been changed a 
lot during the last 15 years, due to the experienced failure of the United Nations on the 
Balkans. The alternative for the European countries was to participate in NATO led 
missions, but the overwhelming American presence, especially in the decision making 
process, made the Europeans to begin developing a purely European capacity. The 
European Security and Defense Policy used the NATO as a model, and since the 
mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo the European Union appeared as an 
independent actor in statebuilding. Furthermore, the biggest advantage of the European 
Union that it has long experience in successful statebuilding and democratization. After 
the system changes, the European Union became very active in the post-socialist 
Central and Eastern European states; and by setting up the mechanisms of conditionality 
it contributed to the large scale transformation of politics, economy and society. 
However, the integration process is rather “member- statebuilding” it has provided 
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evidence for being the most successful among the statebuilding projects so far. The 
integration process is a complex set of different forces that together influenced the 
candidate states to cooperate in statebuilding. The conditionality and EU-ization of 
these countries were completed by the persuasive pressure of the member states, the 
policy transfer of different NGOs and endowments from the European Union and by the 
leading example of European style institutions. All the applicant countries could be 
forced to implement reforms because of their hoped benefits of full membership of the 
community. (Zaborowski 2003: 16) The Union’s (member-)statebuilding could be 
successful because it prescribed concrete institutional requirements, altered the domestic 
opportunity structures and the institutional context, furthermore, it altered believes and 
expectations of domestic actors. The European Union clearly has advantage in Europe 
and especially on its own periphery, where the promise of membership has appealing 
power. But in other areas, the European Union has only taken responsibility when the 
territory and region were already pacified by other actors in the mission. Compared with 
the other main actors, the United States, or the United Nations, the European Union 
tried to be engaged in less demanding situations, avoiding employing intense military 
force. European governments separate security assistance more sharply from 
development politics as it is done in the United States, which creates the major barrier 
for funding activities that need the presence of security forces. That has a practical 
cause, too. It is extremely difficult for the risk-averse European governments to deploy 
large military forces. Furthermore, the general public in Europe is traditionally adverse 
to the use of armed force if it is not due to strict national security concern, which is 
eventually only self-defense. In theory, the European statebuilding capacities are 
enough for mobilizing broad range of civil-military assets, which would make the 
European Union exceptional, as the NATO does not have real civilian capacity, whilst 
the United Nations always has to fight for finding the resources. But in the reality, the 
European Union has not proved to be better in securing funding for statebuilding 
mission, or able to deploy its civilian capacities outside of the borders of Europe. That is 
the European Union’s missions are almost as poorly staffed as ones of the United 
Nations, compared with the robust American led statebuilding operations. (Dobbins 
2008: 226-232) 
Even if we accept that statebuilding is the necessary and appropriate solution for 
failed statehood several dilemmas remain that make the whole picture obscure. The 
most important dilemma is that the existing international law, which is, or should be the 
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foundation of international order, contradicts the emerging norm of protection of the 
people even from their own government in case it abuses human rights. To be exact, the 
question is who has the right to intervene in domestic politics of a not functioning state 
and rebuild the capacities. Or where is the point when the international community can 
decide that a certain state is failed and lost its ability to practice its sovereignty. An 
interim strategy could be that in the world of functioning states there are already 
examples of “shared sovereignty”. The small and micro states, having the recognition of 
incapability to perform all the state functions by themselves, voluntarily cede parts of 
their full independence. For instance, in case of Andorra or Lichtenstein the providers of 
security are other sovereign states. But on the other hand, sovereignty still means 
exceptional rights over territory that is very profitable in case of natural resources, the 
opportunity for seignorage, or right to access to foreign aid. (Krasner 2009) 
In the 21st century, the traditional approach of sovereignty is contested in more 
dimensions. The globalization makes it more difficult for the states to control certain 
domains of domestic processes through wiping the clear borders of domestic and 
external issues. The emerging norms, such as humanitarian intervention, or the security 
implications of failed states also influence the practice against the maintenance of 
traditional notions. In the last 20 years, there emerged new stages of necessity in 
changing sovereignty. Cases like Rwanda, Sudan, or Kosovo call for preventive 
international actions, showing the importance of international engagement when the 
government is unable or unwilling to uphold even the basic standards of human rights. 
Secondly, the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, London or Mumbai proved that the 
intervention may serve our security interest. The state is not a naturally given axiom for 
provider of control of trans-border events or internal development. (Krasner 1999) 
Finally, Iraq is the practical, however, maybe not the best example, that intervention is 
unavoidable in cases where traditional containment and deterrence cannot help to 
change the destructive foreign policy of a given state.4 (Acharya 2007) Going along the 
argument of Stephen Krasner (1999) the “hypocrisy” of Westphalian sovereignty lies in 
the fact that internal sovereignty has been compromised several times in the history by 
more powerful states, however, the external sovereignty seems to be a rigid cornerstone 
of our contemporary system. External sovereignty is honored more, which is proven by 
the reluctance of the international community to recognize new states even if they have 
the attributes of a functioning state.5  
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The second dilemma is the question of effectiveness of the responses. The reaction of 
the international community can vary strongly due to the fact that there are no clear 
rules only recommendations for emergency situations caused by failed statehood. In a 
very severe situation, the conscious passivity of the international community led to the 
Rwandan genocide. The use of existing influence and pressure on local forces is the 
most common respond in crisis situation, however, we have experienced for instance in 
Haiti that the simple financial assistance cannot work if the state failed and it is unable 
to deliver even the most basic public services. The threat with or use of coercive 
measures are obviously ineffective, too. Coercive diplomacy will definitely fail as it is 
based on the assumption that all states are rational actors. This thinking cannot 
understand the dynamics of a failed state which result in irrational foreign policy 
outcomes. The case was similar when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and the highly 
destructive messianic thoughts were the leading power behind the decisions of the 
regime. (Tarzi: 2005). Finally, the international community can decide to take over 
some functions from the government as part of an intervention. (Debiel 2002: 3) 
On the opposite side of the norm of preserving state sovereignty, there is the demand 
of higher recognition for human security. The complexity of providing human security 
makes it impossible that international processes which aim at promoting human rights 
do not harm sovereignty. The recommendations for policymakers show that human 
rights questions must have primacy over sovereignty. However, the territorial state is 
still the appropriate community for protecting human rights as the state is the only 
possible institutional frame for functioning democratic processes which provide equal 
participation for all citizens in the decision making process. The new debate concludes 
that sovereignty is a responsibility of the given government to protect the citizens. That 
new approach of sovereignty demands also the responsibility of the international 
community to help these states fulfill their role, or in case that the government failed to 
do so, to help respond the crisis situation. (Bellamy 2009b: 195) 
Apart from these major dilemmas which fundamentally influence the outcome of the 
international engagement, there are several other questions, which are related more with 
ongoing post-conflict development exercise. These questions have to be addressed in 
the statebuilding strategy, too. They may seem to be minor technical dilemmas, but the 
success of statebuilding depends on the realization of a good strategy.6   
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The dilemmas and contradictions of practice and theory also come from the different 
conviction of scholars and practitioners about the main sources of development. The era 
of decolonization created the theoretic later political category, the developing world. 
The new countries that fitted in with this label were held similar: backwards developing, 
impoverished agrarian economies with very low quality of physical infrastructure, 
narrow industrial base and minimal organizational and technical skills. Not only the 
outside world, but the newly emerging leaders of these countries had the perceptions 
that convergence to the developed world is only possible through rapid industrialization 
and creation of capital goods, which maximize the economic growth. The consequence 
of this thinking led to the overemphasis of the role of leadership in development and 
negligence of participation of wider public in decision making. For the new leaders, like 
Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, or Kwame Kenyatta in Ghana, the 
example of Soviet style development was attractive and it was a proof that they have to 
follow the path of central planning. The outcome could be seen clearly. The autarchic 
thinking and dependence on the export of primary goods left the governments without 
sufficient revenue for investing in the development.  
The fault is not only of the first leaders but of the international community that had 
little knowledge on the consequences of foreign assistance and still had some feelings of 
civilizatory superiority when the question of development came by. The first theories of 
development, such as Rostow’s “take off” idea, or Gerschenkron’s thoughts about linear 
development, suggested that the underdeveloped countries need only a “Big Push”. 
Leibstein’s version is a bit more sophisticated, but at least as invalid as the others. He 
mentioned that without the “critical minimum effort” these countries would not 
develop. From the 1960s, under the influence of the radical and reformist thoughts, 
several international organizations emphasized that the real cause of underdevelopment 
is that the developing countries are unable to realize profit from international trade, 
because of the deteriorating elasticity of export (Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer), or 
because of the imperialism of trade (Aghiri Emmanuele), and because of the 
international differences of relative wages (Samir Amin). Later the thinking about 
underdevelopment began to focus on the domestic causes, and created the theory of 
vicious circles. The task of the international community in this sense is to help the 
countries to escape from that trap, as the major problem of these states is that they do 
not possess sufficient foreign exchange and domestic capital for development. By the 
end of the 1970s, it turned out that none of the models worked. In 1978, with the 
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publication of the first World Development Report, the World Bank took the role of 
shaping the thinking about underdevelopment, and thought to find the key in “Freeing 
the World from Poverty”. That is the real generator of economic development is the 
development of the agriculture and urbanization because that helps people to escape 
from poverty. (Yusuf 2009) In 2008, the World Bank published its 30th World 
Development Report and, however, the ideas and theories become more and more 
complex, they are still not able to give clear policy recommendations for the 
governments of the developing countries on what to do and for the governments of the 
donor community on how to help. Although, the recipe for development has not been 
found yet, we cannot say that the development economics is not able to contribute to the 
understanding of the causes of underdevelopment. Nevertheless, Gregory Clark (2007) 
noted that since the industrial revolution the economic world is unpredictable and the 
economists are not able to forecast future development. According to him “history 
shows […] that the West has no economic development model to offer the still poor 
countries of the world.” It is clear that the development is a complex process, which 
needs the sound constellation of different factors and dimension, such as the external 
and domestic conditions, the effective state and the functioning market and not only the 
automatic outcome of economic growth. (Stiglitz et al 2001) Until the mid 1980s, most 
of the development economists, from the modernization school to the dependency 
theories, believed in the uniformity of the developing world. This was the basis of 
unconditional faith in progress through re-making societies and faith in the role of the 
nation-state in the development process. (Schnurman 2000) 
Today’s development models clearly promote values beyond economic growth. The 
growing number of international intervention, mainly by the United Nations, promoted 
democratic norms through assisting in the creation of new constitutions, organizing 
elections, or helping the creation of civil society. The pillars of the model of democratic 
reconstruction are: first, the earlier mentioned Agenda for Peace; second, Johan 
Galtungs work on conflict management, that emphasizes that peace is only maintainable 
if all the dimensions beyond and below the state are managed; third, the new emphasis 
on the convergence of democratization and statebuilding, as both hold liberal 
presumptions about the open ended development in that the role of the local 
participation is crucial. However, democratization rather underlines the “bottom up” 
development, whilst statebuilding is rather optimistic in the positive role of the 
international actors. (Call et al 2003) 
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Along with the pillars, two distinctive approaches emerged on the field of 
development. First, the political approach emphasizes the political processes, such as 
elections, political institutions, or political parties, and it strives to convince the decision 
makers to channel aid through political development as it will lead to general economic 
wellbeing in the future. The easiest way to generate development is democratic 
transition for which the sound tool is to aid local democrats. Second, the broader 
developmental approach does not simply focus on political institutions or democracy; 
rather it believes the importance of good governance and its connections to general 
socio-economic features. Democracy in this approach is not a value in itself, but the tool 
for achieving more equal economic conditions. (Carothers 2009) 
Parallel to the above mentioned discourses, the debate on the role of the state has 
intensified. However, it is beyond doubt that the importance of the state in development 
has not decreased. As Robert Gilpin notes, there is “strong evidence to support the idea 
that states must be very involved in economic development”. (Gilpin 2001: 331) From 
this point of view, development depends on the effectiveness of the state, for which 
there is a need that the state activities and capabilities are in balance, the public 
institutions function and the level of corruption is low. In case that this requisites are not 
present the development is only possible if the country goes through a complex 
transformation of the state, politics, economy and society. (Gilpin 2001: 332) 
In our world, states face numerous challenges that question the existence of them, 
these challenges are the growing global network and influence of international 
organizations, internationally active civil society and transnational companies, the 
global economy and rules of the market. However, another commonly mentioned fact, 
that the state is unable to prevent ethnic conflicts, is rather the pro argument for the 
state, as the inability stems not from the state but from its absence or the lack of the 
capacities. Robert Gilpin points out that the existence of the state is not in danger, 
because the consequences of globalization are exaggerated and we still live in a “state 
dominated world” (Gilpin 2001: 363) The globalization is limited in geographic scope 
and is different in certain areas of the economy. The real globalized world is limited to 
Europe, North America and Pacific Asia. Moreover, this world is globalized only in the 
sense that these states lost more sovereignty here, but mainly in the financial processes, 
as the cost of labor still differs, and the prices of goods do so, too. Even if the state loses 
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its sovereignty in certain areas it gains new importance in others. Concluding this 
argument, the state still definitely has an important role in the developing world.   
 
 
The dilemma of the post-modern age: democratization or 
statebuilding  
 
 
The new effort of looking for the nexus between democracy and statebuilding 
already indicates the aspiration of the academia for being able to describe the necessary 
preconditions and prerequisites of the whole process. The real dilemma is whether the 
process consists of sequenced steps or it is rather a gradual development. More experts7 
share the opinion that immature democratization in failed states will lead further violent 
conflicts. On the other hand we also have to acknowledge that the history proved – as 
Fukuyama (2004:53) mentioned – that not the democratization but the birth of modern 
states was accompanied by violent events.  
Nevertheless, it is still easy to get under the influence of the argument that 
democratization (or statebuilding) is necessarily sequenced. We can conclude that it is 
more important to build up a stable and functioning state structure than democracy. 
Namely, the stable state and economic development – it is a fact that in authoritarian 
regimes economic development is faster in short term – will create assurance for the 
evolution of democracy and rule of law. Furthermore, the stable system is prerequisite 
of development – as O’Donnell (2007) also phrased – due to the fact that democracy is 
the permanent lack of something more, which means that an unstable democracy cannot 
carry the burden of the permanent political, economic and societal demand. After 
establishing stable environment, the human desire for development will force the 
development of democracy. In this sense, the first sequence is unfolding the opportunity 
that lies in democracy: the human hope for something more and better. Furthermore, as 
Thomas Carothers (2007:9-10) wrote, in countries that are not ready for democracy the 
forced transformation would lead towards more severe problems. Edward Mansfield 
and Jack Snyder call this phenomenon “turbulent democratization” (2005b) that usually 
draws the country back to civil war. If somebody gives voice to skepticism, it would not 
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be surprising, as strictly following this argument it would mean that the world’s most 
populated democracy, India would be still in the foyer of the “democratic theater”. The 
reasoning seems to be tautological that prerequisite for sustainable democracy is the 
democratic past, but it is not false since this past can mean also the functioning state 
institutions and the rule of law. In broader sense, the rule of law is the “Trojan horse of 
democracy”.  
On the other hand, the reasoning8 that urges gradual development is also convincing. 
Gradualism is based on the recognition that an authoritarian regime, however stable it 
is, is rather the barrier of democratic transition. It is due to the general nature of 
authoritarian power: the possibility that the leader resigns after a lost democratic 
election is low, we only have to think about Zimbabwe. Of course, there are some 
factors that help the development of democracy but they are not to be held as 
prerequisites. In this sense, democratization should go hand in hand with statebuilding, 
and the international community must not spend decades with waiting for the ripe 
moment of democratization. 
Considering both views and keeping in mind the lessons from statebuilding 
operations, both sequencing and gradualism appears during planning the complex 
process. However, the question immediately emerges how it is possible? It is obvious 
that a democratic state cannot be born in chaotic circumstances. In the reality a failed 
state is an “institutional wasteland” (Mansfield et al 2007), where several not 
functioning and backwashing institutions are present without having any linkages to 
each other. The articulated societal demand in a failed state is even more dangerous, and 
in case the state cannot satisfy it, it will turn to “bad institutions” such as warlords or 
organized criminal groups, which will hinder the development of democratic state in the 
end.  
In this sense, the birth of a democratic and functioning state depends on the societal 
demand that must not be influenced by the question of everyday survival of the people. 
That is indeed a prerequisite. Without the satisfaction of basic human needs, it makes no 
sense to continue the process and for instance forcing democratic elections. We only 
have to think about a person who lives among the circumstances of civil war and who 
will not search for the satisfaction of his or her “democratic desire” but for the survival.9 
The other sequences influence rather the quality and the speed of the process. 
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The process of statebuilding is a complex system of interconnected dimensions and 
steps. From the recommendations that can be found in the literature it is obvious that 
there are several dimensions that interact during the process. Certain studies may focus 
more on certain specific dimensions, but the convincing argument of other studies 
shows that there are no dimensions that are more important during the whole timeline of 
statebuilding. It is beyond doubt that security is the absolute basis for future 
development, but it does not necessary mean that only the security dimension is 
important during the first step or the whole period of the process. The external 
consequences of state failure, regional security concerns, and the often needed 
international military presence, and on the other hand the domestic capacities for peace, 
such as the level of hostility, all influence the peace. That is there are at least two other 
dimensions; although, we have examined only the security level yet. Interconnectedness 
also responds why democracy cannot be the immediate goal of statebuilding. As most 
of the studies on democratic transition agree that democracy cannot develop under 
unfavorable conditions, it is understandable that these conditions are not always present 
during the statebuilding exercise. Introducing early elections or forcing democratic 
power-sharing structures proved to be failed and counterproductive strategies. The goal 
of statebuilding should be the elaboration of basic prerequisites of democracy and the 
creation of secure environment for future democratization, but not the democratization 
itself. Democracy is the outcome of a longer process of complete transformation of 
politics, economy and society. Democratic transitions failed in countries, mostly in the 
former Soviet Union, where the capacity of the state was not enough to guarantee the 
sound environment, or even the state was the biggest barrier in front of the expansion of 
popular participation in the political decision making processes. Marina Ottaway 
concludes in her book about Africa’s new leaders that, however desirable the quick 
transformation was, the reality usually dictated different strategies. Democracy in the 
eyes of these new leaders meant potential danger of destruction of the whole 
development process. As democracy presupposes functioning and capable state that 
creates the necessary conditions for democratic development, the quick democratization 
in the poor African states could lead to collapse rather than to a liberal democracy. 
(Ottaway 1999b: 2-6) However convincing Ottaway’s argument is, it is difficult to 
judge whether the relative success of the new leaders of Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
could have been achieved under democratic conditions. The future will answer the 
question in these cases, whether they are really able to use the economic development 
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for introducing democracy.10 The need of established control over the territory of the 
state (Ottaway 1999a) for successful statebuilding is beyond question, however, it is not 
the dilemma of sequence between democracy and developing authoritarianism. Without 
denying that democracy can serve as a basis for development, we have to agree with 
Ottaway that in certain situation too rapid democratization is rather counterproductive. 
Not only the mentioned three states have performed relatively better than their 
neighbors, but one of the key features of the Asian Tigers was that they were not 
democratic. Furthermore, the authoritarian leaders of these countries preserved their 
legitimacy in the eyes of their own population and the international community by 
referring the rapid economic development and increasing standards of wellbeing of the 
society. 
Beyond the dilemma, whether democracy is an organic part of statebuilding, the 
question of the sequence of the different steps divides the scholars on this field. As 
James Dobbins’ research group notes there is a need to set priorities in statebuilding. 
They emphasize that the different dimensions have to develop in tandem but there is a 
necessary list of tasks and without finishing them the whole exercise can be undone. 
(Dobbins et al 2007: 1-18) 
 
 
 
Different models of statebuilding 
 
 
The complexity of post-conflict situation is characterized by the large number of 
different suggestion on what steps statebuilding should consist of. Robert Rotberg 
highlighted (2003: 94) that it is easier to prevent failure, than rebuild a state from the 
ground. Both projects have to pay attention to the following dimensions: security and 
order; bureaucracy and secured state revenues; judicial and court system; education; 
health care; and infrastructure. The initial neoconservative American reaction to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks was an engagement in complex statebuilding operations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the over-weighted security dimension in the 
intervention have not allowed the healthy present of technical development questions. 
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Francis Fukuyama (2004) puts more emphasis on the role of the state as the system of 
different institutions, because the restructuring of the roles of old institutions and 
building of new ones can secure the healthy equilibrium between the effectiveness and 
strength of state institutions and the scope of those. Statebuilding, however, will be only 
successful, if domestic demand for the new institutions is present. In the reality, this 
demand is manifested vis-à-vis bad governance and weak institutions in most cases. 
Increasing the demand for good institutions and good governance is one of the most 
important tasks of statebuilding regarding future sustainability. According to Amitai 
Etzioni’s argument (2004), statebuilding has at least three different dimensions: the 
unification of disparate ethnic groups, democratization, and economic development. The 
birth of new identities eventually contributes to the formation of the state itself. 
Complex statebuilding necessitates the creation of a territorial entity that provides 
goods and services simultaneously to the manifestation of a legal and sociological idea 
that connects people. That is, complex statebuilding means the construction of state and 
nation at the same time. The same institution that secures the adequate functioning of 
the state can contribute to the deepening of societal ties. (Townley 2005: 358-359) As 
usually the available resources, time and capabilities do not make the realization of the 
ideal typical strategy possible, there is a need for set up hierarchical timeline for the 
tasks. “Environment shaping” in the sense as Elon Weinstein and Keith Tidball (2007: 
69) used in their article means deselecting certain tasks and prioritize others to avoid the 
failure of the statebuilding process. They also emphasize that, however, state failure 
events are unique in the different states, there are strikingly similar challenges in post-
conflict situations, at least considering the necessary strategy. “Environment shaping” in 
this sense means finding the effective strategy of statebuilding by defining the ideal 
environment for growth and identify the “critical path” that leads to it. (Weinstein et al 
2007: 76; Pei et al 2006: 68-69; Dobbins et al 2008: 1-18) This approach resembles with 
Kofi Annan’s ideas (In Larger Freedom 2005) according to which the goal has to be the 
creation of necessary conditions for sustainable development. 
Statebuilding is necessarily sequenced process but sequences do not represent the 
priority of one dimension over others, rather they show which of the dimensions 
dominates the step whilst other are similarly important as the interconnectedness of the 
dimensions means that one step backwards in one dimension withholds the development 
in other dimensions, as well. The goal of the present work is not to pick one or two 
  
46 
 
cases of a statebuilding exercise and criticizes the interveners and the domestic 
stakeholders because of the failures of the different steps and missed opportunities. The 
goal is rather to draw a more comprehensive picture on the connection between the 
different steps and dimensions in a new framework. To differentiate the steps and divide 
the dimensions there are more opportunities. 
First there is the opportunity to analyze the historical examples of statebuilding and 
getting a general picture about the practice. Second, the analysis and comparison of 
existing normative models of statebuilding and practical lists of different tasks show 
how the literature is thinking about the same questions.  
 
 
The historical examples 
 
Several experts and scholars have tried to build up analogies between past 
experiences with statebuilding and the recent projects. The effort is useful as it flashes 
on several factors of the complexity of the process, but we have to keep it in mind that 
the context of statebuilding and the surrounding circumstances are decisive. For 
instance, the terminology that the literature and “statebuilders” use was created in 
Europe. The meaning of state and nation was formed as social construction, which 
differs in other political, societal or cultural contexts. With small exaggeration, the 
meaning of modern state and nation developed since the fall of the Western Roman 
Empire in 476. The time passed between that date and the Peace of Westphalia created 
the conditions for the birth of modern nations and states. The common basis for state 
making in Europe were the abundant raw materials, the cultural homogeneity, the single 
church and religion, the strong and hierarchical societal structures. Peasantry based 
society overcame the tribal cleavages, moreover due to the formal equality of lords, the 
political structure was decentralized, giving rise to the concept of sovereignty. (Tilly 
1975a: 18) 
In the history of the Westphalian states, the birth of state and nation was always 
inter-connected. The state shaped the political nation as it happened in England or 
France, or the already existing nation built up a state as it was the case in Germany or 
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Italy. The processes of statebuilding and nation-building were parallel. Whilst the state 
formed its functions and defined its territory, the “Gemainschaft” of people was forged 
from self-consciousness of a common nationality. Beyond that, nationality gained 
another dimension, that the members mutually distribute and share duties and benefits. 
(Finer 1975: 87-88) 
Ab ovo, the evolution of modern nation-states is Western process, which happened in 
three stages during the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe. The main difference between 
the stages is the relation between nation and state. The first stage experienced the birth 
of nations in already existing states. The nations were born after violent events, civil 
wars or revolutions. These violent processes were characterized by the emergence of a 
strong middle class that took power from the aristocracy, also reorganizing the state 
itself. Nationality manifested in the belief in the new state and institutions, the ethnic or 
language ties were subordinated the loyalty towards the political nation. Barry Buzan 
(1991: 72) labeled these states very aptly “state-nations”, because as in the United States 
or Australia, beyond the former examples, the state created the nation. The state 
consolidated its territory by monopolizing the means of coercion and centralized its 
power differentiating itself from other states. (Tilly 1975a: 27) Finally, the nation 
became the source of legitimacy for the state. (Kiss J. 2003: 17) The existing state gave 
rise to the nation than the nation reshaped the state. The second stage of state formation 
witnessed the strengthening of stateless nations that finally seized their own sovereign 
territory. The birth of the nation preceded the birth of the state, the existing pre-national 
ties, ethnic, language or historical connections meant the glue in the national process of 
state-making. (Hobsbawn 1997:129-165) The nations played the major role in giving 
rise to the state. The first example for the connection between nation-building and 
homogenization was the product of the third stage. Multinational states consisted of two 
or more complete nations, where imperialism meant the dominance of certain nation(s) 
over the rest. The situation threatened with break up since the establishment of these 
empires, especially as part nation-states were present on the sovereign territory. In 
Central Europe, several states were born next to the borders of multinational empires, 
the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy or the Turkish Empire, increasing the appeal of 
secessionism at the end of the 19th century. Despite of this fact, the new states were 
formed only on the ruins of these fallen empires. The new states were born in a power-
vacuum, as the genuine goal of nationalist movements was rather the opposition of the 
ruling elite within the existing state structure than state-making. Moreover, the 
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secession was rather the result of the First World War. (Kiss J. 2003:17-18; Hobsbawn 
1997:129-165) 
Not surprisingly the states from the first stage were most active during colonization, 
as colonization overlapped chronologically the second and third stages of state-making 
in Europe. However, colonization differed fundamentally, and represented a new kind 
of statebuilding. The colonizers forced their own administrational and institutional 
structures on the artificial territories, where neither nation nor state had existed in the 
Western sense. The external coercion shaped the state structure that copied the 
European standards, without helping the development of societal cohesion. 
Furthermore, the fierce strife for colonies led to the arbitrary partition of most part of 
Asia and Africa. The colonial societies got the model of Western nation-states as tie-in. 
Thus, the governing elite and the colonial administration worked on a statebuilding 
project that completely disregarded the local conditions. The neglected importance of 
societal loyalty towards the new institution paid off after the colonizing powers left. The 
complete failure of the state was only, if at all, avoidable through increasing violence 
and oppression by the government. The newly independent countries, with few 
exceptions, such as India, were unable to tackle the challenge of substantive 
statebuilding and nation-building. It is not surprising, as the original theories of 
statebuilding have been based on European experiences. (Tilly 1975c: 603) The 
complexity of the new situations was revealed by the statebuilding projects after the 
Second World War in Africa and Asia. 
The maintenance of the elite’s power was secured by the colonial institutions, that is 
why the elite was interested in keeping the structures, which hindered the general 
development. (Herbst 1996:120) Nevertheless, due to the Cold War this “development 
paradox” could not stimulate real actions by the international community. The 
Westphalian sense of sovereignty and the bipolar world did not let too much space for 
understanding the differences in the development opportunities of former colonies. 
Despite of the vast number of economically motivated theories of underdevelopment, 
the core was rather political. Pre-colonial sovereignty, especially in Africa meant a rule 
over a certain population, and the colonizers forced the territorial sovereignty over the 
colonies. Due to this fact the emergence of secessionism and violent ethnic conflicts 
during decolonization was not surprising. (Herbst 1996: 123-136; Gurr 1994: 347) 
Because of the fact that the attention of international politics did not focus on the 
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problems of newly independent states, former colonizers had more space to try to 
influence statebuilding projects. This kind of assistance was rather the product of sheer 
geo-strategic interest than felt paternalistic responsibility. The interventions that aimed 
at strengthening the influence were often hidden behind humanitarian façade in order to 
find legitimacy. (Lumsden 2003: 802) Nonetheless, both the former colonizers and the 
local elites were aware of the fact that “national” loyalty has to be built up in order that 
the regime can sustain. The large scale nation-building projects attempted to overcome 
ethnic cleavages by creating new “national” flags, anthems, holidays and sometimes a 
common language. The later meant in the most cases making the language of the former 
colonizer as official. However, the national identity has not been able to take root 
deeply in the society and overcome the pre-nationalist, ethnic and tribal identities.  
History experienced, however, two successful statebuilding projects, that appear 
without exception in all studies that examine statebuilding. (eg. Dobbins et al 2004; 
Fukuyama 2004c; Jennings 2003; Krasner 2004) Rebuilding Germany11 and Japan after 
the Second World War were beyond doubt  success stories of the intervening powers, 
especially of the United States. This fact generated a misleading wave in the literature 
which tried to set up analogies between these two cases and the modern statebuilding 
projects. The fundamentally different historical context and the fact that Germany and 
Japan inherited strong political, economic and societal structures has made the success 
of these analogies dubious. However, both Germany and Japan carried several examples 
that helped understand the dynamics of statebuilding better. Both countries were on the 
verge of total collapse that followed the smashing victory of the Allied Powers. The 
most immediate challenge was the collapse of the economy, which narrowed the 
opportunities of the occupation. The necessary robust presence of foreign military, 
especially in Germany, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former 
combatants, the transitional justice, and economic development through the Marshall 
Plan all contributed to the success. (Dobbins et al 2004:10) Germany and Japan 
regained their sovereignty gradually, for instance Germany became sovereign only in 
1990 after the reunion. The success of statebuilding in Germany and Japan is due to the 
fact that foreign powers met special conditions, which determined the outcome. This led 
to the general recognition in the literature that favorable factors are important, if not 
prerequisites of statebuilding. In case of Germany and Japan, the strong national unity 
existed well before the war, which minimized the possibility of civil war, which is one 
of the main challenges in the recent statebuilding projects. The moral legitimacy of the 
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intervening powers was unquestioned by the German or Japan society. Moreover, both 
countries were industrialized before and all segments of the society were interested in 
rebuilding the state. The high general level of education and technological know-how 
made the society able to participate in the statebuilding as equal partner. Finally, the 
societies were perfect market for liberal democracy. (Dempsey 2001; Dobbins et al 
2004: 10-18) 
The Soviet type statebuilding projects are logically connected to the Cold War and 
resemble in many features to colonization. The fall of the Soviet Union, just like to 
decolonization, opened the door for large scale secessionism. Despite of the fact that the 
experiences of Soviet statebuilding cannot be used as analogy in the recent attempts, 
nobody can doubt that the Soviet Union tried consequently to build up communist states 
in its interest-zone. However, the Soviet Union never endeavored in modern nation-
building; rather it tried to transform the identity of the whole socialist block. Russian 
language emerged as lingua franca, which was also supported by the obtrusive 
reorganization of the educational systems. Nevertheless, the soviet type elite never 
oppressed the national identities; they even propagated the national traditions if it was in 
line with the communist ideology. That was only possible because national identity lost 
from its significance, since the common communist ideology was the supranational tie 
among people and nations. The Soviet leaders never attempted to erase national 
identities, their goal was to depoliticize it and create the unity on the basis of socialism, 
however, the socialist elite took enormous effort to avoid that national feelings 
overcome the central ideology and nationalism become the defiant of communism. 
(Kornai 1997) That is why it was possible to hold together different nationalities in 
multinational states for decades. (Liber 2003) Statebuilding meant the copy of the 
Soviet institutions, the contractors of this “construction” were always the local 
communist parties and the Soviet army and later the Warsaw Pact guaranteed the 
security for the process. The post-socialist era revealed the internal contradiction of the 
process. The latent and frozen conflicts of the multinational states ended in 
secessionism and violent civil wars. On the other hand, socialist statebuilding had 
positive consequences, too. Especially in the Central European countries, the post-
socialist democratic transition could build on existing and strong institutions and state 
structures. (Goshulak 2003: 491; Grzymala 2002: 546-548) 
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Soon in the 1980s, the goal of the two superpowers was to back out from their local 
allies in the African, Asian and Latin-American civil wars. That was only possible, 
without losing the position, if the domestic stability of the countries had been secured. 
Thus, the 1980s already experienced some sort of stabilization missions, however, not at 
the scale or scope of the post-Cold War missions. (Dobbins et al 2005: 18) Intervention 
in weak states became the post-Cold War response to domestic fragmentation and 
conflict. The experiences of the 1990s made it clear that statebuilding is not equal to 
democratic elections. Bosnia was one of the first examples for the new challenges. 
Securing sustainable peace has been unbreakably connected to institutional reordering 
of the state on the basis of foreign military presence. Bosnia already was a failed state at 
the moment of signing the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 and the lack of international 
experience with such was reflected in the weakness of the interim administration. The 
United Nations through the Office of the High Commissioner was responsible for 
mediation among the warring parties, whilst the NATO guaranteed the peace with 
establishing the IFOR and later the SFOR. Furthermore, the United Nations also 
contributed to the maintenance of security through the International Police Task Force 
under the aegis of UNMBIH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina). The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was responsible for 
protecting political rights, while the Council of Europe for protecting human rights. 
Moreover, the European Union focused on governance and state efficiency. Thus the 
international governance cavalcade eventuated in the lack of accountability and 
legitimacy; furthermore none of the international organizations really possessed 
executive power in the statebuilding process. (Caplan 2004:56-63; Talentino 2002:28-
33) The problem was not the lack of international willingness in contributing to the 
solution, but the lack of relevant knowledge, resources and coordination. 
The contradiction between the changed international order in the 1990s and the 
available international options for response was more obviously reflected in Kosovo. 
The NATO intervention began without UN Security Council authorization, but the 
Security Council Resolution 1244 mandated the statebuilding despite of the fact that 
under the international law the military intervention was illegitimate. The uniqueness of 
Kosovo’s case was that Kosovo was part of an independent and sovereign state. 
Similarly to Bosnia the United Nations, the European Union, the NATO, the OSCE and 
several other organizations participated in statebuilding. However, Kosovo declared its 
independence in 2008, the success of statebuilding is rather questionable. According to 
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personal experiences, Kosovo still lacks the resources for development; however, the 
people are willing to participate in the constructive process. The international presence 
is vast which has several negative side effects, mainly because it consumes the space 
from local initiatives. The young state is not mature enough and it does not help, either, 
that several countries have not recognized Kosovo’s independence. 
The interveners after the Cold War had to focus on building sustainable peace in the 
long term by addressing and removing the root causes of conflict. The most important 
international institution in this sense is the system of peacekeeping operations of the 
United Nations. The legal basis of the United Nations’ peacekeeping activity is 
somewhere between the Chapter VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Peacekeeping is a special area between use of force and absolute sovereignty of the 
sates. After the Cold War, the practice moved further towards the Chapter VII, and the 
peace missions became multidimensional and post-conflict reconstruction became 
integral part of the activity. The first milestone in this evolution was Boutros Gali’s 
manifest, the Agenda for Peace in 1992. The agenda already mentioned political and 
societal institution building as key components of a peace mission. Another 
fundamental change was the appearance of democracy as an ideal form of a post-
conflict system. The Agenda for Democracy emphasized in 1995 that democracy 
decreases the probability of war and of domestic violence carried out by the state. Belief 
in democracy completed the conviction that sustainable peace is only possible, as the 
Agenda of Development notes, when the development of the country is ensured in the 
long term. The multi dimensional missions were labeled third generation peacekeeping 
missions by the United Nations and they already focused on different steps of complex 
statebuilding. (Karns et al 2004:85) 
The new missions were pioneers also in the sense that they compromised the 
question of sovereignty by establishing interim authorities on the territories of post-
conflict states. The new missions, such as the UNAMIC (United Nations Advance 
Mission in Cambodia), or the ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Group in El 
Salvador) proved to be more effective than former attempts. (Doyle et al 1997; Thayer 
1998:145-165) But the United Nations was obviously not prepared for whole scale 
statebuilding in a failed state, like Somalia. Both the UNOSOM I (United Nations 
Operation in Somalia) between 1992 and 1993 and the UNOSOM II between 1993 and 
1995 were total failure. The United Nations intervened in a situation where peace was 
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nonexistent and the United Nations was unable to make it. After the withdrawal of 28 
thousand US troops the mission had neither the financial resources nor the military 
strength enough to continue peacebuilding. Moreover, the total lack of interoperability 
between the different nations which participated in the mission led to the end of 
UNOSOM I. Later, UNOSOM II was exclusively mandated for protect humanitarian 
aid. Somalia contributed to the skepticism about the United Nations’ ability to carry out 
complex peace building missions. However, few cases, such as UNTAES (United 
Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia) between 1996 and 1998, or 
the UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) between 
1999 and 2002, proved that the United Nations is not completely impotent with peace 
building missions, but we should not forget the fact that rebuilding a populous failed 
state, like Somalia, is a fundamentally different task. It demonstrated that robust 
military component is necessary in peacebuilding, whilst neither the logic of the United 
Nations mission nor their resources have been ready for it yet. (Dobbins et al 2005:20) 
The United Nations has concluded 19 complex peacekeeping operations since the 
end of the Cold War, from which 10 has been conducted in Africa. Despite of the vast 
criticism in the literature, the practice in Africa still reflects flawed assumptions. First, 
that the Western institutions can work in Africa, and simple institution-building is the 
way forward. Second, the reconstruction efforts can build on the cooperation between 
donors and leaders. That is obviously false as in several cases the elite of the country is 
rather interested in maintaining the failure of the state, as it is more profitable for them. 
Third, the donors are able to provide the necessary material and immaterial resources 
for statebuilding. The practice rather showed that without the interest of the local elite, 
the local ownership of the process will be not sufficient enough, and without the 
appropriate international involvement the success is not guaranteed, either. (Englebert et 
al 2008) 
As the simultaneous terrorist attacks changed the picture about failed states, 
statebuilding projects became more security oriented. The exam for the international 
community was and is Afghanistan and Iraq. As the available experiences before 2001 
could not prepare the interveners for the consequences of interventions, the resources 
for carrying out the complex statebuilding were not sufficient. Moreover, the 
international community and especially the United States have been engaged 
simultaneously in two fundamentally different missions. Afghanistan has been a failed 
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state since the mid 1970s on the other hand Iraq de facto only collapsed due to the 
intervention. Both cases proved that a complex statebuilding project necessarily has 
different dimensions, and these dimension have to develop simultaneously, whilst they 
influence each other. 
 
 
The normative models and practical checklists of statebuilding 
 
As we already mentioned, during the last five years there were born several valuable 
contribution to the theory of statebuilding. On the other hand, there are several 
comprehensive documents which focus on the technical and practical details of 
statebuilding by providing a checklist of the necessary tasks in different dimensions and 
during the timeline of the process. The most useful and detailed ones are the Post-
Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks prepared by the United States Department of 
State in 2004; and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework published jointly 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the 
United States Army (AUSA). The two documents are strikingly similar as both of them 
divide the timeline of the statebuilding process in three different phases: initial 
response; transformation; and fostering sustainability. It is also important that both 
documents share the opinion, that all dimensions are important in every phase. The 
dimensions are also very similar but this fact is not surprising as the State Department’s 
contribution builds on the former works of the CSIS, especially on the one mentioned 
here. Both documents believe that the most important dimensions are security, 
governance, justice and economy; however, of course they use different labels. 
Moreover, the newer document divides the economy into humanitarian and social, and 
economic and infrastructural dimensions. 
The World Bank’s effort to contribute with its own document is also worth to 
mention. The Integrated Recovery Planning published in 2007 also emphasizes the 
special consequences of statebuilding in the political, security, economic and societal 
dimensions. 
Focusing on the practice gives clear policy recommendations for the decisionmakers, 
but it fails to evaluate the consequences of certain interventions in different dimensions, 
  
55 
 
or the connections and linkages among the steps and dimensions. The goal of the above 
mentioned documents were different, but the normative models in the literature give 
more space for imagining the possible outcomes of different statebuilding exercises. 
However, we have to keep in mind that normative models may fail on the trial of 
reality. The goal of normative models is not to give blueprints for politicians, but to 
develop the thinking about the causes and consequences. The think tanks and the 
different working groups can build on these models, and as in the case of the above 
mentioned documents, make the models more useful in certain given situation for 
politicians. Normative models are good basis for academic debates and give new 
directions for future researches by helping understand the big process and 
interconnectedness of the world around us better. 
Among others, Francis Fukuyama’s influential book on statebuilding that was 
published in 2004 tries to answer the question why statebuilding is necessary in our 
contemporary world and what the factors of success are. Fukuyama notes (2004: 5) that 
despite of the fact that many international organizations, most importantly the World 
Bank, promoted state-reducing agenda in the 1990s, the state is on the rise in the 21st 
century because the state is the provider of order, law, security, prosperity and human 
rights which are the basic foundations of modern economy. The states can differ 
according to the strength and scope of state institutions. The goal of statebuilding is to 
present the best constellation of these dimensions in order to provide economic 
development. The statebuilding process and the outcome both depend on the interaction 
of the supply of and the demand for the institutions. The supply is built up by the public 
administration; the design of the political system, such as the parliament, the 
constitution; the basis of legitimization of the system; and cultural and structural factors, 
such as the norms and values that shape people’s decisions. The last factor also 
influences the demand side of statebuilding, giving explanation why it is not easy to 
transplant institutions from a society to another. The demand side is critical because the 
institutional development will not take roots without existing demand for the 
institutions. The challenge is that “good institutions” cannot always create their own 
demand. The classical economic theorem of Adam Smith, according to which the 
supply generates its own demand, will not work here. The history of the European states 
shows that the generator of statebuilding was in most cases an external shock, such as 
war, or economic crises. Successful statebuilding exercises were only experienced when 
the strong domestic demand began to shape the supply. In poor countries, the demand is 
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nonexistent or generates incentives for destructive elements, such as warlords and 
criminal or terrorist groups, which are the providers of public services. In these cases, 
the demand should be generated by an external actor. The three phases of statebuilding 
are the different situations where the intervention should be also different: first, post-
conflict reconstruction is necessary where the state authority collapsed due to domestic 
armed conflict; second, creation of self-sustaining institutions; third; strengthening 
weak states. (Fukuyama 2004) 
Simon Chesterman’s (2004) work already “pushed the envelope” by thinking about 
the change of the basis of the international law and order. The main question of his book 
is, whether it is possible to establish conditions for legitimate and sustainable national 
governance through a period of benevolent foreign autocracy. However, it is 
questionable how we can define “benevolent”, since a foreign autocracy, and not a 
simple authority, may fail to respond the local needs as there are no real feedbacks. 
Furthermore, we are skeptic as the history showed that where the foreign intervener 
enjoyed limitless power, they tried to impose their own rules and institutions on the 
local society, like Napoleon did so at the beginning of the 19th century, or Stalin in a 
much larger scale during the 20th century. On the other hand, we cannot affirm that all 
the historical cases prove that foreign undemocratic authority is unable to contribute to a 
positive outcome in the long term, but, having in mind that today the goal is not to build 
stable autocratic allies, thus, the ends are in contradiction with the means. However, 
Chesterman (2004: 1) is right when he notes that statebuilding is the mixture of idealism 
and realism, as we believe that people can be changed through reforming institutions, 
developing education, or providing economic incentives, but we accept the necessity of 
a military intervention to secure the environment to the fulfillment of the former goals. 
New interventionism has to aim at the consequences of state failure, that is the 
intervention is not only humanitarian, but goes beyond the traditional peacekeeping 
notion and covers the task of rebuilding the government of the given country. 
Chesterman (2004: 4) also notes that the literature should not use the expression nation-
building as it is pejorative in the post-colonial context, but nation-building is as 
important part of statebuilding as to reconstruct the highest institutions of governance in 
a territory, that is the state. However, the literature often mentions the experiences from 
the post World War II reconstruction of Germany and Japan, the problem with the 
practice is that the failure of using historical resonances leads to ad hoc operations. As 
generals are said that they re-fight the former wars, the case is similar with 
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statebuilding, too. For instance, the Kosovo-strategy was designed by using the 
experiences drawn from Bosnia. Finally, Chesterman emphasizes (2004: 234) that the 
focus of interventions should not be forcing democracy, rather establishing security, 
building institutions, developing economy. 
Similarly to Chesterman, Stephen Krasner (2004) questions the traditional notion of 
sovereignty in his article, and suggests new forms of solution by introducing shared 
sovereignty. He mentions that collapsed governments are unable to rebuild the state 
capacities and the consequences of state failure can be even severe without external 
help, although, sometimes the external intervention is that triggers the collapse. History 
has proved that diplomacy and the media is only effective in the world of functioning 
states, but rebuilding a failed state is not an easy task. The solution could be to choose 
de facto trusteeship techniques but the heavy reminiscence of colonialism makes the 
reluctance with this option understandable. The way forward is when a recognized 
domestic actor voluntarily contracts with foreign powers on a specific issue, that is the 
domestic actor shares its sovereignty and accepts the diminished autonomy, because it 
believes that the foreign power can help to rebuild its sovereignty in the long term. The 
experience of postwar Germany proves that the Adenauerian politics of waiving 
sovereignty to become sovereign is a viable option in certain cases. In other situations, 
entering in shared sovereignty contracts is particularly important. In case that the state 
has uncontrolled natural resources, it is recovering from a civil war, it is desperate for 
foreign resources, or it is simple beginning to organize elections. (Krasner 2004) 
James D. Fearon and David Laitin (2004) also attack traditional sovereignty in their 
article, because the goals of statebuilding are not compatible with the present 
international law and the impartial practice of the peacekeeping operations. 
Statebuilding is a long term commitment to rebuild basic institutions for maintaining 
security and political stability. The necessity of rebuilding of failed states comes from 
the structural characteristics of the world system, as the dysfunctional states represent 
major threat for the others and humanitarian danger for their own population.  
Fareed Zakaria in his book, the “Future of Freedom” (2003), anatomizes today’s 
democracies. In his composition on the constitutional features, he concludes that the 
quality of democracy eventually depends on the institutional background, and he places 
the rule of law in the center of politics. The rule of law is the most important tool of self 
control that restores balance between democracy and liberty. According to Zakaria, the 
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sequence of development is liberalism first, as history has proved that illiberal 
democracies are not the path towards liberal democracies, whilst the experience with the 
Asian Tigers is that they began to democratize after consolidating the liberal norms and 
economic development.  
A group of scholars led by Robert I. Rotberg undertook to reveal the detailed causes 
and consequences of state failure in two volumes (Rotberg et al 2003; 2004). Rotberg 
concludes that “[f]ull Westphalian sovereignty […] should never have been accorded to 
fragile post-colonial entities with no history and experience of performing as or 
organizing a state.” (Rotberg 2004: 27) The security dilemma inside of the anarchic 
state makes the creation of strong institutions inevitable. Moreover, the external 
intervention has to take over the most important task of a state, the external military 
assistance is the only hope that the population is defended from external or internal 
violent attacks and the security is maintained. The sequence of statebuilding is first to 
build the state and later the secondary institutions, such as constitution, electoral system, 
federalism, or consociationalism. The creation of the state means the recreation of 
legality and bureaucracy in a sufficient manner, and perfection is not the goal of the first 
stage. 
Roland Paris also published a comprehensive study on statebuilding in 2004. He 
analyzed 12 different cases and concluded that peacebuilding missions were guided by 
promoting liberalization as the most effective tool for creating institutions of lasting 
peace. Peacebuilding missions drove to the practical superficiality, as they forced 
democratization and marketization too quickly. The consequence was usually the 
destabilization of the whole process. As Paris writes, “liberalization is the Achilles heel 
of peacebuilding”. (Paris 2004: 6) Liberalization can contribute to resurgence of 
fighting, recreate historical causes of violence, and generate new conditions that 
increase violence. As an alternative, Paris offers the method of Institutionalization 
Before Liberalization (IBL), the goal of which is to decrease the destabilization effects 
by delaying liberalization until the effective institutions can manage conflicts. The logic 
of promoting peace through creating democracy is paradoxical, as the fundamental 
notion of democracy is free competition, which is a potential source of permanent 
conflict. Consequently, competition is only healthy in stable societies, where the 
conflicting human behavior is canalized into comparatively harmless channels by 
opportunities for money making and private wealth. Due to the fact that competition is 
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not always self-regulating, there is a need for the state. Liberalization without strong 
state generates “bad civil society”, opportunistic ethnic entrepreneurship, destructive 
societal competition, saboteurs of democracy, unhealthy economic development. In this 
sense, successful democratization depends on the existence of a functioning state and 
bureaucracy. In general, not the idea of democracy is false, but the method of promoting 
it. Creating demands for democracy before the state is able to satisfy it will inevitably 
lead to the collapse of the efforts. Paris recommendations are: (2004: 188) wait until the 
conditions are ripe; design electoral system that rewards moderation; promote good civil 
society; adopt conflict reducing economic policies and delay hurting reforms until 
political conditions are less fragile; and rebuild effective state institutions. Statebuilding 
is not peacebuilding, because it means strengthening or construction of legitimate 
governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflict. The core state 
functions that have to be rebuilt are the provision of security, maintenance of the rule of 
law, serving basic services, and the ability to form the budget. In that sense, the 
promotion of Western style democratic regime is not the necessary step to sustainable 
future. (Paris et al 2009b: 14-15) 
James Dobbins and his colleagues published four volumes (2004, 2005, 2007, 2008) 
of studies on statebuilding under the aegis of the RAND Corporation. The most 
comprehensive contribution is “The Beginners Guide to Nation Building” (2007). The 
research group intended to clarify definitions used in the literature, to collect the 
different factors of statebuilding, which they labeled nation-building and to organize 
them into a sound sequence. The goal of the group with the mentioned volume was to 
help apply the lessons from past experiences during planning and executing 
statebuilding. The whole statebuilding exercise lasts five to ten years in average and 
consists of nine steps. Every interventions has to begin with detailed planning of the 
objective, scale and international commitment, furthermore, the interveners have to 
decide whether they want to co-opt the existing institutions, or deconstruct them to give 
space for new ones. The strategy has to set clear priorities, because the first step is to 
secure the basic conditions, which are security, humanitarian relief, basic governance, 
economic stabilization, beginning of democratization, and development. The security 
has to be established in three dimensions, the military, the police and the rule of law 
dimensions complement each other and have to develop together. The dimension of 
humanitarian relief often precedes statebuilding. Evaluating the governance dimension, 
the research group concludes that the interveners can act as a government for an interim 
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period of time, because democracy can wait, but the establishment of the government 
cannot. The dimensions of economic stabilization, democratization and development 
have to secure the future development by providing the necessary resources and by 
finding sound allocation of them through the democratic process. 
The concept, security first, elaborated by Amitai Etzioni (2007) also gives 
recommendation for a general sequence in statebuilding. As the name suggests, the 
most important mission during statebuilding is to establish security, and general 
development is the task of the local people. Because in case that security is non-
existent, the local population will not be able to develop the other dimensions. 
Reconstruction efforts have to focus on narrow goals as they will not lead to democracy 
by themselves. Reconstruction simply means the restoration of conditions to a similar 
state prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, reconstruction of a failed and conflict 
torn state is not a moral obligation, either, the general development is more the duty of 
the local stakeholders and people than of the international community. 
The work of Claire Lockhart and Asraf Ghani (2007) also tries to separate the 
different dimensions of statebuilding and simultaneously define the necessary steps of 
the process. They are also convinced that there is a need of international intervention in 
the world of not functioning states, which are crowded out from the world of developed 
states, which is characterized by the seamless web of political, economic and 
technological connections. Because of globalization and especially the global spread of 
information through the media, the people in failed states have greater expectations than 
their governments can satisfy. When governments fail to maintain basic order and 
security they hurt the basic desire for people and generate fears and limits on 
opportunities of future development. Most of the scholars would agree with Lockhart 
and Ghani that “the state is the most effective form of polity. Only the state can 
organize power so as to harness flows of information, people, money, force, and 
decisions necessary to regulate human behavior.” (Ghani et al 2007: 4) The limits of 
positive outcome of international intervention lies in the dilemmas according to which 
there is little understanding on the real tasks of the states, on the role of the international 
community, on the timeline of intervention, on the sequences of the process, or on the 
interconnectedness among dimensions and actors. Moreover, the suggested solutions of 
statebuilding reflect rather the one-size-fits-all strategy than the deep understanding of 
shared responsibility to rebuild failed states. Realizing these deficiencies, Lockhart and 
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Ghani intended to create a new paradigm of statebuilding. The first challenge was to 
define what the important state functions are. In order to find the answer they examined 
the successful states. The state functions expanded over time, and we cannot be satisfied 
with defining the state as the legitimate user of violence. The authors defined ten key 
state functions: the rule of law; monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; 
administrative control; sound management of public finances; investments in human 
capital; creation of citizenship rights through social policy; provision of infrastructure 
services; formation of a market; management of public assets; and effective public 
borrowing. The simultaneous development of the ten functions will generate legitimacy 
and trust, whilst only one dysfunctional dimension can undo the process and push the 
country in destructive vicious circles.  
The recent book of the International Peace Institute, edited by Charles T. Call and 
Vanessa Wyeth (2008a,b), also summarizes the differences among definitions and lists 
dilemmas connected with peacebuilding. First, it is not clear what the nexus between the 
consequences of a negotiated deal on peace and the sustainability of the state is. Second, 
capacity building measures and the legitimacy of the state may confront each other 
during the rebuilding process. Third, urgent short term tasks of the process often 
contradict long term interests of development. Fourth, the interests of international 
actors, the recognition of the state is not always in line with domestic interests, therefore 
international intervention often lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. 
Finally, the interests of the local elites and the population are often not the same causing 
the dilemma for the intervener, whether the elite or the population should be satisfied. 
The state, which should be rebuilt, is the final authority, a collection of institutions that 
successfully claims the monopoly on legitimate use of force over a given territory, and 
an important entity that represents the political community. However, building a nation 
is proved to be less important than recreating effective institutions, because citizens’ 
identification with the state is not enough to maintain effective statehood. The core state 
functions are security, legitimacy, public finance and economic policy making, and 
justice and the rule of law. Call (2008a) differentiates two statebuilding methods in the 
introductory chapter of the volume. First, the Weberian method focuses on institutional 
capacity building and its goal is to establish and maintain security, and secure the 
sufficient revenues for development. Second, the “state design” approach concentrates 
on the organizational arrangements and on the decision making process at the different 
level of polity. According to the later approach, the basic question is not whether the 
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state functions well, rather whether the police forces are effective. Both versions main 
conclusion is that there is a need of at least a minimal state that can be the basis of 
future development, as it is very unlikely that a territory without state can enjoy both 
domestic and international legitimacy. Nevertheless, statebuilding is a political process 
that creates winners and losers possibly contributing to more conflicts. The eventual 
goal of statebuilding is to recreate a state that is effective and enjoys legitimacy. 
“State failure is regional public bad” (Collier 2007: 130) with global consequences. 
The restoration of order and establishment of frames for future development is the only 
foreseeable solution for state failure, which necessitates military intervention, too. The 
role of developed states is to help maintain the global public good, peace in all 
territories of the world. The new agenda for action described by Paul Collier (2007: 
177-181) consists of four dimensions. First, the conflict trap has to be avoided by post 
conflict reconstruction and preventing the renewed conflict, which both need the 
decisive military present, in most cases interim external administration that is able to 
provide the basic public goods. Second, the resource rich, but policy weak states have to 
escape from the national resource trap by following international standards, laws and 
norms of rule of law. Third, the landlocked countries surrounded by bad neighbors also 
need the development of the neighbors, and aids will only work if the negative spillover 
effects from the neighbors do not threaten the development. Finally, the problem of bad 
governance can be solved only if the local stakeholders participate in the reconstruction 
process and believe in the future development. International standards and norms can 
only take roots if the local actors are willing to follow the rules of the game. Targeted 
aid and technical assistance can help the reforms, but it is evident that untied aids 
granted prior the reforms retard the efforts. (Chauvet et al 2008: 340) The necessity of 
external intervention is beyond question, and its role is prominent in maintaining 
internal order and reinstalling the socioeconomic functions of the state, such as health 
care, education, basic public goods, transport and regulation of private economic 
activity. The later task is the final pledge for being able to conduct the first. (Chauvet et 
al 2008: 332) 
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Assessing the statebuilding models and experiences 
 
 
In connection with the problem of state failure there are several scenarios. The worst 
is when state failure spreads to other countries, increasing the number failed states in the 
international system. On the other hand, there are examples that a country could escape 
from the trap constituted by failed statehood. Uganda and Mozambique are good 
examples for a development which based mainly on internal sources. Pierre Englebert 
and Dennis Tull (2008) even mention, that in some cases the development became 
possible because of the absence of international intervention, such as in Somaliland. 
The irony in this case is that the international community does not recognize Somaliland 
as a sovereign state. The last scenario is when the international community conducts 
large scale project to rebuild the state. The last option, however, necessitates serious 
involvement of the international community. The first reactions (eg. Crocker 2003; 
Dorff 2005; Hurrell 2002) to September 11, and the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq 
were contradictory but it became clear that the interveners have to learn how to rebuild 
states after overturning their regimes, or the whole enterprise will fail. Furthermore, the 
experiences after the Cold War showed plausibly that the weak states, which lose their 
external support, are prone to fail. The some kind of “re-colonization” of these states or 
neo-trusteeship seems to be inevitable in the most serious cases in order to avoid the 
worst case scenario. 
Brennan Kraxberger (2007), beyond that he examined opportunities for the spread of 
democracy in weak states, collected different forms in which a complex reconstruction 
project may appear. Kraxberger identified four frameworks of complex reconstruction 
projects. First, the revival and reconstruction of the state, that aims to rebuild the status 
quo. This, today dominant approach believes that states are the cure for the problems in 
every part of the world; however, there is no consensus about the steps. Second is the 
neo-trusteeship approach, which would make necessary a quasi-permanent international 
intervention. Even Helman and Ratner (1993), who are the pioneers of state failure 
studies, mentioned neo-trusteeship as a necessary respond in the most serious cases. 
Later on Ruth Gordon (1997) proposed the re-colonization of failed states. Apart from 
colonialism, trusteeship could mean the direct control of the United Nations, or regional 
organizations, such as the African Union. Fearon and Laitin in their comprehensive 
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article (2004: 9-11) also examined the opportunities for the different solutions, and 
found that neo-trusteeship under the control of the United Nations would be necessary, 
which would appear as the new generation of complex peace-keeping operations. 
Promoting “good governance” has been integral part of donor-aid relationships since the 
end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank have made serious efforts to change economic policies through assisting 
governments since the debt-crisis in 1982. However, the efficiency of these is quite low. 
Transitional administration has become a recognized alternative to conventional 
sovereignty. The United Nations authorized several missions with this task in the last 
two decades. The mission with the broadest authority was the UNMIK in Kosovo. 
(Chesterman 2005) Or, as Krasner (2008: 108) suggests, apart from the opportunity of 
reviving the institution of trusteeship, there is the option of shared sovereignty. That is 
based on the agreement of an external actor and a recognized domestic stake holder on 
the diminished autonomy of the domestic actors on a certain area. The historical 
example for that is post-war Germany, where the Bonn Agreement in 1952 
reestablished the sovereignty of the German state, however, until 1990, the security 
sector was not fully autonomous because it was integrated in the NATO. The third form 
in Kraxberger’s study is the territorial restructuring of states which may give the chance 
for more capable parts of the state to develop independently from the state. That would 
represent an opportunity for instance for Somaliland to be recognized. The basic idea 
behind it is that many of the failed states have never been able to function, so the revival 
of the state would not make sense. The method is to give de iure sovereignty to 
territories that proved to be sovereign from the state, like Somaliland, let territories 
absorb by stronger and more stable neighbors, or simply just withdraw international 
recognition from chronically dysfunctional states. However, that framework would 
inevitably open Pandora’s Box. There are those who argue that in the phenomenon of 
state failure not only the concerned states but also the Western concept of modern 
statehood failed. That is the natural way of solution is to give floor to change (Grant 
2004: 53), in extreme interpretation, statebuilding operations can redraw even the 
territorial borders. Or on the other hand, the opportunity for total self determination is 
also imaginable. For instance, partition seems to be an alternative, which considers the 
local needs, but it is definitely wrong considering the needs of neighbors or the 
international community in general. Even if we accept that the tradition against 
secessionism was lead by the reality of the Cold War politics of preserving territorial 
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unity and sovereignty by using the normative framework against secessionism (Simpson 
1994: 463), the conservation of the sovereign state is one of the most important pillars 
of the recent international law and order codified in the Charter of the United Nations. 
This order does not provide legal right for partition. However, the reality triggered the 
recognition of the necessity of change. (Grant 2004: 53) Johnson Carter (2008) 
examined the opportunities for and the consequences of partition in his article on the 
pages of International Security. He presupposed partition as the way to prevent the 
recurrence of ethnic war and low level violence. He examined all partitions that ended 
with civil war between 1945 and 2004 by introducing a new measurement tool, the 
Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI). The PEHI contributed to the 
conclusion that partition works only where populations are already separated 
geographically or where the intervener is able to implement population transfers safely. 
Jeffrey Herbst (1996) shares the same opinion when he defines the most important 
criteria of the recognition of newly created states as the ability of the government to 
provide more political goods for the people than the former structure. But on the other 
hand, the practice of recognition of new states could easily lead to slippery slope of 
microstate creation that is rather the way towards more dysfunctional states. It is clear 
that the arbitrary borders for most of the post-colonial states have represented a 
disadvantage at the beginning, but as Marina Ottaway (1999b) reflects on the question, 
the real cause of underdevelopment and failed statehood are not the borders. 
Consequently, the solution can not be the redrawing of the artificial colonial borders. 
Finally, the last form according to Kraxberger’s logic is that some people may prefer 
life without territorial states and may desire for collective governance. This last option 
is, however, not viable, considering that statehood is the basic brick of the present 
international system, and a stateless territory with significant population does not fit in 
this picture. Among the conditions of the present international order and law, only the 
first framework is viable. The problem of state failure is recent and alarming, whilst the 
inertia of the international institutional frames is big, thus, the possibility of change in 
the international law is low.  
The processes of statebuilding and nation-building are inherently interconnected 
because the reconstruction of the institutions of the state without considering the socio-
political cohesion of the society will lead to the birth of unsustainable structures. In this 
sociological understanding, it is impossible to build states without the “building of the 
nation”. This approach is the takeoff from the mainstream statebuilding theory that 
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basically builds on the Weberian concept of the state. According to the institutional 
approach of statebuilding, the role of the institutions is more important than the 
structure of the society. Contrarily, the sociologist approach, which stems from the 
Durkheimian sociology, which puts emphasis rather on the legitimacy of these 
institutions, that is not only the institutions are important, but their socio-political 
connections to the society. The legitimacy of the institutions guarantees the 
sustainability of the state. As Barry Buzan (1991) argues, the state is only an idea in the 
eyes of the people rather a physical organism. The failure of the state is the outcome of 
lost legitimacy and not only the consequence of failed institutions. (Lemay-Hébert 
2009) 
The functional interdependence of different dimensions and sectors is the fundamental 
characteristic of post-conflict situations. For instance, the demobilization process of 
former combatants can be only successful if it is supported by a general economic 
development that creates employment opportunities; otherwise the criminalization of 
economy is unavoidable. The new wars after the Cold War have been internal conflicts 
at low intensity, however, involved and affected neighboring countries, too. New wars 
always stem from identity conflicts and are connected with very low state capacities of 
preventing violence. The new statebuilding missions have to keep in mind that the state 
institutions should function as protecting mechanisms of the citizens’ physical security. 
The occurrence of new wars is a “protection failure”. (Kaldor 1999; 2000; 2003) The 
new wars also are failures of assistance programs that aimed at strengthening the state 
and modernize the economy, because the programs did not pay attention to the fact that 
latent conflicts from the decolonization have been only postponed. Accordingly, 
statebuilding has to begin with the reestablishment of security, which is the final goal of 
the intervention, however, it also includes the provision of frames of secure life and 
order that necessitates the development in other dimensions as well. Robert Keohane 
notes (2003: 275) that military intervention needs the contribution of institution-
building and economic development, too. 
The possibility for intervention is hindered by the fact that elite groups of the weak 
states hide behind the façade of sovereignty and they dominate the international fora, 
especially the United Nations, due to their large number. The citizens of these states 
experience the “political bad” of being member of the society ruled by the situation 
where the Hobbsian paradox is present in form that the state and elite rather protect 
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themselves than decrease domestic anarchy. The conservatism of the international 
system has been called into question by new emerging norms, such as the responsibility 
to protect, or the recognition of strong states own security interests related to the failed 
states. Sovereignty is not an endowment in itself, it is a set of norms and rules, namely 
without fitting in this frame no state can be labeled as sovereign. The fundamental 
barrier for accepting this argument as an international norm is the international law 
itself. The norm of universalism in international law has meant that all the states are 
equal, and only states are the legitimate player of international politics. Shrinking 
sovereignty of weak states questions that very pillar of international law’s foundation. 
(Cutler 2001: 140) Nevertheless, it is clear that “universalistic equality” of states cannot 
be defended anymore, which has led to the increased number of studies in the literature 
that argue for the opportunity of reemergence of some forms of trusteeships. On one 
hand, trusteeship has a very precise meaning and definition in the international law, 
which is codified in the 12th chapter of the United Nation’s Charter, not giving too much 
space for alternative interpretations. But on the other hand, the term sovereignty was 
designed for the good governed states’ world and as the failed states are per definition 
unable to rebuild themselves, the intense engagement of the international community is 
necessary. (Krasner 2004: 85-86) Afghanistan and Iraq proved that it is easier to change 
governments than build up sustainable structures. Long external presence seems to be 
the only solution; however, there have not been many experiences yet. The external 
intervention and the presence of the external power do not necessarily have to mean that 
local actors lose their sovereignty. Using the word trusteeship, however, is controversial 
as it makes the concerned states and societies remind on colonialism, thus, tiding the 
word inextricably with reflections on cultural superiority of the external powers. 
(Gordon 1997: 926) The complex peacekeeping operations of the United Nations are 
already some forms of neo-trusteeships as the interim administrations and the special 
representatives have very broad rights and decisive power concerning the development 
of the given state where the intervention took place. The justifiability of these 
intervention comes from the belief that the interim administration, the de facto 
trusteeship is the only way to guarantee greater peace than it existed in the ante bellum 
period (Elsthain 2002: 9), which is eventually the emerging norm of “ius post bellum”. 
Evidently, the normative models and logical frameworks of statebuilding draw the 
necessary experience from the historical examples but complete the reality with 
normative statements which follow from the evaluation of former statebuilding 
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exercises. It is similar to the popular saying among military historians that the generals 
tend to prepare for the past wars during planning the operations. It is similar in case of 
statebuilding, because the normative frameworks of planning usually conclude from the 
last exercise. For instance, it is often said that the complex intervention in Kosovo is 
well designed but not for Kosovo because it uses the experiences from Bosnia. 
The historical examples are necessary to lead towards the understanding of the 
complexity of statebuilding, because they prove that the interdependent constellation 
and development of different latent and manifested events all influence the final 
outcome of the process. On the other hand, the existing normative models are useful 
because they represent well designed and deliberated lists of the different dimensions 
and factors. Consequently, the analysis of both the historical examples and the 
normative models are important to understand why statebuilding is the logical answer in 
a situation where a state cannot cooperate with the others in securing its sovereignty. 
Statebuilding is answer to both the humanitarian and the security challenges which are 
generated in the chaotic situation inside of a failed state. 
Nevertheless, the normative models are comprehensive and evaluate the necessary tasks 
during statebuilding; they are still static in the sense that they cannot forecast the 
influence of one dimension on another. They also fail to interpret the dynamics of the 
statebuilding process in a single model which could be used as black line in future 
thinking. Eventually, the main debate on the field, whether democratization and 
statebuilding are gradual or a sequenced processes, cannot be settled by using the 
existing models or evaluate the historical examples. There is a need of a new model 
which is able to introduce the different dimensions, factors and also the dynamics of 
development.  
The method of verification of the second hypothesis is similar to the first one. We have 
to keep in mind that the phenomenon of state failure and the process of statebuilding are 
not only the products of the 21st century, which can be seen from the historical 
examples. However, there are no agreed comprehensive frameworks or schemas which 
could understand, explain and forecast the process and the consequence of statebuilding 
at the same time. Despite of the fact that there exist several normative models of 
statebuilding, none of them could serve as clear advising schema for decision makers 
because they cannot handle all the dimensions and the dynamics among the 
development of them in a single model. 
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The aim of the second hypothesis was to assess the different models of statebuilding in 
the literature and clarify the nexus among democratization and statebuilding. It is 
obvious that the international community needs to react in state failure events, however, 
the form of intervention is highly disputed and the historical or the normative models 
cannot provide clear blue print, either. We can see from the examples and models that 
the debate is not settled whether the international community’s responsibility ends with 
simple financial assistance or it includes the takeover of all power from the local actors. 
Summarizing the models, it is obvious that the appropriate from of statebuilding is 
somewhere in between. However, we have to note that statebuilding is a lengthy process 
and the intensity of the engagement of the international community changes over the 
course. Statebuilding is per definition complex and multidimensional because it 
simultaneously covers the tasks of strengthening the state institutions, the revitalization 
of the economy or reforming the society. The real goal of a statebuilding process should 
be the creation of the enabling environment which is the basis of future development. 
Without a systematic engagement the promise of future development remains obscure. 
The definition of state failure concludes that a failed state cannot carry out complex 
development without the help of the international community, and eventually, the 
external actors have to build up the basis of development. Statebuilding or any form of 
intervention, however, is not a simple goodwill act, as it helps to diminish the 
consequences of negative spillover from the not functioning states. 
Even if we understand that statebuilding is a logical answer to state failure, one 
question still has to generate debate: how statebuilding should be implemented? The 
verification of the next hypothesis will evolve this question in more details, but we have 
to state that the focus of statebuilding needs to be placed on those elements of the 
process which create or revitalize the basic institutions and maintain the performance of 
the basic state functions. At the same time, we have to conclude this chapter with 
expressing our conviction that the simplifying and mechanic models are not suitable in 
practice due to the multidimensional and complex nature of the necessary tasks during 
statebuilding. 
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The alternative model of statebuilding and the 
answer to the third hypothesis 
 
 
 
After having reviewed the literature, the normative models and the historical 
experiences of statebuilding, one thing is beyond doubt: the process of statebuilding is 
complex and multidimensional. The remaining question is whether statebuilding is 
sequenced or, because of its complexity, gradual and permanent development of all 
dimensions. The later is closer to the reality, but gives no effective explanation on the 
process itself, because the conclusion of such conviction necessary has to be that the 
statebuilding is too complex and context dependent to be characterized in a single 
model. According to the experiences and more to the normative models, successful 
statebuilding builds on favorable conditions which help future development. In this 
sense, the statebuilding process is sequenced and the sequences are always the 
foundations of the next steps.  
One of the goals of the present work is to contribute to the debate by giving a new 
schema and model of thinking about the necessary interdependencies of different 
dimensions and sequences of statebuilding. The new schema does not intend to criticize 
the existing models, or evaluate the statebuilding exercises. It rather aims at giving a 
new collection of the dimension and conditions in a normative framework by 
interpreting the sequences in the different dimensions. In that schema, the sequences 
reflect rather the timely dynamic of the process than the functional priorities among the 
dimensions. From this point of view, the schema allows us to model the statebuilding 
process as a permanent development in each dimension but to explain the sequences at 
the same time. From the holistic point of view, the goal of each sequence is to complete 
a stage of transition, which is the transition from a failed state to a self-sustainable 
effective structure of security, institutions, economy, society, governance where the 
external conditions contribute to the development. The generator of this transition is 
statebuilding. 
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Apart from defining different dimensions, it is difficult to decide between the 
importance of local and external efforts of building the state. It seems to be evident that 
local ownership is the key for the future, but per definition in a failed state the source of 
the problems has been that local ownership has been nonexistent, not effective, or not 
legitimate enough to be the agent of development. In this sense, statebuilding is also the 
process of transferring the ownership of development from the external actors to the 
local stakeholders. The dilemma is whether it is possible to transfer this ownership 
without losing the efficiency of the statebuilding process. 
Drawing examples from the literature of comparative economics of transitional 
countries, the expression “transitional recession”, introduced by János Kornai12, aims at 
calling the attention to the nature of transition which necessarily brings temporary loss 
during the transition. The same phenomenon is expected during the transformation of 
ownership from the effective external actor to the developing local authority. The 
sequences of statebuilding represent the different stages of the process where the local 
actors take over more and more responsibility of future development. It is obvious that 
without the help of international community a failed state is not going to be able to 
develop its effective capacities. In this sense, external ownership at the beginning of the 
process does not violate the rights of the state as it practically nonexistent, and its 
capacities do not allow the state to practice its sovereignty.  
The steps of the model of statebuilding follow this argument and represent the stages 
of developing local ownership. (1) The foundation of future development is the 
satisfaction of basic needs and creation of secure environment. These basic needs do not 
only appear in the security dimension but have to be satisfied in each of the other 
dimension, too. (2) The interim period of external authority is necessary for maintaining 
the secure environment for development. This step is the stage for elaborating 
techniques in each of the dimensions that help to keep “the interim recession” in a 
manageable frame after the ownership is getting overtaken by the local players and 
institutions. (3) The emerging local ownership is too weak to be able to conduct the rest 
of the statebuilding tasks, therefore the external actors still have to be present as 
“trustees” of the process. (4) The last step of statebuilding has to create a coherent 
national structure where the different dimensions interact in harmony and the external 
actors can decrease their presence to a minimal level, or in ideal situation, only affect 
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the development of the given country through the globalized networks of 
interdependencies. 
Dimensions play very important role in the existing normative models of 
statebuilding. The authors often emphasize the importance of one dimension over the 
others, as for instance the security in case of Etzioni’s (2007) model, or the institutions 
in Paris’ (2004) one. The connections among the dimensions lead to different 
constellations in case of different countries, which is the main answer why the 
assumption about a right set of statebuilding strategies which can succeed without 
reference to the specificity of the local, regional and global context is false. As Jack S. 
Levy (2004) presented in his study, the levels of analyzes and the variables have to be 
combined: the local conditions regarding several variables, the national and 
international processes all influence the development. Jack Goldstone (2008: 285) for 
example differentiated the security, the economic growth, the law and policy and the 
social services as different dimensions. Scott Feil’s (2004: 39) contribution to the 
“Winning the Peace”, which is rated as a cornerstone in the statebuilding literature, also 
emphasizes different pillars of post-conflict reconstruction: security, governance and 
participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. 
Furthermore, he notes that the external and internal tasks and duties are also different. 
The dimensions are also very important in the model presented in this work. The 
dimensions represent set of factors which influence core state functions. These sets are 
important in themselves, but contribute to the effectiveness or failure of the others. 
Differentiating among the dimensions is not always easy as they are overlapping, but on 
the theoretical level we can make a distinction by dividing up the statebuilding process 
into six dimensions. First, the security-military dimension is overwhelmingly mentioned 
as the basic and most important dimension of statebuilding in the literature. However, if 
we consider this dimension, and that is why it is better to call it military, rather than 
security, the pure goal here is to stop violence and conflict and maintain security and 
order by using military solutions. The other factors, which are often mentioned in other 
works, are evidently important, but are part of other dimensions. In this sense this 
dimension is the key of future development, while the other dimensions are as 
important, too. Prioritization of dimensions is important in each sequence, but it should 
not mean that the first one is exclusively this dimension. 
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Second, the institutions determine the design of the state and help maintain security, 
and develop the factors in other dimensions. The most important goal here is to build up 
institutions which help the state to be the effective and legitimate agent of development. 
The institutions also establish the political structure of the state. 
Third, the economic dimension means the material basis of the statebuilding exercise 
and the future development. The realization of achievements in this dimension helps to 
maintain the development in the other dimensions, but this dimension can undermine 
the statebuilding process in case of significant failure. 
Fourth, the society carries the given societal differences among groups, religions, 
ethnicities, or cultures. The diversity in this dimension can represent serious challenge 
for statebuilding, but the cohesion and homogeneity of the society is not a guarantee for 
success, either. The given characteristics of a certain society mean resource and 
opportunity for statebuilding. 
Fifth, none of the statebuilding exercises happens in a closed laboratory. The 
interaction of the international processes with the domestic conditions is very influential 
on the final outcome of the process. External processes can help or hinder the 
development of other dimensions. 
Finally, the sixth dimension, the domestic conditions are as important as the other 
dimensions. This dimension shows what the external actors have to add to the success 
of the statebuilding process. Domestic conditions are closely related to the societal 
dimension, but the cognitive methods about organizing life, or with other words, the 
political culture is important here. This dimension has to be independent as people with 
same religious background think fundamental differently in different parts of the world, 
let us only think about the Muslim religion. The domestic dimension covers and 
represents the historical cornerstones of institutional development, the ways how the 
country organizes its economic activity, governance, or the motivations for peace.  
In this sense, statebuilding does not only mean the recreation of narrow state 
functions, but shaping the environment which secures the sustainable presence of state 
functions by managing a healthy balance between legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
functions and institutions that the state has to be able to influence in order to provide 
opportunity for development.  
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The Rubik’s cube analogy 
 
 
The Hungarian scientist, Ernő Rubik’s invention from 1974 has conquered the world 
in the last three decades. By 2009, the Rubik’s cube is the world’s top-selling puzzle 
game. At the beginning, the puzzle he introduced was held impossible to solve, but 
today the Internet is full with the algorithms of the solution. The solution methodology, 
or at least the way which leads to the solution, shows striking similarity with the 
interconnected system of development in a state where several dimensions and different 
steps jointly determine the outcome while they are mutually influencing each other. It 
means that even a single move in the development of a dimension will not stay without 
effect on the whole process. 
The inventor, Ernő Rubik, worked as a professor, sculptor and architect at the 
Academy of Applied Arts and Crafts in Hungary where he intended to modernize 
teaching tools which help understand three-dimension objects better. The original cube, 
as well as the different variations, consists of small cubes (cubelets) which can rotate 
around. Among the small cubelets there are special ones. First, the edge cubeletes are in 
the intersection of two faces (dimensions) and these always represent determined places 
between the two dimensions. Second, the corner pieces are in the intersection of three 
dimensions. 
 
 
4. The Composition of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d. 
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The cube has eight corners and twelve edges, which means that the permutations of 
different orientations depend on that. For instance, from the eight corners, seven can be 
oriented independently and the position of the last one depends on the orientation of the 
preceding seven. Accordingly, the odd permutation of the corners implies the 
permutation of the edges, too. Explicitly, eleven edges can be moved independently 
with the move of the last one depending on the previous ones. Stemming from this, 
there are 43 quintillion different options of moves during the solution. This number is 
incomprehensible even in mathematics. Consequently, the question emerges: how can 
we use the analogy in social sciences? The answer is surprisingly simple. The number 
of permutations resonates with the number of different options during statebuilding; 
however, the solution methodology also shows that the outcome is always the same 
despite of the number of different variations. It is a commonplace in social sciences, that 
there are no identical development paths, which eventually questions the validity of 
comparisons of different models. With the use of the Rubik’s cube analogy there is a 
possibility to incorporate the high number of variables and different “take off 
situations”. 
 
  
5. The Beginning and the End Situation of the Solution Process of the Rubik’s Cube.  
Source: Hardwick n.d. 
 
The solution methodology of the cube has a basic rule: the center cubelets have a 
fixed position, which means that they have to be solved first. This fact is similar in the 
statebuilding process and shows the sequence which has to be followed during the 
development. Statebuilding can be successful only if the basic requirements are met. 
Also in compliance with the solution methodology of the cube, the next sequences of 
statebuilding are similar in all cases despite of the different moves during a sequence. 
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The alternative model of statebuilding proposed by the present work is a frame for 
thinking and the substance always depends on the real situation such as the permutation 
of the cubelets’ orientation between two sequences of the solution. 
The general rule is that there are general algorithms, id est a list of well defined 
instructions for implementing the process from a given initial state, through well 
defined successive states to a desired outcome. Each of the algorithms takes into 
account the beginning situation and describes the effect of the steps and forecast the 
success of the way applied to bring the cube closer to the desired outcome. The 
originality of the algorithms is the fact that they are strategies for transforming only the 
necessary parts without scrambling the already solved parts. These strategies can be 
applied several times even in case of different parts during a sequence. However, and it 
is a warning sign for using the methodology in social sciences, the algorithms have 
certain side effects, namely in certain situations the orientation of cubelets may change 
other parts of the cube. It means that the analogy has to focus on the corrective 
mechanisms, too, which reorganize the changed parts in the wished manner.  
 
 
 
Fixing the centerpieces: satisfying the basic needs 
 
 
The first sequence in statebuilding is satisfying the most severe demands. The basic 
human needs are present in all dimensions, on all of the 6 faces of the cube, and they 
represent the initial state of the process from which the statebuilding process has to 
reach the outcome, the functioning and democratic state. The first sequence is the 
centerpiece of the entire process, a basis which serves as a point of reference in all 
dimensions for implementing the rest of the process. In this sense, the first sequence is 
the most important during the process. Basic needs have to be satisfied in all dimensions 
during the first sequence. In case the centers of the faces (dimensions) are not correctly 
oriented to the right state, the rest of the process will only mess up the dimensions and 
even undo the apparent beginning achievements. 
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6. The Centerpieces of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d. 
 
In the reality, very similarly to the cube, the fixed centerpieces mean that the process 
has solved at least 30 percent of the necessary tasks. During statebuilding process it 
simply refers to the fact that satisfying the basic needs is not only the first sequence but 
the requisite for development in other sequences. During this sequence, all the 
dimensions are important and the process has to proceed to a satisfying level in each of 
them. The next table is rather an overview about the basic tasks in all dimensions during 
this sequence, than the comprehensive list. 
 
Security Institutions Economy 
Stop fighting Basic administration and 
authority Rebuilding key infrastructure 
   
Society External dimension Domestic determinants 
Stop (ethnic, religious etc.) 
violence;  violence is not the 
same as conflict 
(Humanitarian) intervention Alternative governance – 
spoilers 
 
4. The List of Tasks during the First Sequence of Statebuilding 
 
As a first step of understanding the sequence, we have to define what this sequence 
means in the timeline of the existing conflict and future statebuilding. The most 
adequate definition about this problem was elaborated by Gerd Junne and Willemijn 
Verkoren (2005a: 1) when they argued that post-conflict development has to focus on 
the immediate period after the unrest. However, as they pointed out, too, the end of 
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open warfare does not automatically mean peace and security. The experience of civil 
wars shows that in 44% of post-conflict situation the war resumed in five years. That is, 
“recent violent conflict is the best predictor of future violence”. (Junne et al 2005a: 1, 
Call 2008a: 1) 
The first sequence of statebuilding represents the fundamental basis for future 
development. Without completing this, the other sequences cannot be successful. Basic 
needs are present in all dimensions, however, does not cover comprehensive 
statebuilding stages. Basic needs can be satisfied if there is a minimal state present that 
can maintain basic security and order in most of the territory of the state. The goal is to 
find or create hope for further development. The security-military dimension of 
statebuilding may seem more important than the other five, but without the sound 
constellation of the others, security is not guaranteed, either. The dimensions are 
interconnected and a country is stable on the surface, but if there are problems in any of 
the other dimensions, the security dimension can be undone, too. The more direct 
connection in this stage is among the security, the external and the domestic 
dimensions. Assuming, that the state is incapable to maintain security, the foreign 
military intervention is unavoidable to reestablish peace and security. Nevertheless, the 
success of the intervention depends on other external factors, such as on the willingness 
of the interveners, on the size and scope of the intervention, on the role and reaction of 
the neighbors, and on the domestic capacities that represent the limits of foreign 
presence. The security-military dimension shows the general state of peace and security 
from that the statebuilders can conclude on the size and scope of the needed action. The 
external dimension has to answer the questions: who is able to take the role of leading 
the statebuilding, and what are its limits? Whilst the domestic dimension gives clear 
picture about the feasibility of any plans. As long as we believe that external-domestic 
balance is important, we can understand why more external effort is needed in 
situations, where domestic limits are high, that is the capacity of local actors is low. 
This argument resembles to Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis’ triangle of 
peacebuilding. Where the hostility is higher, the destruction will be more severe and the 
necessity of heavier international assistance is bigger. The efforts and success to resolve 
civil wars depend on three factors: the degree of hostility; the extent of local capacities 
remained after the war, and the scope of the international assistance. (Doyle et al 2006: 
4) The lower is the local capacity and the bigger is the hostility in the given country, the 
bigger effort has to be made by the international community. The triangle’s territory 
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represents the opportunity for solution, and the bigger is this territory, the bigger is the 
hope for solution. 
 
5. The Nexus between the Level of Hostility and the Local Capacities for Solutions and the Scope of 
Necessary International Involvement. Source: Doyle et al 2006: 68 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the three important dimensions in this stage are the ones 
on the vertices of the triangle introduced by Nicolas Sambanis and Michael Doyle. 
However, the importance of the economic, societal and the institutional dimensions are 
latent, because the real effect of failure in these will be revealed only later. Furthermore, 
factors that may be present in the nexus of the three mentioned dimensions may 
contribute to the success of statebuilding in general. For instance, prior democratic 
experience, the level of economic development, or the homogeneity of the society all 
are factors which made former complex interventions easier to succeed. In case of 
Germany after the Second World War, the high level of education and industrial know-
how, the strong traditions of rule of law, existing culture of protected property rights, 
and belief in free trade made the job of the occupying powers easier. Similarly, in Japan 
the honorific culture that respects the victor and the discredited former ideology, and in 
addition, such as in Germany, the highly developed economy and society made Japan a 
ready market for the American statebuilders. (Bali 2005; Dempsey 2001; Dobbins et al 
2004; Jennings 2003) Similarly, the same complexity of interdependent development of 
dimensions explains the unprecedented and unanticipated success of democracy in 
India. In India, the domestic vertex of Sambani and Doyle’s triangle would have given 
little hope. India was not an industrialized country and the middle class was 
underdeveloped, moreover, the society was deeply divided along ethnic, religious and 
cultural lines. But the legacy of the British colonialism, such as the strong centralized 
state with capable civil service and the democratic elite, made India able not to fail like 
Pakistan. Moreover, the national movements which had fought against the British 
colonizers paradoxically kept the old institutions. In the person of Jawaharlal Nehru and 
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in the National Congress the leading elite were unified and were committed for 
democracy. The national education system, the centrally controlled communication and 
the existing national political culture all built a sound basis for statebuilding and 
development right after the eve of independence. (Shakar 2001) 
Examining the historical experiences, it is clear that the presence of a foreign power 
or agent in a failed state is usually the only opportunity. This is highly understandable 
since even the weakness of the state or its violent behavior was the main cause of the 
failure, therefore it is a naïve consideration that the situation would change by itself. 
 
 
The complex of the security, external and domestic dimensions 
 
In the next sub-chapters, we will analyze in more details the dimensions. However, 
due to the interconnectedness, the logic of the first stage demands to handle certain 
dimensions together. During the first stage of statebuilding, the security, external and 
domestic dimensions should not be treated separately. Similarly to above introduced 
triangle, the development in the security dimension is ultimately influenced by the 
domestic capacities and the scope of the international involvement. As we already 
indicated, the dimensions are overlapping and they can be separated only in theory, as 
the development of the state means simultaneous change in all dimensions. 
Consequently, the arbitrary grouping of the dimensions is not false because it helps 
highlight the closer relation among the security, external and domestic dimensions. 
Furthermore, the grouping helps understand the dynamics during the first stage of 
statebuilding better. 
Security is a prerequisite and the most important pillar of future development. If the 
most basic human needs such as security, food and safety place for living, are not met, 
any democratization and statebuilding effort is waste of time and money. Freedom from 
fear (id est security) is a basic human right, which guarantees the life without violence. 
(Salomons 2005:19) One of the scholars of London School of Economics defined state 
failure, as a phenomenon that is connected with the unsatisfied basic needs of the 
people. (Ikpe 2007:87) On the other hand, only the countries are able to survive and 
develop in the globalized world, which possess the techniques and facilities for 
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production of internationally competitive goods. Today this is eventually connected 
with capital attracting capacity of the state. (see e.g. Porter 1998) Hence, it is an obvious 
fact that capital owners will not invest in an unstable environment.13 Certainly, a failed 
state does not fit in the plan of the investors. The government in a failed state lost the 
capacity to secure safe development, as usually does not possesses monopoly on the use 
of violence. Furthermore, in certain cases the government is the source of violence. 
Thus, a failed state generates a security vacuum, which has to be filled. Creating 
stability does not only mean stopping armed conflicts but also preventing humanitarian 
crisis. Securing the humanitarian aids is a basic task during each intervention. For 
instance Somalia proved in 1992 that the humanitarian aid supply may be the aim of 
fighting. We refer here on Somalia because it is the “ideal typical” example for a failed 
state14 in other dimensions, too. However, the internal quality of the state contributed to 
the fact that Somalia has appeared in the headlines as a collapsed state well before the 
“new world order”15, but the real cause of collapse is found in external factors. It is well 
known, that Somalia oscillated between the two military blocks receiving military aid 
until the end of Cold War. The aid had always been the most important financial source 
of the government for being able to poise among the interests of different clans. Later 
on, the cut off this income meant the death sentence for the government that lost its 
position against the strengthened warlords. The example also proves that statebuilding 
needs to enhance state capacity for punishing, or buying off the challengers of state 
authority. (Dorussen 2005:411-413) 
Evidently the first step of achieving the final goal of this stage is to stop fighting. The 
other objectives in the security-military dimension are reestablishing the monopoly on 
legitimate use of force and violence and building secure environment for the future 
development, meaning that both the local stakeholders and the foreign players need 
predictability. The opportunities for the eventual end of the fight rely upon the type of 
the armed conflict, which is closely related with the domestic dimension of the Rubik’s 
cube model and with the factors level of hostility and local capacities in Doyle and 
Sambanis’ triangle. The difference of the two is that our model emphasizes non-
linearity of the system of interdependent processes and dynamics of the different 
dimensions. For instance, the external intervention influences the security, which gives 
sources for change in the domestic dimension, too. A legitimate foreign military 
intervention can give credibility, and power for the domestic government, whilst as we 
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saw in Iraq, the intervention can also destruct the domestic capacities by dismantling the 
state and giving space for higher level of uncontrolled violence. 
The above dilemma whether the intervention contributes to peace or violence is 
difficult to predict without knowing the common straits of conflicts. The characteristics 
of wars changed significantly (Kaldor 1999) since the end of the Cold War. As Asraf 
Ghani and Claire Lockhart underline (2008: 223), the necessary factors of preempting 
long wars are the functioning state and the trust of the people in the state. The domestic 
situation and the security challenges change rapidly due to the interconnected 
dimensions, therefore the states have to be dynamic and flexible to be able to respond 
the challenges. The picture is even more complex if we note that the international 
organizations, mainly because of the institutional bureaucratic processes and the 
frequent disagreement among the members, are too rigid to react flexibly to the 
changing situations. Mark Hoffmann (2002) elaborated a typology of armed conflicts 
after the Cold War. The diversity of the conflicts gives good reasoning why the 
international interventions fail easier in certain cases, however, they would use the same 
military techniques. Actually, the very fact that the interventions used similar 
techniques in different situations was the source of failure. Hoffman defined five 
categories of conflict, and added the category of conflict prone situations to the 
typology. First, there are several protracted conflicts from the Cold War, such as in Sri 
Lanka, Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, or the Middle East. Our personal opinion is 
that eventually all the conflicts which were born during decolonization should be 
considered in this category. Second, the post-Soviet transitional conflicts, such as 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, or Transdniestria, represent different challenges. Third, 
violent ethnic conflicts, which took place in the Balkans or in Rwanda easily escalate 
into large scale human right abuses, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Fourth, the complex 
emergency situations such as emerged in Darfur unite more dimensions of threats for 
the people living on the respective territory. Fifth, as we experience in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone or Angola, the economy of violence is profitable for several players in the 
conflict, which make those interested in maintaining the conflict. 
Making the fight end is still not easy, even if we understand the importance of basic 
security. The main problem is that the local players, who are actively participating in the 
fights, are not always interested in the peace, even if the majority of the population is 
tired of the long years of violence. The clear role of the international community here is 
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to make the factions lay down the arms, that is to force the peace through different 
peacemaking exercises. The intermediary channel between large scale violence and 
basic conditions for security is the peace agreement, which is often absent, thus the 
situation creates extra challenges for the statebuilders. In Afghanistan the Bonn 
Agreement was designed as a supplementary document of the absent peace agreement.  
The outcome of the first objective in this stage, id est ceased fighting, depends on 
two important factors: who was the winner (if there was at all) of the war; and whether 
the method of ending the war was appropriate regarding the remained conditions and 
the characteristic of the war. These two factors are critical in terms whether the 
intervention could establish credible presence in the country. The first six to twelve 
weeks are critical in this sense and can influence the final success of the statebuilding 
mission. (Chesterman 2004: 100) Each conflict creates power vacuum which may be 
filled by warlords, criminal groups, or other destructive non-state actors. Consequently, 
the sustainable development of the country depends on the fact whether the state is able 
to fill this gap. Disintegration of legitimate authority is one of the most tangible signs of 
state failure, which limits the state to practice the monopoly on violence, and per 
definition, foreign military interference is needed to fill the above mentioned vacuum, 
as conflict is not over until the state authority has been rebuilt. 
Accordingly, the development in post-conflict situations depends on the method of 
ending the war, and on the situation which was born after the conflict. The conflict 
always creates power vacuum and it is significant which groups are able to fill the gap. 
If there was a clear winner, the structure and dynamic of the post-conflict development 
is influenced by the unbalanced power relation among the groups and the will of the 
winner will overwhelming in the decision process. In most of the situation, the losers 
are explicitly excluded from the rebuilding process. It always relies upon the winner 
whether it excludes the other factions, causing significant risk of future reemergence of 
violent power struggles. In Germany and Japan after the annihilating loss, the 
occupying powers intended to avoid the same mistakes that they committed after the 
First World War, and did not want to humiliate the German or the Japanese society, 
which could have been the source of future vengeance. Let alone the fact that the 
specific situation after the Second World War makes it inappropriate to compare 
Germany and Japan with recent cases, one general lesson can be drawn, the method of 
ending a war is significant to the future development. Further challenge is that in many 
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situations, such as in Rwanda, or more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, the loser of the 
war feels net loss in power as a security threat and may take more extreme and violent 
preventive actions. On the other hand, when the war ends without providing clear 
winner, the warring factions will probably agree in the aftermath of the conflict by 
integrating all the players in the new system. In this case the challenge is when the 
political culture is not ready for the democratic decision making process. When 
undemocratic tendencies clash in the political arena the recurrence of violence is 
probable. The “inverse Clausewitzean rule” means that the struggle has practically 
never ended: the politics was only the continuation of war by other means. In this 
second case, the length of the war and the number of the warring groups are also 
significant considering the durability of peace. During a long period of war, the other 
five dimensions are extensively affected, too. In this case, the peace agreement probably 
will not mean the end of the war, only ceasefire among certain groups whilst others will 
continue the fight. The post-Cold War history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
was permanent fighting with high fluctuation among the players and systems of 
alliances. The broader is the peace dividend at the end of the war, the more probable is 
the lasting peace. The problem is that in multiplayer games it is difficult to arrive at a 
conclusion that is equally acceptable for all the groups, and even if the agreement is 
reached, the implementation will be to slow to be able to maintain the conditions of the 
agreement as the power relation of the groups can change meanwhile. Apart from the 
complex networks of the warring parties the legitimacy of the new order created by the 
peace agreement may not be strong in the eyes of the different groups and the people of 
the country. 
Both the method of ending the war and the question whether there is a clear winner 
influence the way how the second step of creating basic security should be achieved. 
The reestablishment of the monopoly on the use of legitimate violence is not only 
serves regaining the most important state function, but increases predictability of the 
statebuilding process. In the long term, the central authority must be the only player on 
the territory that has the legitimate opportunity to use coercive force to be able to 
achieve further goals by deterring and punishing the spoilers. One of the key features of 
state failure is that the state is unable to control the whole territory of the state and the 
borders threatening neighboring countries. An incapable or unwilling state does not care 
about effective border control giving space for the birth of the fluid complex of 
regionalized webs of political, economic, identity and security relationships. (Boas 
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2005: 392) The consequence of the privatization of the use of force leads towards the 
escalation of vertical and horizontal failure of the state in every dimension. Apart from 
military defense, the territoriality of the state is a basic concept in economic regulation 
and in the social services, too. Without border control the tax-revenue is nonexistent, or 
it is impossible to provide social benefits for people, who do not necessarily stay on the 
controlled territory of the country. The unprotected borders give space for migration, 
weakening the identity of the population through changing the social structure. 
Maintaining the state monopoly on the means of coercion is only sustainable if the 
development in the security dimension is followed, or completed by the reestablishment 
of basic political institutions, protection of human rights, provision of social services 
and enhancement of economic recovery. (Englebert 2008: 106) The constellation of the 
dimensions in this sense provides a special situation when development is made 
possible by the fact that citizens are able to produce wealth instead of fighting. 
The success of reestablishing the monopoly on the legitimate use of force depends 
also on the counterinsurgency measures. Nevertheless, the needed counterinsurgency 
tactics and measures depend on three factors. First, the characteristics of wars changed a 
lot during the last decades. The new forms would not represent war in the 
Clausewitzean sense, but they are not low intensity conflicts or simple domestic strives, 
either. The goal of counterinsurgency cannot be simply to compel opponents to fulfill 
our will. The informally regulated economy or social networks are the sources of these 
new wars and violence. (Kaldor 1999) The counterinsurgency tactics have to keep in 
mind that the networks of these new wars are optimal tool for the insurgents to mobilize 
and recruit new soldiers, whilst the necessary foreign military help is rather 
counterproductive by creating negative feelings against that military force and 
eventually against the powers allied with it, which is mostly the legal central 
government. The new wars are criminalized, predatory and private, that makes the 
transformation from the state of war to the state of peace difficult. Second, the 
international involvement is important because the weak state has no resources and is 
not able to create security in an environment where the composition of the players is 
very fragmented. The several players carry the hazard of increasing the costs of 
mitigating the differences of the interests. The armed groups represent permanent threat 
to the statebuilding process, and there is a need to buy these groups as part of the 
counterinsurgency. Third, neglecting the dynamics of local revolution and counter-
revolution makes the possibility of winning the war against various non-state 
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movements low. The long wars represent the same challenge for counterinsurgency as 
they represented during the Cold War. (Berger et al 2007) 
In order to achieve the third step in the security-military dimension, two objectives 
are to be fulfilled. First, conditions for basic human security have to be established. 
Second, the security-dilemma, which encumber the warring factions to be able to chose 
nonviolent conflict managing solutions, has to be solved. As we argued above the 
different actors involved in statebuilding have different interests, the elite, or the state 
itself can be interested in maintaining conflict and violence, for which the state can be 
characterized failed. The striking example is Darfur, where Khartoum is one of the main 
causes of the maintained violence and the failure of providing basic human security. In 
this sense, we could say that the notion of state failure is contradicting in itself, too. As 
Morten Boas and Kathleen Jennings (2005: 385-386) point out, the expression assumes 
that all states function on the same spectrum. According to them, the relevant question 
is for whom the state is failing. The argument is worth to think about, because taking 
again the example of Darfur, the Sudanese regime, id est the state enjoys security, and 
‘only’ the people suffer from the consequences of insecure life. Taking the people as 
referent objects, the picture of security may be fundamentally different. The approach of 
putting the human security in the center of analysis gives the opportunity to understand 
basic security concerns that has to be addressed in order to be able to reach the goal of 
the first stage of statebuilding. There is a certain threshold below which the possibility 
of human life is unlikely. The most significant dangers that threaten human security are 
starvation, poverty, disease, environmental degradation, pollution or organized crime. 
(Boas et al 2005: 389) The solutions and even the threats come from other dimensions 
than security, that also proves the interconnectedness of them. In the absence of a 
functioning state, the consequence of human insecurity is growing marginalization of 
groups and increasing resistance, which lead to ethnic, religious hatred in the society. 
The felicity of Rubin Barnett’s (2003) composition is striking in this sense, because he 
defines human security as the concept that unifies fields of policy that have 
conventionally been kept separated, human security brings together the goals of 
humanitarianism, development and international security.  
It is easy to understand that after long years of war none of the warring parties trust 
in the counterparts. If a group feels itself insecure a vicious circle of mutual threat 
begins. The threatened group will try everything to feel less insecure, which means 
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usually increased violence against other groups. Only if the dilemma is solved can the 
statebuilding proceed with tasks such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, 
or with the building of new security institutions. Even if the key is to increase the 
security of the warring parties, we should not forget the needs of the civilians. (Call et al 
2002) In several cases, because of the critical level of violent crime, the civilians have 
faced higher level of threat than during the war. Because of the inability of the 
government, the international powers are responsible for maintaining civil security, too. 
However, in most situations the military forces are not appropriate to serve this goal. 
The solution is the deployment of international police personnel, which is prepared for 
the task to maintain civilian security until the new institution built in the later stages are 
strong enough to manage these tasks. 
The changing international environment also influences the outcome of civil conflict 
as it shapes the expectations and more importantly the political, social and economic 
networks in which the failed state has to be integrated during the statebuilding process. 
The international context of a domestic war and conflict determines the opportunities of 
the solution, too. The most important characteristic of the new international order is that 
the different dimensions of the reality cannot be managed separately. The powerful 
process of globalization also means that the dynamic of change is very rapid and 
spontaneous, and as a consequence neither the international organizations, nor the 
powerful states are able to build ready strategies for future events.  
One of the most unfavorable conditions of maintaining functions of the state is when 
a landlocked country is surrounded by “bad neighbors”. As Paul Collier (2007: 63) 
mentions, very simple questions influence the development, such as the dilemma, that 
without that the neighbor spends money on developing the infrastructure, the trade of 
the landlocked country cannot increase, either. The solution is to help neighbors to 
develop and let the positive growth spillover effects to increase growth in the whole 
region. Important factors are the sound economic policies and improved coastal access 
for the landlocked countries, too. The unintended externalities are also present in 
situations where the consequences of the war could not be kept inside of the borders of 
the country. State failure is a regional public bad in “the bottom billion” (Collier 2007: 
130). The chaotic situation in one country leads to the deterioration of possibilities of 
saving neighbors from failing. The best examples are found in Africa. The turmoil 
initially broken out in Liberia eventually led to wars in the whole region in the 1990s. 
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Similarly, the uncontrolled situation in Darfur pulls the Central African Republic and 
Chad into the conflict. Longer wars in a country have a greater possibility to spill over 
to other countries, too. However, the duration of civil wars depends on other seemingly 
independent variables. Motivations and the main generators of hostility behind the war 
significantly influence the duration of the wars. Long lasting civil wars increase the 
opportunity of negative spillovers and lead easily to interstate disputes, too. This is most 
commonly present, because the neighbors, because of humanitarian reasons, but more 
often, because the felt opportunity of gaining influence, intervene to change the 
outcome of the civil war. The opportunistic attacks of neighbors are motivated by the 
decreasing expected opportunity costs of military intervention parallel to the 
diminishing state power. Apart from weakening the rival country, other motivation for 
intervention by supporting rebel groups are to remove completely the not wanted rival 
regime, to support separatists because of irredentism, protect of ethnic kin, or using the 
intervention as retaliation. The “inventory” of examples is unfortunately very large, 
enough to think about the permanent Pakistani support of the Kashmiri separatists, the 
Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia to protect Vietnamese, or when Sudan began to 
support the Lord Resistance Army in exchange that Uganda supported South Sudanese 
rebels. The externalization of civil conflict is also possible through the attack of the 
government that is already in the war in a form of cross-border counterinsurgency 
attacks, such as Turkey used to do in Iraq, or as Israel did against interventionist 
neighbors in form of retaliation. It is also common when a powerful regional power 
intervenes in a country to prevent the opportunity of expansion of the expected spillover 
effects. The externalization of civil wars can be very easily explained also by the fact 
that in absence of domestic resources the rebel groups, warlords, or other players of the 
conflict need to find external resources for continuing the fighting. That is the 
explanation why weak rebel groups are able to survive for decades. The external funds 
and more evidently the sanctuaries in neighboring states mean the source of survival for 
them. (Gleditsch et al 2008) 
On the other hand, not only civil war can deteriorate situation in certain regions, but 
regional problems can lead to intensified civil conflicts closing the vicious circle of 
violence. In case of Afghanistan, during the last few decades the neighboring countries 
were interested in a weak Afghanistan and eventually they tried to pull the country 
apart. (Dobbins et al 2004: 129) In that sense, support of neighboring states has to be 
the integral part of the complex and multidimensional strategy of rebuilding failed states 
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and intending to strengthen the domestic institutions. Another regional factor which 
weakens the capacities of a state is international migration. Mass migration is usually 
the consequence of violence and war, but the reasons behind it can be very complex and 
diverse, however, all forms represent significant security problems for the receptive 
states. The migration flows not only weaken the capacity of the state but they question 
the sovereignty and autonomy of the state as they usually show that the state is unable 
to control effectively its border. The situation is more severe where the congruence 
between state and society is weakened by other factors, such as weak governmental 
institutions, abuses of central power, everyday violence that cannot be controlled by 
state authority. Zaryab Iqbal and Harvey Starr (2008) proved by using statistical 
quantitative methods that civil war and international conflict in the proximity spread 
very easily. However, state failure in itself does not diffuse, only by transmitting the 
consequences. 
Connected to the arguments of the paragraphs above, the lessons from former 
statebuilding exercises are convincing in terms that external environment and 
externalities are crucial in the future success. There are two main groups of those during 
the statebuilding process: the intended effects, in form of a foreign intervention and 
engagement; and the not intended externalities, in form of preexisting negative or 
positive spillovers from the region. The techniques of conflict management still reflect 
to the traditional logic assuming for instance that sanctions against the central 
government can have effect on the flow of events in the state. Actually the assumption 
is correct but the effect is not intended as sanctions weaken the state even more. On the 
other hand, solutions that involve international interventions not surprisingly provoke 
the fear of resurrection of unilateral power politics. Two stiles of the Cold War 
interventionist politics are represented by the French practice on their former colonies, 
they openly helped loyal parties to power. The British intervention in the Biafra War 
was similar where London provided military assistance to the incumbent government. 
(Gambari 1995:226-227) 
After the Cold War, the norm responsibility and necessity for intervention is 
influenced by more everyday factors, as the feelings of the general population of the 
country that plans the military intervention. According to the “doorstep principle”, only 
proximate suffering generates reaction. It is also an empirical fact that citizens of the 
developed countries are slow in demanding action from their government to stop the 
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mass killing committed by governments in remote regions. (Bagaric 2005: 436) 
However, physical and geographical distance does not matter as much anymore. Due to 
the effects of globalization and especially the booming development of communication 
technologies we live in the world of “global neighborhoods”. Even if the media is not 
able to completely set the political agenda, “the CNN effect” has had decisive power in 
several situations. The media is the explanation that in less covered countries (Sudan, or 
Rwanda in the 1990s, or Congo still today) the public interest for intervention is lower, 
but where the media transmits frequent live coverage on the suffering, the politicians are 
pushed to make decisions. That was the case with the American engagement in Somalia 
where the intervention and also the exit of the troops were influenced by the American 
public that followed the events on television. 
International intervention can appear in non-military forms, as well. But the 
experience with coercive, non-military measures and their effectiveness in a failed state 
makes their use rather questionable. It is a common knowledge that economic sanctions 
rather harm the society. And even if economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing 
leadership in the country only chaos will emerge. Economic sanctions have been 
overemphasized but ineffective tool in the hand of the international community, which 
is eventually understandable, since economic sanctions are the obvious cheap solution. 
The basic idea behind economic sanctions is that every government and leader is afraid 
of losing the profit from cooperation. (Marinov 2005: 566) But it is only true if 
economic sanctions appear in form of political costs for the leaders and if institutions 
are strong enough to push the leaders to work to lift the sanctions. In the post-Cold War 
world coercive diplomacy can only work in the world of the developed sovereign 
countries as it builds on the presumption that all countries are rational. Today, there is a 
need of “smart sanctions” (Craven 2002), which target the state and not the society. In a 
certain sense, the complex statebuilding is a smart sanction, too. 
However, statebuilding as a smart sanction necessitates international military 
engagement. Due to the fact that there are no clear norms of intervention, and the 
international order and law is rather based on the non-intervention discipline and the 
territorial sovereignty of states, the interventions cannot be legal in all situations. On the 
other hand, the document Responsibility to Protect was endorsed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 2005 and passed by the 1674 Security Council 
Resolution in 2006. Since then, the practice reflects more and more reference to this 
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document, as in case of Sudan, or in Kenya when the former Secretary General Kofi 
Annan tried to mediate the conflict. Furthermore, the recent Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon sees its main mission, as the head of the United Nations, in making the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ a real action from mere words. The document means that 
sovereignty is a responsibility of the states towards their citizens, and towards to other 
members of the international community, and on the other hand responsibility of certain 
international institutions, such as the Security Council of the United Nations, to practice 
this norm. However, responsibility does not refer to unilateral military interventions 
without the authorization of the Security Council, or military interventions without 
focusing on other dimensions of the conflict. There is a need for clear definition of 
military intervention in these situations, which would also help to answer the concerns 
of countries that see only a more sophisticated façade of unilateral interventions. 
(Bellamy 2009a) On the other hand, protective military engagement of the international 
community is necessary to protect the population of failed states and it is justified for its 
own sake, for humanitarian reasons and for preventive security purposes. (Zartman 
2005: 6) 
The history demonstrates that states have believed in the right of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention as an available option in case of imminent humanitarian 
crises which threatened their population. For instance, India referred to its right to 
intervene in East-Pakistan in 1971 to prevent humanitarian catastrophe, Vietnam ended 
the terror of Khmer Rouge in 1979 and Tanzania did so in case of the agony of Idi 
Amin in 1979 justifying their unilateral military intervention into the domestic issues of 
other countries with the same argument. (Bagaric 2005: 429) Even if somebody denies 
the right for hurting the sovereignty of a state, one has to accept that the norm of 
humanitarian intervention expanded by the dimension of responsibility and human 
rights necessarily triumph over the old norm of untouchable state sovereignty. 
Because of the anticipated consequences of neglected emergency and humanitarian 
crises the intervention is practically the duty of the international community. However, 
the practice shows that the occurrence of the intervention depends on the fact who is the 
initiator of it. According to statistical data (Dobbins et al 2008: 1-7), in cases where the 
United Nations was the initiator, European and North American countries were 
underrepresented among the troops on the ground, which shows that geopolitics still 
plays a role in the decision on engagement, even if there is no motivation to gain 
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geographical advantage. European countries represent a negative attitude towards the 
United Nations’ operations, because of the United Nations’ obvious failures in halting 
civil wars in several points of the world, but most prominently in Bosnia. Consequently, 
after 1995, European countries withdrew troops from the United Nations led missions 
almost entirely and rather backed NATO missions. On the other hand, European 
countries are usually reluctant in NATO missions, too. The bad appetite from the 
European point of view is caused by the significant influence of Washington on where 
and when to intervene. Nevertheless, the existing evidence suggests that United States’ 
leadership is often critical determinant of an operation’s success or failure. 
Unfortunately, we also have to accept that the international missions where European 
and American troops are absent have to fight with lack of resources and ineffective 
strategies. Historical experiences have showed that multilateral interventions could only 
affect the local situation in smaller countries. The United Nations’ operations have been 
under-resourced, fought with serious deficit in hard power, with slow deployment of 
military personnel, with uneven quality of the military contributions, and with problems 
of coordination and interoperability. On the margin, this is why the United Nations’ 
operations (would) have needed the European and even more the American presence. In 
reality, Washington is reluctant to provide its forces for multinational decision 
structures, which are proved to be ineffective so many times during the short history of 
post-Cold War international interventions. The United Nations has been effective in 
legitimization enforcement coalitions for interstate collective security but very 
ineffective in intrastate conflicts, because even if there were consent in the Security 
Council on the very fact of the intervention, the weak implementation has undermined 
even the best agreements. (Doyle et al 2006: 2) 
Consequently, a new norm of intervention is emerging which does not necessarily 
relies on the authorization of the United Nations’ Security Council. In connection with 
the new norm, three basic questions come to one’s mind. First, it is not clear when the 
international actors have to intervene. Namely, it is not equal when the interveners 
prevent future catastrophes, or only intervene when the situation is already present. 
Justifying interventions on moral grounds reflects the religious tradition of just war. It is 
clear that the international community has the duty to act in case of experienced 
genocide or humanitarian crimes, but it is not obvious whether the international 
community has the right to intervene in a domestic situation. Second, the form of 
intervention is not clear, however, it seems that the first priority should be the protection 
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of civilian population. Third, multilateral operations seemed to be more legitimate but 
the effectiveness of those interventions is low. (Locke 2001)  
In connection with the above mentioned dilemmas, there is no clear strategy of 
action in for the sound military presence in post-conflict situation, either. For instance, 
the Afghanistan model of minimal presence of foreign military, commonly labeled as 
“light footprint”, obviously failed to achieve the previously stated goals of the Bonn 
Agreement or the Afghanistan Compact. That is why the Obama administration had to 
revise Washington’s Afghanistan strategy, as the situation threatens with intensified 
recurrence of violence, which can undo everything that has been implemented in the last 
8 years. It needs serious planning before the intervention on the breadth of tasks that the 
international community assertively pursues to achieve counting with the agreement 
which was reached on the size of the intervention. The duration of the intervention is 
also important. A too short international present is not effective, but a too long one is 
not legitimate. Being responsive to the needs of the local population is also not easy; it 
is difficult to decide who is in the best position to represent the interests and demands of 
the society. The foreign military assistance alike to the economic aid creates 
dependency structures but at the same time growing resistance in certain parts of the 
society, which eventually may generate deep cleavages in the society tearing apart the 
achievements of statebuilding. Finally, the international interventions are usually not 
coherent enough because of the lack of coordination among the vast number of foreign 
organizations present in the post-conflict situation. (Paris et al 2009a: 305-310)  
The success of a statebuilding exercise depends on the domestic conditions of the 
country, as well. The external dimension needs to complete the factors which are 
missing or temporarily not present in the domestic dimension. The conditions mean the 
local capacity and opportunity for statebuilding. The lack of domestic capacity is the 
real limit of statebuilding. Foreign powers can help in establishing and maintaining 
security, but the institutions and democracy can only work when local stakeholders also 
participate in the (re-)building process from the first moment. However, statebuilders 
should not overestimate the importance of local resources either, as the domestic factors 
and conditions represent rather facilitating or limiting circumstances than automatic 
success or failure in the statebuilding process. The domestic dimension of the process 
shows clearly what the country lacks, what is missing, and where a need of enhanced 
effort is. The history of former statebuilding exercises proved that preexisting law, 
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order, pacific political  culture, literacy, high level of general education, moderate 
economic differences, general economic development, sizable middle class, rule of law, 
strong civil society all contribute to the sustainability of the reformed institutions. 
(Etzioni 2007: 42) However, the problem with weak and failed states is that they per 
definition lack these conditions as a cause and, or the consequence of state failure.  
The characteristics of wars changed significantly after the end of the global 
opposition of two ideologies. In the 1990s after the drowning of the super power 
assistance, many former proxies sank into large scale domestic violence. These wars 
had several unprecedented features. They were depoliticized, private, criminalized and 
predatory contrarily to the old ideological, political and collective wars. The main cause 
of the change was that the warring parties had to rely on the scarce domestic sources. 
On the other hand, we have to keep in mind that violence and war are not synonyms. 
Stathis Kalywas (2006) prepared a thought provoking argument about the differences of 
war and violence using the example of the Greek Civil War between 1946 and 1949. 
According to him, the causes of the war are not the same as the causes of violence. The 
later intents on civilians who are not full time member of any armed groups. War is 
rather the frame or the opportunity for people to cause harm to everyday enemies by 
using violence. War privatizes politics and transforms everyday grievances into violent 
solutions. 
Consequently, the three most important influencing factors of the domestic 
dimension in direct connection with the security dimension are: the history of violence 
in the given country; the thoughts of domestic stakeholders and the people about 
violence; and the direct causes of the conflict. It has been clear for all that the direct 
causes of conflict have to be alleviated in the short term, the new aspect is rather that the 
first two factors have rarely been analyzed separately. The history of violence and war 
is important as it transforms the everyday dynamic of life.16 The expectations and the 
demand for certain qualities of life are much lower in societies where the only wish of 
the people is to stop fighting and there are no long term plans. Long wars enhance 
informal non-state networks that exist parallel to the state but follow a different logic. 
The society needs alternative structures and groups that try to address human rights 
threats and protect the people from the consequences of war and state failure. The 
network of these groups, however, means a challenge for statebuilding, as it is even 
more difficult to understand the logic of the network and find the ways how to capitalize 
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it as an existing resource. We need a new understanding of these situations. However, 
the lack of centralized authority, as a consequence of a long war, does not automatically 
indicate domestic anarchy. The countries rather experience domestic disorder when 
mutually sovereign claims struggle with each other. To better understand the motives of 
the people after the war, we have to keep in mind that there are different kinds of wars 
with different dynamics. The problem is not the occurrence of wars, but the length, 
however, the insurgencies experience very low success but can operate permanently. A 
long war broadens the palette of motives, and evidently the explanations, behind the war 
and violence: greed wars, new wars, identity conflicts, radical alternative for hopeless 
youth, ethnicity wars, and political causes. (Boas et al 2005) The domestic war 
connected with external conditions make the domestic picture even less clear. The 
cheap arms, the market for diamonds or drugs, the permanent safe heavens all are 
factors that contribute to postponing of settling the end of the conflict. 
Second, the attitude of the local population towards violence influences not only the 
length of the war but the opportunity of future recurrence of violence. On the other 
hand, long history of war means widespread privatization of violence and negative 
attitudes towards the central government, which makes people less loyal to the central 
authorities and more recipient to violent events. The desire for order is paradoxically 
linked to multiple manifestation of violence. The violence is the outcome of the struggle 
of people for more certainty. (Dunn 2009) In lot of cases, a large segment of the society 
is excluded from the benefits of being the citizen of a certain state, and future 
expectations are not better either, as the economic and educational gap between groups 
steadily grows. 
The direct causes of conflict can eventually explain the outcome of the statebuilding 
process. Susan Woodward (2007) published an article on the root causes of civil war. 
The causes are complex and not always directly manifested, but the statebuilding 
process have to address them right from the beginning of the intervention. The cultural 
explanation holds that wars are fought on the political outcomes of cultural differences, 
that is the main motivation for war is grievance. On the other hand, according to the 
economic argument, rebels will fight for economic gains, and only fight until it is 
profitable for them. The newer political-regime argument concludes that the main cause 
of civil war is the absence of democracy. However, the interventions are rather interest 
motivated and there is no room for taking into account the root causes of civil conflicts. 
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Therefore the success of the first stage of statebuilding depends on the ability to exploit 
the existing resources and foundations of the politics, society and economics, and to 
overcome the deficiencies. The conflicts and civil wars usually have local causes apart 
from the national or regional consequences. For instance, the social motivation of the 
youth can mobilize them for supporting the new local “chief”. It is because comparison 
about power on the local level is easier, thus, hatred and economic hostilities are the 
characteristics of this beginning situation. The local communities, which are not part of 
the national social contract that gives universal social services in exchange for the 
monopoly on the use of force, have growing demands towards the state that is unable to 
satisfy them. Discrimination of social and economic rights lead to grievances, and the 
violation of the political and civil rights of the people is a clear conflict trigger. 
Inequality, denied participation in the political process and experienced turbulent 
democratization are all contributing factors to escalation of a low level conflict. (Thoms 
et al 2007) These communal demands, the historical inequities and the local elite which 
advocate violence all contribute to the complexity of the situation. The complexity in 
most of the situation reflects the struggle for identity after the state emerged from and 
without the colonial borders. 
The different dimensions overlap each other, however, as it is seen during the first 
stage, there are certain constellations which show more direct connection in 
development. During the first stage it is different than in the later steps. The security 
depends on the domestic capacities and the external involvement. The scarcer are the 
opportunities for development from domestic resources, the higher intensity of external 
intervention is needed in order to create the environment in which basic security is 
maintained. The nexus among the three dimensions is represented by the Doyle and 
Sambani’s triangle which was used in examining the interconnected nature of the 
dimensions. 
 
 
The complex of the institutional, societal and economic dimensions 
 
Understanding the differences of conflict situations, we easily accept that the 
security-military dimension is interconnected with several factors present in the other 
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dimensions. Security cannot be guaranteed only by military forces, even though it is 
often necessary. Security depends on the existence or creation of functioning state. 
Functioning state’s basic characteristic is to satisfy the criteria of the double compact, 
which is the “network of rights and obligations underpinning the state’s claim to 
sovereignty”. (Ghani et al 2008: 6) It is a compact between the state and the citizens, but 
also a compact between the state and the international community to ensure adherence 
to international norms and standards of accountability and transparency. That is, the 
eventual criterion from the external point of view is a state which is able to control its 
sovereign share of the world’s territory. Expecting the fulfillment of these criteria in the 
first step of statebuilding is too early, but we have to keep in mind that without stability 
and security nobody will invest in peace. Security is a basic human right, security is the 
factor that gives faith in the future development, and strengthening itself reduces the 
possibility of recurrence of large scale violence. However, reverse changes are possible, 
too. For example, too rapid institutionalization and democratization may reignite the 
conflict. The urgency of ending the war is significant in the economic dimension, too, as 
postponed violence and conflict dramatically increase the costs of statebuilding.  
The connection among the institutional, societal and economic dimension is also 
clear, but it is not as strong as among the security, external and domestic dimensions. 
The institutional, societal and economic dimensions contribute to the opportunity of 
creating a secure environment for the future development. The basic institutions, the 
alleviated gravest social problems and the reconstruction of the basic economic 
functions all support the development of the domestic capacities whilst they influence 
the success of external involvement. Furthermore, the last three dimension also 
influence the development of the environment in which security can be maintained. 
Consequently, the worst risk factor during the first stage is the opportunity of a new 
war. The new war can have even worse consequences than the former one. In Rwanda 
the genocide followed a failed peace, which was tried to reach by the Arusha Accords in 
1993. Charles Call (2008a: 3-4) listed several concerns regarding the early steps of 
statebuilding. According to his argument, enhancing state institutional capacity may 
potentially harm the chances for consolidating peace. The most significant dilemmas 
are: first, the consequences of negotiated deals are not automatically lead to peace; 
second, the capacity of the state often confronts the legitimacy; third, urgent short term 
measures may hinder long term development; fourth, the international interests in the 
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statebuilding process are not always in line with the domestic demands; finally, the elite 
of the country can also have different interests than the population at large. The security 
is based not only on military forces and related factors but on seemingly far conditions 
as the shared values in the society, or the moral culture or the state of morality. Even if 
the social order and the level of security would suggest that the statebuilding succeeded 
in the military dimension, for instance criminal activities can emerge undoing the 
achievements. (Etzioni 2007: 152) 
Similarly to the security dimension, the domestic opportunities come from the 
institutional, economic and social reality, therefore the domestic dimension is more 
directly related to economy, society and the structure and effectiveness of the 
institutions. Institutional change is the key for future success and the very basis of new 
and sustainable institutions is the rule of law. Nevertheless, rule of law necessitates 
institutional change and mentality change at the same time, that is rule of law is 
impossible without some prior changes. It means, as Simon Chesterman (2004: 181) 
also pointed out, that the basic administrative institutions of justice have to be ranked 
among the highest priorities of statebuilding. The first stage of statebuilding in the 
institutional dimension needs the elaboration of functioning administrative structures 
that help to build out the justice system which is the holding pillar of the rule of law. 
During the first period, most importantly in the first months, it is inevitable that the 
intervening party carries the burden of conducting administration, but there is a need of 
locally recruited bureaucracy that is loyal to the statebuilding process, too. The 
administration has to be uniform and the rules must be effective on the whole territory 
of the state. (Ghani et al 2008: 131) 
Creating effective administrative structures and the basis for future institutions 
always depends on the existing institutional environment and the given opportunities by 
that environment. There are several challenges with which statebuilding process has to 
face during establishing the basic administration. Having in mind the criteria of being 
effective on the entire territory, the largest challenge of the state is the long existence of 
stateless zones, where alternative institutions are present, and where the local players 
are not interested in becoming part of a more centralized structure which could control 
their activity. Some populations may prefer life without states and collective 
governance, but the possibility of pre-Westphalian political geographies is close to zero 
in today’s globalized networks of politics, economies and societies, where the basic 
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frame of human activities is the state. The existence of stateless zones is partly the 
consequence of decolonization when the withdrawal of colonial authority was not 
substituted with emergence of functioning local institutional structures. The real 
problem with ungoverned and unadministered territories is that the power vacuum 
creates instability in the whole region. The phenomenon is manifested especially in 
Africa where the provoking factors are the low people to land ratio, prominence of 
parallel political authorities, widely available weapons, smuggling, high degree of 
mobility of labor and capital, permanent limited cross-border wars. The state is totally 
absent on several ungoverned territories, so do the norms represented by the state. 
Despite of the similarities, there also are significant differences among ungoverned 
territories. First, in certain remote areas the state cannot be present because an 
alternative governance structure contests the power of the state, and the elite of the 
territory refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the state. Second, in certain situations 
the state simply lacks the necessary resources for governing a territory, because of 
inaccessibility, social resistance, or ongoing armed struggle. It means that the state is 
unable to provide even the most basic resources for the population on that territory, 
which invites alternative powers to fill the vacuum. Third, sometimes the state decides 
to stop providing services for a territory because of cost-efficiency reasons and try to 
control the territory outside of the official state institutions. (Kraxberger 2007; Rabasa 
2008) 
The first step of statebuilding in the institutional dimension needs to focus on these 
ungoverned territories and help to establish legitimate administration. The chaotic 
situation can be overcome if the capacities of the state to administer the entire territory 
are strengthened and if the state is able to provide the necessary services and 
administrative structures. As we mentioned above, the new forms of institutions need 
also the change of attitude of people towards the institutions. 
It is a naivety to wait with the expansion of state administration until the point when 
the state is able to do the necessary tasks by itself. The international administration is 
not the goal but the necessary mean to overcome this challenge. The two most important 
proposition of the new institutionalism in transitology is that institutions influence 
norms, beliefs and actions of the society; and that institutions are indigenous, that is 
their form and functioning depend on the conditions under which they have emerged 
and endured. (Przeworski 2004: 527) Consequently, the state’s participation in creating 
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the new institutions is the key for sustainability, but the institutions can shape the 
people, too, giving more space for the state to proceed with institution-building.  
As we mentioned several time above, the basic goal of this stage is to stop fighting 
and avoid future conflict and violence. The development in the institutional dimension 
has to complement this goal, too. But institutional efficiency is in vain if conflict 
renews. The first emergency phase needs special attention, and we must not be satisfied 
with such conclusions, that democracy will solve the problem in the future, or that the 
society of a failed state needs free and fair elections. Luis Herrero (2005) collected the 
important tasks of this stage, also concluding that the most important emergency need 
of the society is to have administrative institutions, which also will be the basis for 
development in other dimension. For instance, the administration is the mean for having 
an effective taxation, or a banking system. The administrative basis has to be 
complemented with local civil services and mechanisms for local participation in the 
decision making, eventually in the statebuilding process. This is important for 
maintaining loyalty, or at least for decreasing the opposition of the local population 
towards the whole process. The basic administration and the foundation of further 
institutions lead to the emerging legitimacy of these institutions. 
The institutions that enjoy legitimacy among the people are the inevitable frame for 
the smooth and sustainable development of economy and society. Institution building is 
more than peacebuilding. It also consists of the tasks of rebuilding and enhancing local 
authorities, the civil society and the judiciary system. This step has to be divided up into 
three sections: after establishing basic administrative structures there is a need of setting 
up the mechanism of democratic political consultations, finally the system of 
administration of public services and goods. In several cases, institution building does 
not justify the direct intervention, as there is no need for that. Measures that aim at 
strengthening the governments are commonly used, for instance by the European 
Union’s or the World Bank’s development programs, such as propagation of “good 
governance” through training of judges, legislators, election observers or police officers 
etc. (Caplan 2004:43-60; Krasner 2004:103; Posner 2004; Starr 2008) 
Institution building is usually a top-down process, but the reverse direction also 
influences effective functions of the institutions. The most important factor of 
sustainable democratic development is the emergence of the rule of law. This is highly 
understandable as the state is materialized not in the staff of political institutions but in 
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the idea behind that, which is basically the system of rules. (Kende 2003:39). 
Nevertheless, the definition of rule of law is rather vague in the literature. It is easier to 
catch the essence of it through defining the necessary parts of it. In this sense, rule of 
law means that law has to stand above all arbitrary authority in any circumstances. 
(Lánczi 2000:181-183; Posner 2007) Practically it indicates that the “institution 
builders” have to take into consideration all the lessons and guidance that the scholars 
and experts have written down – from Friedrich Hayek to John Rawls – about the “rule 
of law”.  
As a conclusion, the past experiences with statebuilding in weak and failed states 
show at least one very clear lesson: forcing rapid democratization is counter-productive 
and it does not help to build up and maintain long term structures. Quickly pushed 
democracy weakens the existing structures as it increases competition where the 
positions of the central authority are still weak. Elections and power sharing will not 
make democracy when the institutions of the state are absent or weak. In the first stage, 
the way towards democracy is not enhancing participation, rather the promotion of 
legitimacy through governance and administration on the whole territory of the state.  
Prescriptions for institution building sometimes pay little attention to the reality. 
Even if the material side of institution building is present because of the international 
actors, the institutions will not function in the long term without significant local 
ownership. Namely, the economic dimension has to develop to contribute to the 
sustainability of the new or reformed institutions. Furthermore, in general, the economic 
dimension provides the necessary material and financial resources for the completion of 
the statebuilding process. The objective of this stage is not the creation of a perfect 
national economy. The goal is rather to eliminate the existing burdens of long term 
economic development. The limits of development are not always the lack of necessary 
resources, rather the fact that the state is too weak to use these resources and reinvest 
them into the development. In many cases, the state does not even practice control over 
these resources letting the opportunity for alternative governance structures to have their 
own revenue sources. One of the contributing factors of conflict is that the state is 
unable to provide services, collect taxes or exploit the natural resources. The absence of 
the state in this dimension means that it is unable to alleviate chronic poverty which 
leads to violence and to even worse poverty. On the other hand, economic development 
can give a common cause for the people to shift focus from the past to the future by 
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overcome grievances and gaining new identity in the economic development. But in 
certain situations, the end of large scale violence is that one group run out of resources. 
In that case, the complexity of statebuilding is even more obvious: the economic 
development in itself may give back the missing economic resource, that is why the 
development in the other sectors and control over the territory is important to avoid 
renewed fighting. (Junne et al 2005: 6) 
The real problem is that state failure is the consequences of a severe conflict and a 
post-conflict situation poses the challenge of economic recovery and risk of renewed 
conflict. Paul Collier’s argument in his several articles and publications (2008a,b, 2007, 
et al 2006) examines and interprets the connection among the two factors, concluding 
that economic growth correlates with decreasing risk of conflict recurrence. That is the 
argument goes beyond the simple greed explanation by stating that insurgency and 
rebellion will appear where it is feasible, and when the economy grows, the opportunity 
costs for using violent means will increase, too. In that sense, the basic challenge is how 
to prove that economic growth will occur in the future, whilst renewed fighting has to 
be encumbered as violence would also undo economic growth. Civil wars are not the 
consequence of irrational activities in the society. Greed and grievance also exist in 
functioning societies, the main difference is that weak and failed states do not have the 
institutionalized mechanisms for managing them by peaceful means. Not simply the 
status of certain social groups causes conflicts, as the modernization theory suggests, 
rather the complex political and economic net of conditions, which give the frame for 
decisions. Not only the existence of natural resources influences violence, but the form, 
how profit is made from it. Statistical measurements (Lujala 2009) prove that drug 
cultivation causes less likely war then exploitation of oil, gas, or precious stones. 
Natural resources influence the severity of the conflict, the location of these resources is 
crucial, and also the type of resources matters. The access to lootable resources makes 
the rebel groups more violent. Statistical analysis shows that in countries where the 
economic assets are immobile and unequally distributed political violence is more 
likely. The explanation is that the agents of the economy also use political strategy to 
maximize their profits, and in the context of not functioning institutions violence is a 
viable political option for them. (Boix 2008; Murshed 2002)  
Rebel or insurgent groups obviously need money to be able to operate. The existence 
of natural resources on the territory of these groups increases the opportunity of war, as 
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provides the necessary economic resource for them. In poor countries, the problem is 
even severe, because the opportunity costs of waging war is low, moreover the state is 
unable to control the events. The opportunity cost is the outcome of a simple cost-
efficiency measurement of the costs of war distracted from the expected benefits. It 
explains that in an ethnically fragmented environment the opportunity of war is lower as 
the coordination costs in a highly diverse society is much enormous. (Collier et al 1998; 
2001) The ideological, ethnic, religious, or cultural motivation of the rebels is less 
important than the feasibility of their activities.17 Finding volunteers is not easy and 
maintaining an army is costly. For instance, the Tamil Tigers spent 350 million USD 
per year for covering the costs of the rebel army, that is more or less the 20% of the total 
GDP of Sri Lanka’s North East region. (Collier et al 2006) Another example, the goal of 
most of the wars in Africa is to control resources, not a superior ideological idea or the 
identity. The “low-tech” conflicts need only the arms that are easily accessible on the 
world markets and the lootable resources are good means for exchange. However, it is 
true that the validation of the causes, why they use these resources to finance violence is 
already depends on identity questions. (Aspinall 2007) 
On the other hand, the natural resources can give opportunity also for the state to 
develop. 
 
 
6. The Possibility of the Outbreak of Conflicts and the Natural Resources  
Available in the Country. Source: Collier et al 1998: 571 
 
It is true, that to rapid and high level surplus of resources causes regression in other 
dimensions of statebuilding, but no or low surplus weakens the state, too. In 
macroeconomics, the “Dutch disease” means that abundant new resources make the 
other sectors of export uncompetitive. Examining the problem from the view of the 
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state, abundant resources make taxation less important. Without tax revenue the 
economy is less institutionalized, the influence of the state is low, as the only 
importance is to guard the control over the natural resources. The final outcome is 
decreased accountability and autocratic state. (Collier 2007: 38-60) Corruption is, 
however, indigenous to many societies and states. Corruption in these states serves key 
functions beyond the financial self-interests of the involved public officials and 
politicians, because corruption participates in the political ordering and despite of its 
corrosive effects, corruption forms part of the fabric of social relations. Nevertheless, 
corruption is not a decisive factor of conflict, but violence will arise, when corruption 
changes the social pattern of the state.  
Countries that possess significant natural resources have to fight with the challenge 
to escape the “resource curse”. Interestingly, the vast basis of natural resources cannot 
help the economic development and it rather weakens the institutional base of the state 
and increases the competition for power. The opportunity of control over the resources 
will attract destructive groups and actors to fight against the central government, that is 
why it is crucial that the state builds the ability of managing and exploiting these 
resources in a manner that serves long term development. The possibility of good 
management, however, depends on other dimension of statebuilding, too. The best 
example is the diamond market before the initiation of the Kimberley process. The 
implementers of the process often complain about the devastating level of corruption 
and the weak state capacities, which eventually hinder the implementation. 
Nevertheless, we should not forget that most of the concerned states sank in the chaotic 
situation because of the uncontrolled and profitable trade of “blood diamonds” among 
others. The activity of big diamond companies, most prominently the South African De 
Beers, have not helped to solve the situation either. De Beers having stores on the Fifth 
Avenue in New York was not really interested in the root of the diamonds. The real goal 
was pure profit, which was actually higher in situations when the given exporting state 
could not control the trade. Without saying that these companies are interested in state 
failure, we have to admit that the activity of foreign companies and foreign investments 
in the natural resources extraction sector is dangerous for the sustainable development.18 
In relation with the resources and the environment we have to mention the problem 
of the refugees, too. The “tragedy of the commons” is more strongly present in 
communities that do not expect to live on the same territory for long period. The 
  
105 
 
refugees have very short term interests and without resource management of the state in 
the neighborhood of the refugee camps, the refugees and the local communities will 
have emerging conflict over the decreasing resources. It is statistically proved that 
environmental scarcity fuels violence. (Martin 2005) 
Another challenge in a post-conflict situation is not simply the absence of economic 
activity, as the gray or black areas of the economy may flower during the war. The 
challenge is to rebuild the complex structure of legal economic activities that help 
general development. Where the state cannot control a part of its territory alternative 
authority and non-state groups will conduct economic activity. They can have even 
factories and control over foreign trade from that area giving the financial opportunity 
for the groups to survive without the state. That eventually makes these groups 
uninterested in statebuilding, they may feel even threatened by the process.  
The success of the first stage of economic development depends on the ability of the 
state and the statebuilders to satisfy the immediate needs of reconstruction. The 
reconstruction is evidently influenced by the existing economic endowments in the 
country. The distinctive human and economic geography of different weak states 
explains why the economic growth and development cannot converge in every country. 
It has a decisive influence on the countries development whether it is landlocked, highly 
dependent on primary goods export, or the ethnic diversity makes the coordination of 
the economy more costly. The reconstruction efforts, however, do not equate to 
development. Reconstruction means the economic rehabilitation of wartime damage of 
production capacities, or of the skilled labor, and reconstruction also means overcoming 
war-economy. The reconstruction is supported by several factors, such as the secure 
transportation opportunities, supportive financial, legal, educational and health 
institutions, accumulation of capital goods, human capital, natural resource 
management, innovative capacity and secure supply of power. (Etzioni 2004: 10, 
Mendelson Forman 2004: 74) However, the contribution of economic recovery to the 
stability of peace is not proven, the reconstruction efforts are crucial in statebuilding, as 
the failure of recovery obviously leads to renewed conflict. The key aspects of the 
security dimension are also costly, and quick economic recovery creates confidence in 
the societal dimension, provides funding for the new state institutions, manages the 
distortion in the economy caused by the international presence and creates sound 
domestic environment to proceed with the next stage of statebuilding. The challenge 
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with reconstruction is that in many cases the causes of conflict were socioeconomic in 
nature, therefore the reconstruction of the exact same structures will ignite new conflict. 
The conflict never leaves tabula rasa for future development and during the 
reconstruction the focus has to be on overcoming the challenges and exploiting the 
opportunities provided by the remaining structure. All these need the flexibility of the 
statebuilding strategy, because the specific country situations may create circumstances 
when the society’s demand is higher because of the not adaptive strategy, than the state 
could satisfy.  
The primary step of reconstruction is rebuilding the basic infrastructure because the 
physical elements of the economy relate to the long term needs of a country. 
Functioning infrastructure can provide net benefits for the communities. The 
maintenance of infrastructure, among others the protection of it from deliberate human 
actions, contributes to the overcoming of political, social and cultural divisions.  
 
 
7. The “Good Governance Triangle”. Source: Brown 2005: 109 
 
The societal dimension is understandable also highly connected with other 
dimensions, most prominently with the domestic dimension. The state of the society 
represent an important resource, namely the human resources for development are 
eventually influenced in this dimension. During the first stage, the goal is not to build a 
nation, and not to strengthen cohesion. It is obvious that external actors cannot force a 
society to become a nation; the goal is rather to create the environment and the 
conditions under which the people can leave together despite of the differences. It is a 
popular view during planning the multidimensional post-conflict interventions, that 
contrarily to the European nation-building, when the nations were born through violent 
and long wars, the new style of nation-building is to create nations through conflict 
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resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. (Ottaway 2002: 16) We have to keep in 
mind, that even if the country has unified nation, there is no guarantee that the state is 
functioning. A not functioning state in turn is the source of instability and conflict. 
Nation-building is a recent phenomenon, however, the idea of the nation, that is shared 
common culture, language, or identity is only a 200 years old concept. Nation is an 
imagined community based on shared commons, such as goals and future. In this sense, 
creating a nation does not seem to be impossible, citizenship or a functioning state can 
provide the conditions in which the people can be confident. In spite of the fact that 
nation-building cannot be the goal of statebuilding, there were and are forces and 
mechanism which intended to build a single nation with negative nation-building. In 
those cases the international community has the responsibility to stop these activities.  
The successful and rapid development of Germany and Japan after the World War 
has proved that the cohesion and homogeneity of the society is crucial contributing 
factor of statebuilding. In both cases the cohesion based on the national identity. 
Learning from the lessons of former statebuilding operations, we have to keep in mind 
that a foreign power has never succeeded with nation-building if it meant creation of 
cultural or historical ties within the society. Not letting alone the fact that the indicator 
of statebuilding is the viability of the reconstructed political, economic and societal 
institutions, the basis of sustainability comes from the fact that they can satisfy the 
demands of the society. Hence, this demand will only meet when the society is uniform 
in some terms. The identity could be the commonly felt loyalty towards the democratic 
institutions, as well. In this sense, nation-building is integral part of statebuilding. 
However, it does not aim at building up a nation rather at enhancing the connections 
within the society and between different groups.  
The history serves several examples for experiments for unifying a society. It is clear 
that the radical methods cannot be part of the solution. The forced assimilation in 
multiethnic empires during the 19th and 20th century, such as in the Austrian-Hungarian 
Monarchy or the Turkish Empire rather led to the break-up of these entities. The 
assimilation is a one-way melting attempt, that is based on the violent oppression of 
minorities. The majority aims to oblige the ritual convergence of minorities through 
forcing its institutions, as it was the case with Native Americans. (Shah 2003:167) On 
the other hand, the politics of segregation – the clearest appearance of it was the South 
African Apartheid system – not even attempts to create unity, rather tries to segregate 
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functionally and ethnically the minorities. Secondly, the politics of ethnic dominance 
(Lustick 1993) builds also on the oppression of minorities with forcing for instance the 
majority language on all citizens through the administration or the schooling system. 
That happened in Great Britain during centuries where the dominant ethnic group 
bureaucratically annexed the other ethnicities.19 During the colonization the colonizers 
followed the same technique by favoring one of the ethnic groups in the administration 
or in the economic relations, and as we could see that had catastrophic consequences for 
example in Rwanda. Finally, there are examples where the government tried to settle the 
societal tensions by abolishing the minority. The forced displacing and migration after 
the Second World War’s Central Europe, the Rwandan genocide or Milosevic’s 
“political solution” all fit in this category. (European Center for Minority Issues 2005) 
If we consider another type of solutions, interesting dilemmas are emerging. If the 
international community adopts the idea of total self-determination, the opportunity of 
the birth of several not viable state entities will rise. (Sorensen 2001) The possibility of 
secession would only increase the number of failed states in the international system. 
Furthermore, the so far internal conflicts would become international challenges. 
The not radical instruments of nation building carry the opportunity of sustainable 
solution. The role of the elite is crucial in articulating the identity of the society, for 
example the elite use a language, which serves as lingua franca in multilingual societies, 
such as the English in case of India. The process of modernization is also influenced by 
the elite behavior, which could become a leading force in development through real 
multiculturalism. Even the equal political, economic and societal rights of the different 
groups may create the common identity in multicultural societies which appears in form 
of growing loyalty towards the existing system. (Wallensten 2002:198-202) 
The unity of the society can also exhibit through state institutions. Analyzing the 
society from the institutional point of view, the nation is equal to citizenship which 
indicates the legal and political participation in decision processes. Accordingly, the 
unity comes from the confidence which eventually lies in the institutions that secure the 
participation. The most important role of such institutions is to make members of the 
society know their rights and duties. As long as the state is able to allocate the rights 
and duties along these institutions, and no strong contra-incentive remains, the process 
can strengthen the state. The “just institutions” are the source of societal confidence, id 
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est the common concept about justice will hold together the community. (Lánczi 
2000:172-175)  
Recognizing the power of societal dynamics, the present international political 
agenda sometimes overestimates the importance of this dimension. That is the 
explanation for the high number of NGOs on this field, which usually believe that 
strengthening the civil society will help democratize the whole country. The dynamics 
of the functions or even the failure of local civil society is often not known by the 
agents of intervention. However, several experts recognized that the civil society is not 
the goal rather the tool for future democratization. (Lund et al 2006) 
Security, order, working institutions, functioning economy, and the external and 
domestic consequences all depend on the human capital. However, the above mentioned 
state institutions and the civil society cannot overcome the complex deficiencies. In 
accumulating human capital, the statebuilding process faces several challenges. 
Preventing local violence is an important factor of maintaining the above institutions. 
Before moving forward, we have to recognize that violence is not the same as conflict, 
it roots in the society. In conflict situations or in the right aftermath of them, the people 
are more aggressive, and violence is only a mean of the struggle for everyday survival. 
(Kalywas 2006) Poverty and inequality lead to violence and they are clearly linked. 
(Sen 2008: 5) The violent activity of different groups deepens the cleavages in the 
society. The violence may become part of the normal dynamic of life and socialize 
younger generations to hatred against other groups. As a consequence of violence, 
social marginalization gives space for new leaders that gain loyalty among the people of 
their own group and they use the cleavage lines as means to mobilize people that 
eventually only serve their own enrichment. (Boas et al 2007: 27) Good examples were 
Fonday Sankoh in Sierra Leone or Charles Taylor in Liberia. That is one of the 
explaining factors why nationalist-ethnic movements do not intend to secede. 
Consequently, the surprising fact that Afghanistan, despite of the several religions and 
ethnicities, has not experienced large scale secessionism gains new explanation. 
Namely, the lack of secessionism in Afghanistan is not the positive sign of some kind of 
common identity or pre-national ties, as some scholars suggested (Starr 2008), rather 
the intended behavior and interest of the local elites, basically the warlords. The 
exploitation of the local population is only possible in a weak state, because on their 
own territory the local leaders should provide the services, and the demands for these 
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services would manifest vis-à-vis them. The reward for controlling the whole state, even 
during war, is bigger than controlling an entity without foreign recognition. Ethnic and 
nationalist movements are rather characterized by local elite competition for power and 
personal benefits. (Englebert et al 2008) Religious state failure events became only 
frequent after September 11, mainly because of the unintended consequences of the 
“War on Terror”. In many situations, groups with the same religion and ethnic 
background fought against each other, basically for power, such as it is the case in 
Palestine, or in Somalia. David Laitin and James Fearon (2003) also concluded that 
ethnic heterogeneity and religious differences not automatically lead to civil war, they 
are only two of the several other factors, such as poverty, political instability, 
geographical burdens, or large population. A weak state with large population in 
poverty is a stronger predictor of conflict and violence than societal differences. 
According to this argument, the causes of civil war lay predominantly with other 
dimensions. However, grievances do not necessarily lead to war, but because of 
grievances the wars are not easy to settle after they broke out. Grievances can follow 
from ethnic, religious, political, or economic inequalities and differences. However, 
statistically there is no significant proof that these differences lead to conflict by 
themselves. (Collier et al 2001) Settling conflicts with parties from different religions is 
difficult but not because of the religious differences, rather because that the demands of 
the groups are usually anchored in a religious tradition, which makes the conflicting 
questions incompatible. In itself, if the religion is part of the identity is not a problem, 
but it is problematic when it is part of the incompatibility with other groups. (Svensson 
2007) The same is the situation with cultural differences, as religious characteristics and 
cultural issues overlap in a society. From the cultural point of view, there is a new factor 
why different groups fight for seizing the central power. Even in weak states, the state is 
the ultimate mean for shaping the central identity, therefore apart from the personal 
benefits, the groups are motivated to be the one who can define identity. This identity is 
manifested in the citizenship and it is crucial for several groups to be able to define the 
content of it. (Dunn 2009) As a consequence, we argue similarly to Ravi Bhavani and 
Dan Miodovnik’s (2008) conclusion in their article that ethnic heterogeneity causes 
conflicts when the opportunity of salience for a group is possible, that is by controlling 
the opportunity of salience and keeping the balance among the groups is a mean of 
regulating ethnic conflicts. 
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On the other hand, there are positive opportunities that could be present in this 
dimension. The existing emotional ties among the people, or pre-national identities all 
give a basis for future societal cohesion and development. For the final success and 
sustainability of the statebuilding process, a central emotional tie is needed which 
connects the people with the state. Because that allows the opportunity for the state to 
carry out policies that are not always in favor of all groups. The politics cannot be 
effective if permanent power-sharing disputes make the process of development slower 
and more costly through the higher transactional costs. That central tie also means the 
faith in the central institutions and the state, and eventually respect for inconvenient 
decisions, too. The preexisting ties divide the states into several different categories, 
where these ties are present in a mixed reality. The common and shared identity of the 
groups can be separated by ethnic differences, existing and rival nationalities, or in a 
form of nested nationalities. (Miller 2000: 126) 
The final question in this dimension is how to build on the positive features and how 
to overcome the challenges. The societal dimension is the environment for the given 
capital, and the domestic dimension determines the method how the given entity and 
group can capitalize these characteristics. The practice suggests that the pre-national ties 
and any cognitive connection to the central institutions, or the different groups are 
sensitive for any change in other dimensions. Statistical results (Hudson et al 2008) 
show that increased gender equality enhances the stability in politics, and gender 
equality serves as a critical model of treating the differences in the society. Similarly, 
the protection of the rights of other underrepresented and vulnerable groups of the 
society helps the consolidation of shared values in the society. It is not proven whether 
the protection of these groups lead to common identity, but it is clearly true that human 
rights abuses against certain groups will deepen the cleavages in the society and 
increase the opportunity of renewed conflict and violence. 
 
Assessing the centerpieces 
 
Summing up, the first stage has to satisfy the basic needs of the country and the 
people. There is a need for at least a minimal state that is able to maintain the 
achievements for the next sequence. Simultaneously, the necessity of external presence 
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is high, because the state is definitely not able to develop by itself. During the first 
sequence, the real stakeholder is the international community and the external actors 
that are present in the given country. From the point of view of the external actors, the 
goal of this stage is to create an environment in which the exit strategy is a viable option 
in the foreseeable future. 
The nexus among the security-military, the external and the domestic dimensions is 
more direct whilst we have to keep in mind that the sound constellation of all factors is 
needed in order to be able to say that the first stage was successful. The security is a 
prerequisite of future development, but contradicting to the existing normative models, 
it does not mean the absolute primacy of the security dimension. On the other hand, the 
Rubik’s cube analogy also helps understand that the importance of other dimensions 
should not be exaggerated, either. The development of the dimensions simultaneously 
influences each other. A positive change in a dimension contributes to a similar 
transformation in another dimension, whilst any deterioration in one dimension 
negatively affects the others. 
The security can be created and maintained only if the domestic capacities are 
present, or the external involvement is complete the missing domestic factors. 
Furthermore, the domestic factors depend also on the institutional, societal and 
economic dimensions. These dimensions also influence the success of the external 
involvement by indicating the opportunities for external actors. 
The first stage of statebuilding is only the first step and its measurable indicator of 
success is not necessarily the lasting peace or the functioning state. The goal of the first 
stage is to lay down the basis for future development. The six dimensions have to 
develop gradually and simultaneously. The external involvement may be higher than the 
domestic efforts. Although, as it was mentioned several times, the fact that the 
stakeholder of the first stage’s development is the international community and the 
external actors does not mean that the domestic actors do not have a role here. The first 
stage is only a sequence and the goal is to move forward to the other sequences of 
development. In this sense, the domestic actors have to become able to accept the stakes 
and the ownership of the process of statebuilding has to be transplanted from the 
external actors to the domestic ones. We can say that the first stage was successful if the 
basis of future development is visible. 
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The second sequence: interim authority 
 
 
The interim period serves for building up the basis of power transition from the 
external to the local actors. It means that the external powers have to identify the right 
“edge pieces” of development and form solid “edge groups” by putting the respective 
“edge pieces” next to their corresponding “edge pieces”. In this sequence, it is less 
important whether the local actors implement the most efficient work, but it is crucial to 
identify the appropriate stake holders, even if they will have different roles in the later 
stages of development. In this sequence the external powers are the implementing 
agency and they prepare the locals for the transition.  
 
  
  
8. The Composition of the Edge pieces of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.  
 
The statebuilders need to make the effort of local actors (“edge pieces”) join, who were 
separated from each other. In practice, the external statebuilders have to solve the “edge 
groups” one by one whilst the danger of reversals is decreased by the external authority 
which is the executive power during this sequence. One of the most important rules 
according to the cube’s solution methodology is that in case the activities of the local 
actors made the center pieces change the interim authority has to make sure to repair the 
centers and basic functions before moving to the next sequence. The following table 
shows the most important tasks in each dimension during this sequence. 
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Security Institutions Economy 
Safe and secure environment 
for development - Avoid 
renewed fighting 
Transitional authority and the 
rule of law 
(Re-)provision of key public 
goods and services 
   
Society External dimension Domestic determinants 
Address the causes of 
hostility – reconciliation Trusteeship 
interim mixed governance 
solutions - negative governance 
(stop not effective practice and 
transitions) 
 
9. The List of Tasks during the Second Sequence of Statebuilding 
 
The main goal of this sequence is to build the conditions that make possible the 
foreign interveners to transform the state from an externally run collection of 
institutions to a coherent system of locally accepted institutions. The first priority is to 
avoid renewed fighting, even by means of limited local participation. 
Having in mind the fact that the dimensions can be separated only in theory and all 
influence of the development of the others, similarly to the first stage of statebuilding 
there are dimensions which necessitate more synchronized development. In the interim 
stage, the significance of the security-military, the external and the institutional 
dimensions seem to be stronger. However, the economic dimension is also extremely 
important, but it is closer relation with the societal and the domestic dimensions. The 
goal in this stage, as it was mentioned above, is to avoid renewed fighting and to make 
the local actors become stakeholders. It is clear that the presence of foreign actors is the 
key, the development of security situation depends on them, and also they will shape the 
frame of the institutions. On the other hand, the locals can only have an organic role in 
the statebuilding process if the economy develops. Furthermore, the societal conflicts 
can be mediated easier if the locals are willing to change the situation and the 
opportunity costs of new economic development are higher than the motivation for 
renewed fighting. To sum up and express the dynamics of this stage in a very simplistic 
way, we can say that the security can be only maintained if the external actors have a 
significant and visible presence, and the interim institutions help to maintain the 
governance in the security dimension. Moreover, the security dimension is the link 
between the two groups of dimensions, because security is only possible if the local 
actors are willing to participate in the process. This participation depends on the 
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development of the societal conflicts and the economic opportunities. According to this 
argument, the following two chapters will analyze the security-institutional-external 
dimensions separately from the domestic-societal-economic dimensions using the 
security dimension as a link among the two groupings. 
 
 
The complex of the security, institutional and external Dimensions: 
democratization and security  
 
In order to maintain peace and prohibit renewed fighting, foreign military and 
peacekeepers have to be present. Nevertheless, the challenges of complex conditions in 
failed and weak states during the interim post-conflict situation needs that the foreign 
militaries adopt new strategies. The old military models used in reconstruction missions, 
such as in Germany and Japan cannot work anymore. First, because after the Second 
World War, the foreign military presence in the occupied countries were incomparably 
bigger. Today’s wars are asymmetric, which end with fast military victory with the 
obvious need of reconstruct at least the basics of the country to avoid renewed, and 
according to the experiences, even worse fighting. As an American defense policy 
textbook (Binnendjik et al 2004: 1) paraphrases it, the stabilization and reconstruction 
operations has to be integrated in the genuine intervention plan. 
 
10. External Forces Available vs. Necessary in Long Wars and Forces Necessary for Stability and 
Reconstruction Missions after Ending the War. (Intensity = number of forces; Duration = time) 
Source: Binnendijk et al 2004: 3-4 
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New wars are short, network based, and the developed countries prefer “distance 
warfare” using proxies on the ground. The consequence is that foreign military presence 
cannot reach its pike when the war is over. The main difference between the world wars 
and for instance the gulf wars is that in the former case the military presence steadily 
decreased after the war ended, but in the latter the military presence increased due to the 
growing needs of security in statebuilding, that could not be provided by the limited 
number of military troops and capacities on the ground. 
 
 
11. External Forces Available vs. Necessary in Short Wars and the “Stability and Reconstruction 
Mission Gap”. (Intensity = number of forces; Duration = time) Source: Binendijk et al 2004: 3-4 
 
The main conclusion is that winning the war not anymore ends in the simultaneous 
win of peace. The mentioned textbook concludes that the army of the United States 
should create independent stabilization and reconstruction forces that would focus on 
the post-conflict situation from the beginning of the war. (Binnendjik 2004: 34) The 
conclusion, however, is a strong recommendation not only for the American army, but 
in general for the international community. 
Independent and specialized forces for post-conflict peace are emerging as a new 
model of statebuilding since 2001.20 The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan has been an experiment of uniting the military and civilian capacities in a 
joint structure which can reflect the local situation more flexibly. The idea of the PRTs 
is innovative, but despite of the great expectations, they have not been able to stabilize 
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Afghanistan. The PRT model is in line with the military development in the post-
conflict reconstruction models in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia, the NATO created the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995 to implement the military annexes of the Dayton 
Agreement. The IFOR gave the space for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) one year later. 
The major task of SFOR was to maintain peace and security during the reconstruction 
process. Later in 1999, the NATO launched the operation in Kosovo, where the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) aimed at preventing further ethnic violence. The KFOR already 
employed new techniques that were developed by using the lessons from the similar 
models in Bosnia. These missions and the PRT model in Afghanistan also try to 
empower local governments and authorities by providing the necessary security. The 
problem is that the provision of security is not sufficient enough that is why the 
credibility of the model is low in the eyes of the population, especially in areas where 
the fights are still part of the everyday routine. 
Even if we see, that the NATO tries to use a new model for statebuilding, the legal 
foundation of foreign military presence in civil wars and post conflict situations still has 
to be authorized by the United Nations, more precisely by the Security Council. Despite 
of the fact that the Security Council have authorized several complex peacebuilding 
missions, such as the above mentioned instances, where the NATO was part of a more 
complex system of international actors, the interim power and power transitions steered 
by the United Nations  have not been too successful. For this reason, it is worth to 
examine briefly the main characteristics of power transitions. First, it is worth to 
understand the United Nations’ missions of this sort. Second, there is a need to 
understand the challenges of power transitions, which is basically in line with the new 
discourse on the nexus between conflicts and democratic transitions. 
The United Nations still searches for its new face and capacities in peacekeeping, as 
it is obvious that the demands of a post conflict situation cannot be addressed by the old 
methods of peacekeeping. After brief successes of the first post-Cold War peacekeeping 
missions, the United Nations had to recognize that managing complex situations needs 
multidimensional answers. Whilst trying to define how a peacebuilding mission should 
look like, the United Nations obviously proved in Rwanda and Bosnia that it is unable 
and too slow to solve situations where there is a need for using military force. After the 
Cold War, the United Nations implemented missions of similar sort in Namibia, 
Mozambique, Cambodia and El Salvador, where the peacekeepers, supported by all the 
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important players of the international politics, aimed at fostering societal and political 
transformation, too. The peace mission in Cambodia (UN Advanced Mission in 
Cambodia) was pioneer among the complex missions because it established interim 
international authority in 1991 on the territory of the state. The mission in El Salvador 
(Observadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador), similarly to the UNAMIC, 
achieved success in several terms. Both missions helped to stop fighting, the 
repatriation of the refugees and internally displaced persons, to organize national 
elections, and to build up functioning national institutions, such as the police and the 
judicial system.  (Evans 1998; Dobbins et al 2005; Doyle et al 1997; Thayer 1998:145-
165) Nevertheless, the United Nations was not prepared for rebuilding failed states or 
reestablish order in a complex conflict situation. This statement is reflected in the sharp 
dissimilarities between the above mentioned two missions and the total failure in 
Somalia. In Somalia, the United Nations became involved in a situation where the peace 
was non-existent, and the light armed peacekeepers with contradicting mandate were 
not able to make peace. One important factor of the failure was that the United States 
led United Nations International Task Force seemed to be successful by securing the 
humanitarian aid for the people. As a consequence, the American government decided 
in May 1993 to withdraw the 90% of the 28 thousand troops and leave the responsibility 
on the UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia). However, the mission was 
not prepared for continuing the intensive and complex conflict management due to 
financial reasons; moreover the staff was not trained enough, either. Consequently, 
seizing the aid became the new goal of fighting among the warlords. Finally, the lack of 
interoperability and unified command structure become the “death sentence” of the 
UNOSOM. On October 3, 1993 the American Rangers, under the live coverage of the 
CNN, but without the back up of the UNOSOM, began to “free” Mogadishu. The battle 
left 2000 Somalis and 18 American troops dead. Under the pressure of the American 
public, the Clinton Administration had to withdraw all troops from Somalia. 
Foreign military presence, however, raises several complex questions, which are 
multidimensional in nature and influence seemingly independent processes during 
statebuilding. The most important question what the scope and mandate of the 
foreigners should be. It is obvious, that without interfering in the process of institution 
building, the international actors cannot be sure that they are able to maintain security. 
Having in mind that, there can be detected a strong relation between the security, 
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institutional and external dimensions. The foreign presence needs to push the country to 
build appropriate institutions. 
Simultaneously with the sound aggregation of external presence and “good 
transitional institutions”, security necessitates the participation of the local actors. As it 
was mentioned above, security is the glue between the two complexes of dimensions. 
Security can be maintained, the institutions can function, and the external actors can be 
successful only if the people are not interested in or able to continue fighting. Therefore, 
the second task of this stage is to disarm and demobilize the former combatants, who 
later have to be reintegrated into the society by coordinating sound development in the 
economic and societal dimensions. The peace necessitates disarmament and 
demobilization of the warring factions, which, however, is not the guarantee for peace, 
but in case that the statebuilding process decided the extent of disarmament and 
demobilization with regard to the society, the possibility of success is bigger. The extent 
depends on the method of selective disarmament which means the importance of paying 
attention to the cultural context. In certain societies, the arms are not simply the means 
of war, but societal symbols. Another example, the disarmament of traditional herders 
makes also not much sense. Disarmament can be only the second step in the 
statebuilding sequence, because without general security none of the warring factions 
will lay down the arms. The solved security dilemma is the prerequisite of this step. If 
there is no clear victor after the war, the situation is more complex because there is a 
need of cooperation. Nevertheless, the foreign military presence would give the 
opportunity of the foreign powers to force disarmament, but it would be rather 
counterproductive. The disarmament is crucial because it removes the means of future 
war. On the other hand, it creates a more stable environment as it needs mutual 
confidence of the parties. Furthermore, disarmament does not necessarily mean the 
destruction of the arms, rather it means an ownership change when the state extends its 
monopoly on the use of legitimate violence on these arms, too. Disarmament has to 
extend to the collection of the unexploded devices and demining, as well. 
Demobilization on the other hand means the disbanding of former military units. The 
challenge here is that the military gave a certain societal status to the combatants and 
without giving predictable future and secure substitutes for it, the former combatants 
will not agree in the changed situation. Another challenge is that the civilians usually 
are afraid of the former combatants and work against the demobilization and 
reintegration of them into the peaceful society. The situation is even more difficult in 
  
120 
 
cases, such as it was in Rwanda, where the possibility of vengeance makes it impossible 
to reintegrate former combatants. (Spear 2002) The needs of the wider society have to 
be met, and not only the livelihood of the combatants are important, that is the only way 
of keeping the unavoidable conflicts in a peaceful channel. The peaceful cohabitation of 
the civilians and the combatants needs a new social contract. The goal is not to “bribe 
them” and “keep them busy” with peaceful tasks, rather than the creation of real 
employment opportunities that provide them a predictable future. Simple cash 
contribution is useful for the first period but is not effective to create productive 
capacities and to help the social and economic reintegration.  
The leaders of the armed groups have to have faith in the future to order the 
disbanding of their units and give up the arms. The disarmament of the military units is 
a “point of no return” before the former military leaders understandably hesitate. 
Therefore the creation of sound environment for demobilization is an extremely 
important task of the first sequence of statebuilding. The sound conditions are reflected 
in five interconnected processes (Salomons 2005: 24-25): first, the political process has 
to create new power structures through the negotiations and the peace agreement; 
second and third, the security and military processes have to maintain the ceasefire and 
the peaceful environment; fourth, in the humanitarian process the goal is the creation of 
opportunity for the people and especially for the former combatants and vulnerable 
groups to “well-being”; fifth, the socioeconomic process has to secure that the resources 
are not the fuel for the war-economy anymore.  
To convince factions to be committed to peace needs significant incentives in the 
economic, political and societal dimension. However, simply offering important 
peacetime roles for the leaders and members of the former armed factions may 
jeopardize the entire statebuilding process, because the development of the general 
society is equally important. The economic consequences of the increased supply of 
unskilled labor risks the economic development and the statebuilding process must not 
neglect to count with the consequences. The balance between stability and development 
is crucial, because filling up the most important jobs with former combatants may 
provide stable political environment, but slows down the economic growth. 
Consequently, without economic development the statebuilding process is not 
sustainable, that is the price of stability could be enormous in the long term. The goal of 
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this interim period is just to provide the right balance and risk less stability to let space 
for economic development. 
Transition from a failed state to functioning institutional structures necessitates a 
strong domestic government, that is by definition absent in the interim period. Therefore 
the international actors have to overtake the duty of the central authority. While, the 
transitional government has to rely on power-sharing and joint decision mechanisms 
between the international and the domestic actors in order to enhance legitimacy. It is 
obvious that the state in itself is too weak to be adequate final generator of the complex 
process of statebuilding. The state needs external help, however, there is wide debate 
about the possible forms and manifestations of the legal and institutional form of 
external authority. We have to emphasize that any solution is interim and serves the 
security and the political stability of the institutions in the transitional period. 
First, there are scholars (Chesterman 2004; Fearon et al 2004; Krasner 2004) who 
believe in the necessity of some kind of trusteeship institution during this period.21 
Although, in the existing system of international law, trusteeship has a clear definition 
that is codified in the 12th Chapter of the Charter of the United Nations, there are several 
historical and recent examples of transitional periods in post-conflict situations when 
external actors practiced domestic authority. The two ends of the spectrum are the 
merely supervision missions, such as the UNAMIC, and the direct governmental forms 
such as the UNMIK. Apart from the obvious examples of the UN trusteeship system 
there were other appearances of external authority in other situations, too, like in the 
case of Danzig or the Saar Basin after the First World War. Per definition, the role of 
the international administration is much broader than even a complex peace-keeping 
mission. The external authority has to maintain security and order, repatriate the 
refugees, provide administrative services, build sustainable political institutions, provide 
justice, and enhance economic reconstruction and development. The interim period 
offers the opportunity for the local stakeholders to gain experience in governing the new 
institutions under the tutelage of the international authority. (Caplan 2004) Although, it 
is obvious that there is the need of external intervention, there are normative dilemmas 
about the legality of trusteeship-like missions. The bad and unfortunate resonance of the 
colonialist period cannot be wiped out from the collective memory of the countries and 
societies, therefore the most adequate appearance of international authority would be the 
UN assistance as part of a new conceptual paradigm about trusteeship, or the 
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involvement of regional trusts, such as the African Union or the Organization of the 
American States. The real practical problem with both is that they are ineffective 
without further political will of powerful states. (Gordon 1997) 
Second, the shared sovereignty concept tries to interpret a more sophisticated way of 
violating the norm of sovereignty by concentrating on special aspects and sectors of the 
rebuilding process and leaving the rest of the tasks for the local society. The idea of 
gradual protectorate provides the necessary assistance for the local stakeholders but 
does not take all the responsibility of statebuilding. The first promoter of the idea of 
shared sovereignty, Stephen Krasner (2004) listed already existing techniques. Widely 
used method of the World Bank and the IMF is demanding “good governance” in 
exchange of the financial assistance. The demand is manifested among others in 
intensive training programs, assistance in rewriting criminal codes, professionalize 
police, and increase fiscal transparency according to the standards of these institutions. 
Krasner mentions (2004: 102) that transitional administration today is the recognized 
alternative of conventional sovereignty, but instead of the codification of de facto 
trusteeship in failed states, the focus should be placed on shared sovereignty solutions. 
The history provides ample amount of examples that shared sovereignty can be 
successful. The Ottoman Empire practiced direct external control over the collection of 
specific taxes until the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century for 
instance on the Balkans. During the Cold War the armies of the satellite states of the 
Soviet Union were not independent and eventually the Warsaw Pact institutionalized 
Moscow’s right to interfere in domestic military questions by codifying the superiority 
of the Soviet command structure. Or the Bonn Agreement in 1952 determined the 
limited authority of West Germany over security sector issues. 
Transitional authority practiced by the United Nations is widely regarded as just 
alternative to conventional sovereignty, if it is authorized by the Security Council, the 
final trustee of international peace and security. The contradiction is that the 
international humanitarian community, the United Nations’ organs and several 
international NGOs aim at protecting the humanitarian norms of the international law, 
whilst there is no consensus on the existence of the right for humanitarian interventions. 
Intra-state post-conflict reconstruction is fundamentally different from the older practice 
of peacekeeping in inter-state hostilities. The United Nations has been effective in 
legitimatization of enforcement coalitions for solving inter-state collective security 
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problems, but very ineffective in intra-state situations. Transitional authority will not 
function correctly in case local leaders do not cooperate, or the coordination among the 
external actors is complicated. The “neocolonialist model” of United Nations’ 
administration in Kosovo tried to overcome these deficiencies by coercing cooperation 
and focusing on coordination. However, the goal is to sustain peace after the interveners 
left the country, the examples can only show that the level of violence can be decreased 
significantly only when the foreign powers are present. Recognizing this fact, the 
United Nations strives to apply complex measures in order to help economic 
development, strengthen the rule of law and observe humanitarian law under the aegis 
of good governance at the same time. It is still challenging how the United Nations’ 
missions are going to address complex crisis situations as their mandate is prepared for 
best-case scenarios and are undermanned and under-resourced for robust military 
presence. Actually, the most positive feature of these missions is that they have at least 
this mandate. (Dobbins 2005: 243) However sophisticated the soft power abilities are, 
the hard power deficit can easily end in tragic situations as the withdrawal from Rwanda 
or the impotence in Srebrenica.  
The second problem with the interim authority is how to maintain the complex 
system. It is clear that the external actors cannot be present indefinitely. However, in 
this stage, the main problem with power transition is that the local actors are still not 
mature for implementing all the necessary tasks. On the other hand, democracy and the 
democratic transition process is today a compulsory element of statebuilding because 
the general belief that democracy will help maintain security in the long term. The 
dilemma is that in case democracy is introduced at the beginning, the efficiency is 
lower, but in any other case the general goal gets in conflict with the specific one.  
Although, we see the deficiencies of democratic transitions, introducing democratic 
institutions is the only opportunity for the external actors. This belief has two pillars, 
one comes from the universal norms on which the whole international system is built. 
Second is the generally accepted conviction that democracies will not go in war with 
each other. Nevertheless, it is less clear when we can say about a regime whether it is 
democratic, or what happens during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. 
New elites of states in transition often try to keep power by enhancing nationalist 
feelings and waging war. (Mansfield et al 2005a) One clear example from the past is 
General Leopoldo Galtieri’s decision, Argentina’s president back then, on trying to 
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solve territorial dispute with the United Kingdom by unilateral military action, and to 
attack the Falkland Islands. We can think about a more recent case, too. The popularity 
of both the Russian president and prime minister increased after the war with Georgia. 
The external effects of statebuilding are still very important in the success or failure 
of statebuilding. The presence of foreign military is still significant in this stage and it 
shapes the whole picture of the statebuilding. Consequently, after the first stage where 
the most important goal was in the external dimension to make peace by the foreign 
intervention, here the goal is to keep this peace by the foreign presence. Unfortunately, 
we have to experience that despite of the enormous foreign military presence, the 
situation in large countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, is not better. On 
the other hand in smaller countries, however, the foreign military presence is necessary, 
it slows down the domestic development, as it has happened in Bosnia. The explanation 
is that the foreign military cannot transfer the ownership of statebuilding due to the low 
local capacities and the unripe conditions for the next sequence in statebuilding. 
Summing up, the military in large countries cannot have adequate effect because of the 
domestic conditions, whilst in smaller countries the external factors overwhelm the 
domestic ones. The institutionalization of the foreign presence, namely the trusteeship 
agreements, and the interim international governments, can be successful only if the 
transitional period gives enough space for local actors to be prepared for the ownership 
transformation in the future. In this sense, the local institutional structure depends on the 
foreign statebuilding strategy. After finding the sound balance of external and internal 
efforts and coordination of the dual structures in the interim period, the next challenge 
in the external dimension is the presence of several international actors. In turn, this fact 
automatically poses the problem of coordination. The external actors have to coordinate 
the steps in the interim period in order to be able to begin the next step and transfer the 
ownership to the local actors. It means that the external actors always have to keep in 
mind the importance of maintaining leadership roles to host country actors and having 
local counterparts in all tasks during the interim period of statebuilding. Large 
international presence may have negative consequences because it may encourage 
dependency in the local society, distort the local economy, distort the local norms, and 
damage health by transmitting infectious diseases. Furthermore, the timeline of 
statebuilding is usually determined by the external actors following the bureaucratic 
needs of the international organizations, or their home country domestic political and 
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technical agendas, which is very harmful for the statebuilding as it disregards the local 
needs. (Orr 2004: 20-30) 
The influence of the globalized world can be felt in every dimension even in a closed 
society. Globalization is a worldwide chain of political, economic, social networks, and 
because of the presence of the foreign military and aid workers none of the countries 
which experience statebuilding can be separated from the outside world. Both the 
developed and weak states depend on each other. The difference is the asymmetry of the 
relation because the weak and underdeveloped countries are more vulnerable and 
sensitive to the changes of the external conditions, especially during the transitional 
period when everything is still in making and none of the institutions could deepen its 
roots in the society and economy. 
Obviously, the goal of statebuilding is not to build up an autarkic state, but to build a 
state that is adequately integrated in the global economy. The transnational companies, 
the globalized financial flows, the increasing trade and the technological advances all 
help develop a country. On the other hand, the globalization makes countries more 
vulnerable to the external effects, and in case of weak states the consequences are 
unpredictable. However, de-linking clearly leads to total collapse as it is the case in 
Zimbabwe. The political decision making processes are also influenced by international 
factors. The international organizations, the several international NGOs promote new 
governance techniques that change the domestic dimension of a country. Similarly, 
globalization means universal cultural norms are emerging, and the Internet and 
information makes the society more aware of the opportunities, which means growing 
demand for “good institutions”. Finally, the international law and universal norms of 
human rights provide a clear path from which the countries cannot differ without the 
risk of facing severe international political and economic consequences. (Held 2006: 
296-304) 
In general, the external actors influence the transition because they are interested in 
the process. For instance at the beginning of the 1990s the external dimension of the 
democratic transitions were very strong in Central and Eastern Europe, the generator of 
the change were the European Union, the NATO, or the financial institutions, such as 
the IMF, World Bank, or the EBRD. The external actors were the channels of different 
models of transformations. Obviously, the democratic transitions did not have to face 
the same challenges as countries after a devastating conflict, but Kosovo can show that 
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the same players are as important there, and they helped to eventually reach 
independence. 
We have to keep in mind that the experiences in the 1990s from the post-socialist 
countries were different than the challenges a country has to face in the second sequence 
of statebuilding but the lessons can call the attention to the nexus among different 
dimensions. Furthermore, the role of foreign factors is verified by cases where they 
were not present. For instance, due to the lack of external incentives that were present in 
the Baltic states and in the Central and Eastern European countries, democracy has 
flawed in the 1990s in Russia and it is today rather a guided democracy if not an 
authoritarian regime. (Brown 2001) Marcin Zaborowski (2003) mentioned in her article 
that several scholars had been convinced at the beginning of the 1990s that mainly 
domestic political and economic conditions shaped the transitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, because unlikely to Latin America, the foreign actors had not had direct 
role. It is obviously wrong. Foreign actors, such as the European Union, the NATO, the 
IMF, the OECD, or individual countries like the United States and Germany had very 
deep impact on the transitional process. The latter two, not only through direct 
assistance, but with the help of its different endowments – such as the party 
endowments in Germany, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, or the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, and on the other hand the American democracy promoting NGOs, like the 
National Endowment for Democracy – were the transmitting channels of transition 
models. 
The hide of external factors lies in the misleading feature of the Central and Eastern 
European transitions that the political elite adapted several foreign techniques and 
institutions without the Western world’s enforcement. The international context at the 
beginning of the 1990s not only provided the favorable condition with the fall of the 
Soviet Union but helped the emergence of different external actors and forms of 
external influence. Although, undoubtedly the change of the bipolar world had the 
deepest effect on democratization, we should not forget that the Western political, and 
more significantly the economic institutions had already gained presence in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1960s, and pushed these countries towards economic reforms, 
that served as a strong basis for reforms after the system changes. 
In the case of Central and Eastern European countries, these conditions were –apart 
from the changing world order due to the fall of the Soviet Union eventually giving 
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space for system changes – determined by the European Community and the fact that all 
of these countries wished to return to the Euro-Atlantic community from which they 
were separated by the agreements of the Teheran and Yalta Conferences during the 
Second World War. Both NATO and the European Union set up though conditions for 
these countries before allowing them in the community. So to say, the promise of 
integration was the main driving force of radical reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
that gave unity in politics and legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens even under the 
circumstances of the harshest economic backsliding in the middle of the 1990s. 
The presence of the foreign actors and their excessive influence is unavoidable but 
they can contradict the goals of this stage in some cases. The enormous influence of the 
external donors limits the policy choices of the country in need, because it has to follow, 
the sometimes backward and inadequate prescription of the donor countries. Countries 
with weak institutions and “bad leaders” have recognized that by the façade of obeying 
the recommendations and minimally satisfy the expectations they can secure the 
permanent inflow of aid. Furthermore, the donor programs have unpredictable outcomes 
that makes hard to prepare for the next phase of statebuilding. Finally, the donor 
activity, and the presence of the foreign workers and military change the motivations in 
trade and investments. Most of the local actors try to satisfy the foreign workers and 
become part of the “aid economy”. (Lewis 2008 104-105) 
Apart from the general theoretic discourses on democratization, we also have to 
realize that in fact democratization is not an automatic process. Recently, the wave of 
democratization has slowed down and it even stopped in certain regions. The main 
cause, why the world is surprised is that world leaders and even scholars believed in the 
automatisms of democratic transitions. Democratic transitions in Central and Eastern 
Europe have had enormous effect on the development of transitology. Having in mind 
the successful steps of these transitions, the widely accepted expectation was that these 
steps can be copied and transplanted into other political, economic, social or cultural 
contexts. The fiercely criticized article of Thomas Carothers (2002b) on the “End of 
transition paradigm” calls the attention to this fact. Without rethinking existing 
strategies of democracy promotion and development, the challenge will increase. The 
greatest danger in front of the success of statebuilding and democratization is the 
loosely identifiable set of factors and conditions which are present in countries that 
failed or failing. New democracies can experience problems because of weak rule of 
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law, bad economic performances, ethnic divisions, weak political institutions, or weak 
constraints on leaders. Risk of reversals in many developing states or post-socialist 
countries is high. Just taking some examples, in the last years none of the following, 
earlier in some terms celebrated democratizers – Bolivia, Georgia, Russia, Uganda or 
Venezuela – have kept the hope that they are going to develop toward a more inclusive 
democracy. (Kapstein et al 2008:57) 
Similarly to the argument of Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield (2005a,b; 2007), we 
have to accept that transitions are violent and conflict prone. Not only the transition 
from authoritarian rule to democracy is dangerous, the unstable situation of any large 
scale social transformation gives the space for latent negative factors. As Francis 
Fukuyama (2007) complemented Snyder and Mansfield’s argument, not 
democratization, rather the process of statebuilding is violent. The unpredictability of 
interim periods during the development of the state gives the hope for the opposition of 
statebuilding that the process will fail. The characteristic of the interim period is that the 
domestic central institutions are not stable enough;  peaceful channels of conflict 
management among the groups is not institutionalized; the demand of the society 
towards better life is already stresses the system; and the groups with incompatible 
interests try to mobilize the accumulating energy of the society. Therefore, 
democratization is even more dangerous in those situations, because democracy is a 
marketplace for ideas, where different groups have to compete. Without functioning 
peaceful mechanisms, competition may lead to violent conflict. (Mansfield et al 2005b; 
Henderson 2002) Due to the background dynamics, those groups and elites are more 
prone to use radical means who feel their level of security decreasing. Transition also 
weakens preexisting structures of rules and the new uncertainty is a security threat for 
local stakeholders. In the interim period, hybrid structures are still present which 
threaten security, because the potential challengers of central authority and the 
monopoly on the use of force are still present and they are interested in the pluralization 
of security providers. 
The analysis of transitions has enjoyed great attention in political sciences since the 
1970s. Regarding the transitional period in statebuilding the central problem is the 
question on the design of political institutions without undoing any achievements in the 
other dimensions. In this sense, seeking for the creation of sound environment for future 
democracy is not simply a question of institutional design but it is a central problem in 
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maintaining security. That democracies are peaceful is widely accepted syllogistic 
reasoning, and since transitions lead to democracy, they lead to peace. It is a 
conventional wisdom that no mature democracies have ever fought war against each 
other. (Doyle 1986) 
In spite of the fact that we may agree with this argument, it still does not say 
anything about the countries in transition. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2005) 
proved in a quantitative study that countries with weak statehood are prone to war 
during the transition, because democratization weakens some vital institutions during 
the transition. The regime easily collapses in countries where the government cannot 
satisfy the rising demands of the public. This proves that the sequence of 
democratization cannot be neglected: ill prepared attempts to democratize weak states 
leads to costly warfare and serious delays in democratization. According to the above 
argument, democratization is less dangerous in countries which possess high per capita 
income, educated population, strong institutions, especially those of the rule of law and 
independent jurisdiction. Low level of corruption and powerful elites, which are not 
threatened by the system change, seem to be crucial factors, too. Furthermore, the 
wrong causality and not well sequenced process causes incomplete democratization. 
Incomplete democracies are prone to revert in autocracy. The record from post-colonial 
states supports this argument. These states are beyond doubt more prone to civil wars 
due to the fragility of the state and institutional underdevelopment. One of the main 
causes is that the national elites failed to integrate their societies into cohesive national 
entities. (See also Henderson 2002: 3-4) 
On the other hand, the belief in transition’s success is based on the experience with 
former cases in Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. But 
the reality from the middle of the 1990s showed that several problems made the process 
a “standstill”. In generally, elections are treated as a cure for an authoritarian regime, 
however, there is no guarantee that the elections will be free and fair to allow emerging 
more democratic structures in the power. But even if the elections are free and fair, the 
weakness of the state hinders the development of democracy, as the state does not 
possess a coherent national economy, the society is not a coherent community, and the 
institutions are weak and not responsive to the citizens’ needs. The dominating elite are 
always in a better position to transfer its power, and even the more successful cases 
showed that the old elite would find the ways to keep some power. The new and more 
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difficult cases of democratic transitions in Africa, and the Middle East experience neo-
patrimonialism, personal rule and patron client relationships to substitute the former 
dictatorial rule, because of elite domination. (Sorensen 2008: 67-79) 
Nevertheless, the last twenty years witnessed several, fundamentally different 
processes, and the slowed wave of democratization and few reversals prove that the 
process is to be labeled as transformation rather than transition. Laurence Whitehead 
(2002: 60) already noted in the middle of the 1980s that liberalization of an 
authoritarian system would not automatically lead to democracy. As the system can 
shape the ways in which democracy can develop, we should not wait from the 
opposition of a dictator to become democratic automatically after seizing the power. 
The opposition is the product of the oppressive regime, too, and can be as authoritarian 
as the regime it succeeded. Alfred Stephan (1986) differentiated the paths of transition 
from an authoritarian regime towards a more democratic outcome. As the old 
experience of the Second World War shows that successful democratization is possible 
after large scale external conquest.  First, there is the option of transition in form of 
international restoration after a decisive war. Second, internal reformulation can also 
lead to democracy, but the experience shows that it is often violent, as it was in Greece 
between 1946 and 1949. Third, the externally monitored installation of democracy is a 
possible path, too. This is, however, similar to the project of the Soviet Union which 
was carried out in 1948 in Central Europe. Fourth, it is also possible that 
democratization is initiated from within the authoritarian regime by civil political 
leadership. Fifth, the military can also take the role of government.  Sixth, there is 
possibility that the society leads to regime termination. Seventh, democratization is also 
possible through party pact, or violent revolution. 
Most of the scholars would agree with Stephan that transition from authoritarianism 
is possible in several ways, however, the existence of certain factors and conditions 
determine the outcome of the process. Furthermore, not only the conditions, but the 
different steps of the process are important. The sequences of these are debated since 
the birth of transitology. It is obvious that during the transition there are different 
sequences, and different countries at the different stages of the process face different 
challenges. The greatest problem in authoritarian regimes is to be able to begin 
democratization; in the democratizing ones the challenge is to consolidate the 
achievements, and in “old-democracies” the main task is to strengthen democratic 
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quality. During the process, the danger is that anti-democratic beliefs and movements 
have continued to exist in form of fanatic nationalism or religious fundamentalism. 
(Dahl 1998: 1-2) 
Several scholars22 emphasize that economic development is important during the 
transition. The reasoning is convincing, as economic development transforms the 
society in ways that make difficult to sustain the authoritarian concentration of power. 
Namely, the economic development changes the attitudes inside of the society towards 
democracy, and reshapes the social structure by giving opportunity for development of a 
strong middle class. However, if that is generally true, China’s authoritarian regime 
does not have a long future. Furthermore, experiences with democratic transitions show 
that a process of system transformation could only begin after that the former regime 
became weak. The lost effectiveness of the regime causes legitimacy problems, and the 
regime loses its moral title to rule in the eyes of bigger and bigger part of the society. 
(Diamond 2008c: 88) 
The political landscape changed significantly by the millennium. By that time, none 
of the followings existed: right wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, military 
dictatorships in Latin America, authoritarian regimes in South-East Asia, socialist rule 
in Central and Eastern Europe, or the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the declining number 
of one party regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, and recognizable liberalization in several 
countries in the Middle East also gave hope for continuation of the democratization 
wave. In spite of the optimist atmosphere of transitology, Thomas Carothers (2002b) 
called for deeper attention to the transition process and the differences in the individual 
cases. However, his argument in “The End of Transition Paradigm”, which was already 
mentioned earlier, was fiercely criticized by several scholars (Nodia 2002; Hyman 
2002; O’Donnell 2002; Wollack 2002) on the pages of the Journal of Democracy in 
2002, the reasoning of the article – that was emphasized again in his answer to the 
critics (2002a) – that academic researches and the practice of democratic transitions do 
not move in tandem, and though the scholars know that different transitions may differ 
in sequences, the practice seemed to follow the same recipe in all cases. The slowed 
down democratization proved that sequences are indeed important, and as Carothers 
noted (2002b: 13), the initial conditions, such as wealth, past experience with 
democracy and pluralism, and the institutional legacies of the past regime significantly 
determine the success of the democratic transition. Even if we accept, that transition 
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paradigm never existed (O’Donnell 2002: 7), the importance of right sequences cannot 
be doubt. The question is rather which these sequences are and what the logical 
connection among them is. 
However, Carothers did not attempt to set up a new paradigm in his article, some 
questions are necessary: is there a new transition paradigm that could give 
recommendations for the future of the recent crisis in democratization; what are the 
steps of democratization, or is there a schema or model that gives a mental crutch for 
future researches? Although, it seems to be true that before democratization can evolve 
there is a need for certain factors, democracy is not a luxury that can wait until general 
prosperity. (Diamond 2008c: 28) The different steps are fundamentally interconnected. 
It is a commonplace, that regime type has an influence on the economic performance. In 
case we analyze more closely the worst performing states in economic terms, we may 
get a clearer picture. In Peter Lewis’ article (Lewis 2008) the argument about this nexus 
in Africa is conclusive. Democracies in the long run perform better, or at least as well, 
on the field of economic development. However, Lewis also states that democracy 
cannot guarantee economic development in the long run, but is necessary in such poor 
states as the Sub-Saharan countries. 
Democratization in countries that are poorly prepared for democracy is a bad idea. 
(Carothers 2002b: 15) However, strictly insisting on sequencing can lead to the trap of 
tautology, as well, according to which democratization is only possible in already 
democracies. Sequencing would mean that certain preconditions have to exist before 
democratization begins. These preconditions, that are usually listed, are: rule of law, 
well functioning state, developed economy. The logic of this reasoning assumes that an 
autocrat can and will develop rule of law recognizing that it is needed for democratic 
development, whilst a weak democracy is not able to do so. The key elements of rule of 
law, such as independent judiciary, are in antagonistic relation with the authoritarian 
rule. Contrarily, as Carothers notes (Carothers 2002b: 17), democracy and 
democratization are vital to strengthening the rule of law. Conditions that favor 
democratization should not be held as decisive factors or prerequisites of democratic 
transitions. The general nature of the democratization process is rather gradual than 
sequenced. It is true that a well functioning state is the best basis for development, 
whilst democratization in a failed state, without changing the basic conditions is a 
mission impossible. But it would not be a good strategy to wait for a large scale 
  
133 
 
statebuilding before democratization, as democratization is part of the state building 
process, and the two mutually strengthen each other. But unfortunately there are few 
examples for rightly sequenced processes. The case of India, building strong state 
institutions, before democratization, is a good example, but an exception rather than the 
rule. On the two sides of the same coin are weak democracies and autocratic 
developmental states. Which one should we call? As Carothers mentions (Carothers 
2002b), authoritarian regimes outside of East Asia, have no record of being able to 
establish the monopoly on the legitimate use of force or basic rule of law. That is an 
autocratic regime seems to be incapable to provide the basic conditions for democracy. 
On the other side, for a weak democracy it is challenging as well, to establish these 
conditions, but it is at least not inherently impossible. Democracy is widely recognized 
as the best form of government that can provide conditions for societal and economic 
development. The viability of democratization depends on the extent to which citizens 
are prepared and willing to cooperate. The moral attitudes of people, the level of trust in 
the society and civic engagement are the constitutive factors of success. (Beuningen 
2007: 50-55) The societal factors are indeed important, too. In a deeply divided society 
it is extremely challenging to establish the basis for democracy, however, problems  
which come from societal divisions are greater in undemocratic states.(Lijphart 2008b: 
75) 
Similarly to Carothers, Francis Fukuyama (2007) is skeptic about the support of 
liberalizing autocrats would be the first sequence on the path towards democracy. 
Overemphasizing the correct timing, however, is not the path forward, either, as there 
are no guarantees that a correct timeline is the key for success. Contrarily, the history of 
European democratic development showed that false starts and reversals were integral 
part of the democratization process. A working group of prominent scholars of 
democratization collected comprehensive arguments on sustainable democracy. The 
group was led by Adam Przeworski (1995), who devoted several works to prove the 
connection between the success of democratic transition and consolidation and 
economic development. The main message of the findings of the group is that the state 
has essential role in promoting universal citizenship and creating conditions for 
sustainable economic growth. Following from that and thinking on the connection 
between democracy and economic development, the state has essential role in sustaining 
the democratization process. Effective practice of universal citizenship needs material 
security, education and real access to information. These requirements are only 
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guaranteed by a democratic state. It means that the establishment of democratic 
institutions has to come before economic development. Economic development, 
however, helps to sustain democracy, but without the later economic development is not 
predictable in the long run, either. The development of democracy – as we could see 
above – depends on several factors, initial conditions and of course on the connection 
among those. Democracy that is built on moorland will not last too long, as we could 
see during decolonization in most of the Sub-Saharan countries. On the contrary, India 
that inherited strong institutions and a working state structure has been able to maintain 
democracy, except a brief period, since the independence.  
The second stage in statebuilding is the period of joint administration of the country 
by the intervention powers and the local actors, which is expanded to all the political 
and administrational bodies. The conditions that determined the institutional needs 
during the first phase still have effect in the second. The physical base that is the 
territory of the country and the population all mean resource for institutional design. 
The attitude of the people towards the political institutions in the past was necessarily 
negative in a weak state, which has to be changed in the future. This attitude is the 
demand side of statebuilding and the institutions will not be able to develop without this 
demand. (Fukuyama 2004: 31-35) 
There are several other challenges in the institutional dimension during this stage. 
First, the inherited, or the new institutions are still too weak to satisfy all the 
expectations. Second, the power vacuum generated by lack of authority in the post-
conflict situation invites players that may spoil the achievements of statebuilding. Third, 
Marina Ottaway (1999b) argued that in countries where the institutions are weak the 
role of leadership and authority is more important. The leaders give the direction of 
development and not the institutions. In the eyes of the people the most important 
factors are stability and growth. The dilemma with letting the “Big Men” consolidated 
their own power is not always the way forward, however, until the leader is interested in 
the rebuilding process it can eliminate the spoilers of development. Fourth, the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the institutions is almost impossible to build up at the 
same time. The goal of this stage is to maintain the previously created effective 
institutions that give the basis for transferring the power from foreign players to local 
actors. The low level of local ownership may lead to low level of legitimacy, but the 
effectiveness of the institutions will lead to increased legitimacy in the long term. Fifth, 
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maintaining security and the effectiveness of the institutions poses severe governance 
dilemmas, too. Establishment of central government that is legitimate in the eyes of the 
population is beyond doubt crucial, but it is naïve expectation that legitimacy will 
emerge without strong local and national governance. Governance is the systematic 
relation of the institutions and the society.  
Creating secure basis for power transfer from the international parties to the local 
actors is a challenging task. First, liberalization is important as long as it does not limit 
the authority. However, it should not mean the acceptance of hybrid regimes that 
rhetorically liberalize the politics, but does not allow the emergence of civil and 
political rights in wide segments of the society. On the other hand, formal democratic 
institutions with illiberal traits mean low level of accountability and even if the central 
authority is strong, the long term development is not guaranteed. Semi authoritarian 
regimes provide stability, many times in troubled regions, which is welcomed by the 
population, the neighbors and the international community. This phenomenon was 
analyzed and presented by Marina Ottaway (1999b). According to her the opening of 
and increased participation in politics in Uganda, Ethiopia or Eritrea would have led to 
state collapse. The problem with this argument is that stability is superficial and 
precarious. Liberalization can wait in this stage but not forever, and without strong 
institutions, the stability would give the ill-fated hope, that development is ripe for 
increasing participation and democratize the country. The fake stability hides 
unsatisfied demands which will be freed by the liberalization and will explode in a later 
time. The negative factors that make liberalization counter-productive root in other 
dimensions, too. Bad civil society, opportunistic ethnic entrepreneurship, destructive 
societal competition for power, presence of saboteurs of statebuilding, and the 
necessarily disruptive effects of economic opening all call the attention to the 
complexity of liberalization and increase the dilemma of the balance between authority 
and liberalization. (Paris 2004: 159) Summing up, every small step towards 
liberalization matters (Diamond 2002) but if liberalization conflicts with stability the 
later has to enjoy priority in this stage. 
Statebuilding needs strong institutions, because the liberalization will empower the 
challengers of central power, and without institutionalized techniques, there are no 
peaceful means of rewards and punishment to control the competitors. The common 
solution is that the government tries to buy off the leaders and competing groups, but it 
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absorbs the anyway scarce economic resources of development. The strong institutions 
can balance the interest of the different societal groups and help economic development 
which eventually eases the compensation of the losers of the statebuilding process.  
It is very rare that the statebuilding process meets tabula rasa, therefore the existing 
institutions can present a significant positive asset, but certain limitations, too. The 
political transition from an existing system that could not work to a new complex 
interdependency of the different dimensions can be even more challenging than 
institutional design from the ground. The government of the country has key role in 
maintaining development in other dimensions, too. In this sense, the creation of a 
functioning and strong government is the primary step in this stage. Strong government 
means effective bureaucratic structures that necessitate skilled civil servants. 
Institutions, however, will be only sustainable, and the power transition will be only 
successful when the created structures are coherent and none of the players, including 
the external actors are allowed to place themselves above the structures. There is 
unusually deep concordance in the literature that the challenges of institution-building 
can only be solved when the rule of law is already the norm that penetrated all aspects 
of life and development in every dimension. The existence of rule of law is primarily 
institutional phenomenon, as it directly depends on the government. But during the 
transition and in the interim period, when there is no new constitution, or strong 
legislatures, and the order is mainly maintained by outside forces, the rule of law has to 
rely on the domestic acceptance of the institutions of governance and the society has to 
trust in the statebuilding process. On the other hand, the government and the foreign 
parties and actors also have to act along the rules and norms that are created and 
followed by the general public. 
The rule of law is the glue that binds together all aspects of the state in every 
dimension by guiding the behavior of the actors present in the country. The rule of law 
can maintain systemic checks and balances of power and consequently can create trust 
in the society for the statebuilding process. The rule of law is the ultimate assurance that 
the not functioning rules, laws or institutions can be reformed and the disputes can be 
solved within the rules, following an organized dynamic. The rule of law enhances 
stability, predictability, and trust in the system and empowers the political structure. 
First, it stabilizes the position of the government but holds it accountable. Second, it 
creates a predictable political environment. Third, the confidence of the public in 
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change is growing, because the people believe in the opportunity of change when it is 
necessary. Fourth, it empowers the civil society and those in the economy and society 
that take action when the central authority tries to abuse its power. (Ghani et al 2008: 
124-128) 
The rule of law consists of two fundamentally different aspects: sets of legal limits 
on private interactions; and imposes limits on the political regime. The different 
contributing institutions such as the criminal law, police and law enforcement, the 
criminal prosecution process, the system of punishments are interlocking issues and 
their role is not to keep the incumbent regime in power but to maintain order and 
predictability. The rule of law helps to define clear property rights, which is necessary 
for economic growth and eventually for political stability. Precondition of functioning 
rule of law is widespread information that helps the local actors to plan future activities 
but also creates confidence in foreign parties to invest in the development of the 
country. (Ackerman 2003: 184-197) 
Before the rule of law guarantees that the stability of the new system of complex 
interdependencies, the enhancement of wide participation of the people in decision-
making is counterproductive. In the recent past, the failures of international peace 
missions have made the decision-makers realize that the role of governance and the 
establishment of rule of law enjoy priority in the sound sequence and free and fair 
elections not necessarily create sustainable peace and freedom.  
Respect for the rule of law is the basis of faith in the institutions of the state. To 
achieve it the first stage of statebuilding has to be successful, the rule of law needs force 
and coercion, basic administration, agreements inside of the society. Constitutional 
settlements, however important they are, cannot anticipate the existence of the rule of 
law, which depends on a at least minimally existing state. Nonetheless, in the long run 
the state is not viable without the rule of law, that is they mutually complement each 
other during statebuilding. The most basic requirement of the rule of law is the state’s 
monopoly on the use of force. There are two models of building the rule of law. First, 
the enforcement model incorporates legitimate coercive measures if it is necessary to 
strengthen the rule of law. In this model the police forces, the custodial system, the truth 
and reconciliation commissions, the transitional courts play central role. Having in mind 
that the interim period of statebuilding presumes that the local institutions are not strong 
enough, the listed requirements are to be provided by the joint effort of the external and 
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internal actors, for instance in the form of an international civilian police, or 
international courts and custodial facilities. Second, the negotiated model believes in the 
power of voluntarism, that makes the achievements more durable, that is why the 
primary tool of it is the training at all levels of the society. (Plunkett 2005) 
The rule of law is the essential pillar on which a future and successful democracy can 
rest. The rule of law necessitates a legal system that is uniform on the entire territory of 
the country and there are no brown zones where the incompliant and destructive actors 
could hide spoiling the achievements of institution-building. The rule of law must not 
tolerate any form of discrimination. The central authority has to treat all individuals in 
the same way and punish the deviancy by controlling the territory of the state by lawful 
means. The judicial system must not be exclusive and every citizen of the state has to 
enjoy the same right before the courts. (O’Donnell 2005) 
The historical culture of local institutions is central to strengthen the rule of law. The 
successful step of achieving that depends on limited set of appropriately sequenced 
influence of strategic variables. In post-conflict situations, not only or mainly not the 
law orders the behavior of the people. The cultural context always creates informal 
institutions, customs and conventions that build a frame for the social activity in the 
country. But development needs predictability and only the rule of law can secure the 
generally prospective, clear and consistent environment. The central authority rules by 
law, that is formally legal and based on the needs of the society and the given 
opportunities by the reality. The substance of the rule of law on the other hand is the 
affirmative duty of the government to make the people’s life better. The final outcome 
that is expected by establishing and maintaining the rule of law is citizen security, 
political stability, enhanced protection of human rights, peaceful opportunities for 
conflict resolution, economic growth and development, and protection from corruption 
and abuses with power. (Jensen 2008) 
The rule of law in itself is in weak states after conflicts only an empty expression. 
The external actors have to force the society to fill it up with substance. In this sense, 
institutions of transitional justice are important elements on the road of establishing the 
rule of law. The most important task of the law is to regulate violence by limiting the 
use of force for legitimate reasons and only by the central authority. These institutions 
have to challenge the formal practices, customs that are inconsistent with the goals of 
statebuilding. The transitional justice institutions challenge the past by confronting 
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denial of abuses, creating forums for debates, changing the dominant frameworks that 
try to interpret the past and establish the legitimacy of the statebuilding process by 
being responsive to the local conditions. (Leebaw 2008) In contrast, the use of 
customary practices of the society helps to gain popularity for the statebuilding process, 
as these customs and traditions usually enjoy higher legitimacy, but these may be 
inconsistent with the goal of sustainable development, or they are discriminatory or 
build on human rights abuses.  
One of the most important aspects of rule of law is the intolerance with corruption. 
Corruption is the abuse of entrusted authority for illegitimate private gains. Corruption 
slows down the development in the economic, institutional, societal dimension, and 
even can fuel violence by undermining stability and trust. Increasing legitimacy of the 
government can help to fight against the informal economy through controlling the 
economy easier by having less free-riders. The level of corruption is also a good index 
of the success of the statebuilding process, as all the steps in statebuilding are also 
necessary elements of fighting against corruption. (Boucher et al 2007; Cheng et al 
2008) Although, the anticorruption measures have to be responsive to the local and 
domestic conditions, because the corruption is often rational strategy in societies that 
are vicious circle of underdevelopment, bad governance and conflict, tolerating 
moderate corruption in countries that have weak institutions will easily lead to rampant 
corruption that penetrates all aspects of life and reverses development. 
 
 
The complex of the economic, societal and domestic dimensions 
 
Similarly to the first stage of statebuilding, the complex of economic, societal and 
domestic dimensions are less interdependent as the security, external and institutional 
dimensions. We have to mention again, that the grouping of the dimensions can be 
made only in theory and it serves rather the understanding than clear lines between the 
different dimensions. 
The institutions built in the interim period of statebuilding are also important in the 
economic sector. One of the explanations of the different economic growth of countries 
is the experienced differences in the institutional dimension. (Acemoglu 2008) 
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Economic dimensions cannot be examined separately from the political structure, or the 
power distributions inside of the society, that is why the direct reform of the economic 
institutions my backfire. Out of sequence institutional changes in the economic sector, 
even if it seemed to help faster economic growth, may undo the achievement of other 
dimensions. The globalization and the experience of the developed countries suggest 
that the recipe for development is privatization of state owned enterprises, the 
deregulation of currency, lowering tariffs and cutting back the public expenditures, but 
as the spectacular failure of the “Washington consensus” showed generalization of 
economic development is false. Before the economy can undergo large scale reforms, 
there is a need for other institutions and conditions, such as for security, for the state’s 
ability to collect taxes, for transparent policies, for low level of corruption and 
functioning government. In any other situations, the economic reforms may contribute 
to the (new) collapse of the state. (Haken 2006) 
The development in the economic dimension serves the same goal as the other 
dimensions. According to an emerging view (Inglehart 2009), economic development is 
the generator of positive changes in the other dimensions. After the Cold War, a “new 
modernization” began, a process which penetrated the whole society and economy. The 
modernization is externally led and the globalization forced for instance political and 
cultural changes, such as gender equality and democratization. The modernization, 
however, does not automatically solve the problem of weak states, as the process always 
depends on the take off, which is the beginning situation. But economic development 
has several consequences such as increasing economic security and better and wider 
education, which all help maintain the process of statebuilding. 
The economic development needs to follow certain rules and the causal coherence of 
the steps can serve that. Rehabilitation and reconstruction has to come before general 
development. Rehabilitation of the economy not only means the alleviation of war 
damages but the stabilization of the financial conditions. In a country where the 
inflation is permanently over a certain percent the development may be undone by the 
growing deterioration of the currency. In several countries, the authorities chose the 
comfortable solution and completely gave up the own currency, for instance Kosovo 
began to use Euro after the intervention. Apart from finding the right sequence in the 
economic dimension, the interim period has to face with severe economic challenges. 
First of all we have to mention that the first stage of statebuilding served rather 
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reconstruction that is not equal to development (Etzioni 2007: 27). In this stage, the 
basis of economic development has to be laid on the success of the reconstruction. The 
reconstruction project needs to have an endpoint when the foreign actors give space for 
the local dynamics of development. However, the reconstruction can be the enemy of 
development in certain cases. In case that the first stage and the interim period of 
statebuilding cannot solve the coordination of the several external and domestic actors 
active in the reconstruction, the local actors will not be strong enough for bearing the 
burden of development by themselves, and on the other hand, the external actors will 
not leave enough space for domestic initiatives and ownership.  
In order to conduct the necessary steps, the statebuilding process needs to secure the 
way of financing the reconstruction and finding the mechanisms how the state can 
collect the necessary revenues. For the complex system of financial security for the 
statebuilding process, there is a need for certain institutions, such as the central bank 
and functioning monetary authorities; a stable currency; and the creation of the 
commercial financial system by reviving the commercial banks and insurance 
companies. (Addison et al 2005) The management of public finances is important to the 
state because it gives the opportunity to realize public goals (Ghani et al 2008: 135), 
therefore the efficient collection and allocation of resources have to be the priority in 
this stage of statebuilding. A stable state needs a sustainable system of public finance, 
and the final success of statebuilding also depends on the timely introduction and 
development of this system. The system of public finances helps the state be able to 
estimate the available resources, allocate them to the priority needs, plan an effective 
budget, collect revenues, expend resources against the budget, and monitor all these 
activities. The primary revenue of a state has to be the tax. The ability of collecting 
taxes presumes the existence of the concerning laws and institutions, security, well 
trained public officials, general education, and evidently adequate economic activity.  
The logical connections dictate that the state needs legitimacy to be able to collect 
revenues. The management and allocation of resources has to be in balance with the 
effective expenditure. The governmental expenditure has to be based on the previously 
planned budget. The problem in a post-conflict situation is that the government has not 
enough resources for reconstruction and statebuilding, but the aid is a complementary 
resource that is not part of the budget and the government cannot plan with it. The 
situation can socialize the governments to the dependency on aid, as, similarly to the 
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state owned companies in the socialist countries, the government meets soft budget 
burden, and therefore it does not have to try very hard to meet the previous financial 
expectations and plans. Furthermore, and not only because of the aid, the vast majority 
of resources flow outside of governmental channels in the post conflict situations. The 
lack of coordination by the donors creates parallel structures and high expectation in the 
society that the government will not be able to satisfy in the long term. Due to the 
growing aid economy inside of the formal economy the tax revenues consequently 
decrease, because usually the aid related works demand for tax exemptions. The 
contradiction is in this situation that the aid workers and donors are present to help the 
country be self-sustainable, but the largest sector of the economy, namely the aid-
economy, is beyond the control of the government. On the other hand, in most of the 
cases channeling aid through the government is not the best idea either, because of the 
widespread corruption and weak capacities. (Lockhart et al 2008) 
It was discussed in the previous subchapter but we have to mention it briefly again 
that it is an important tasks in this stage to provide livelihood for former combatants, 
namely the economic dimension has to support the security dimension and the process 
of disarmament and demobilization by creating job opportunities. As we discussed 
above, simply buying off the combatants by providing cash is not sustainable, and 
generates unsustainable structures. Real job opportunities on the other hand give the 
hope the combatants that they can give up fighting without facing starvation on 
homelessness. Moreover, finding jobs for former combatants is the first step of 
reintegration them into the society. The livelihood creation is the root of potential 
economic success and security. There is a “golden hour” of job creation when the 
statebuilders have to lay down the foundation of recovery or the conflict will reemerge. 
This “golden hour” is within one year of cessation of the conflict. The next table, 
adapted from the Essential Task Matrix of the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization of the US Government, shows the necessary 
immediate tasks of job creation. 
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Public works jobs • Initiatives to provide immediate employment 
• Create opportunities for young male 
Micro- and small 
enterprise stimulation • Assess skill deficiencies 
Skills training and 
counseling 
• Assess and determine immediately employable labor 
force for appropriate critical and emergency needs 
Public Sector 
Investment 
• Prioritize public investment needs 
• Develop a plan to allocate resources 
• Pay civil service arrears 
• Determine structure and affordable size of civil service 
to meet ongoing and future needs 
• Strengthen ethics regulations 
Public Sector 
Institutions 
• Identify operational capacity, including physical 
structure and security 
Bank Lending 
• Provide immediate credit including access to micro- 
and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) lending 
• Ensure that standard banking practices to approve loans 
are part of early credit programs 
Trade Structure 
• Evaluate tariffs, tax structures, and barriers to trade 
• Reduce restrictions on imports that hinder access to 
goods for small business and investors 
Trade Facilitation 
• Open or maintain line of credit mechanisms and trade 
credits to trade critical goods 
• Set trade priorities and explore new trade opportunities 
• Initiate dialogue between country economic team and 
international actors responsible for granting preferential trading 
status 
Private Sector 
Development 
• Assess the depth of the private sector, including 
weakness of the goods and service sector and its distribution 
channels 
• Identify obstacles to private sector development 
(barriers to entry; high import taxes; import restrictions; lack of 
business credit; lack of power, telecommunications, or transport; 
non-repatriation of profits) 
• Take immediate steps to remove or counter these 
obstacles where possible 
• Jump-start small-scale private sector entrepreneurs 
through grants and loans to micro-entrepreneurs and SMEs 
Small and Micro-
enterprise Regime 
• Identify constraints to small business development and 
take steps to remove them where possible in the short term (lack 
of credit, onerous taxes) 
 
12. Essential Tasks of Job Creation in Post-Conflict Situations.  
Source: Mendelson et al 2005: 4-5 
 
Unlike to the humanitarian programs which need to have a quick impact, the process 
of demobilization is not easy, quick or cheap. (Mendelson 2007) On the other hand, 
creating jobs only for the combatants may be counterproductive, because it may deepen 
grievances and the feeling for revenge in the civilians. The problem is that former 
combatants can find the way to make ends meet, but it mostly means violent or criminal 
activity, as there is only one thing in which they have expertise and that is violence. 
Following this argument job creation is not the ultimate solution, the general society 
also has to accept the new roles of the former combatants, because in any other case the 
attraction of the new life is very low. To be able to maintain that attitude in the society, 
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the general society has to live better, for which the general economic development is the 
sound way. 
General economic development is only sustainable if the government follows and 
implements sound economic policies and finds the priority areas in the economic 
development. Without the hope of economic development the goals of this stage of 
statebuilding are in danger. The priority areas in economic development are a complex 
policy system of the different dimensions. The basic macroeconomic needs can be 
secured only by having a legal regulatory framework that supports it. The government 
has to be able to manage the natural resource component of the conflict, engaging the 
private sector, and jumpstarting international trade. Moreover establishing basic 
educational services is crucial for the future, because the most dangerous societal group 
is the unemployed youth. (Mendelson 2004) The danger with it is, when negative actors 
take the role of formal education, as it happened in Afghanistan with the appearance of 
the Taliban movement and the spread of fundamental madrassas. We can label a policy 
decision sound when it creates immediate benefits in the economy sector because that 
can manage the growing expectations of the people fuelled by the new political 
environment and the promises of the statebuilding process. 
The private sector and the market both play crucial role in creating sustainable 
structures. The general belief is that the enhancement of the privates sector during 
statebuilding usually have positive effect, and increases human security. On the other 
hand, private sector gives space for competition and in a fragile society that can 
aggravate social conflict and weaken national political settlement. Private sector can be 
strengthened if the market can function. For the formation of a market, there is a need 
for setting and enforcing rules for commercial activity; supporting the operation and 
continued development of private enterprise and intervening in times of market failure. 
(Ghani et al 2008: 149) The functioning market is interconnected with the private sector 
in every possible ways; the market cannot serve its role without private property, 
individual entrepreneurship, or innovation. The belief in the importance of the market 
bottom on the conviction that in a modern society the economy is that determines the 
final form of the institutions. According to the same argument the market is necessary 
for sustainable economic development; job creation; increase in productivity which 
means growing standards of life; and ensures the optimal allocation of goods in the 
society. On the other hand, the market is a political institution, too, because it decides 
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who can have the power, and also marginalizes certain layers of the society. (Xing 
2001) 
For having a functioning market, the decisive factor is the people who will make the 
market function. Investment in human capital is a crucial as it makes the next 
generations more competitive in the globalized world. The final goal of investing in 
human capital is to create a bigger middle class. The productivity of an economy always 
depends on the educated and healthy society, therefore general economic development 
needs to reform education and public health. 
The educated and trained workforce, the human capital, the innovative capacity of 
the society all are very important to maintain institutional structure of the economy. 
Furthermore, legal and economic institutions create the institutional environment for 
accumulating capital goods. Development assistance tries to incorporate in the strategies 
the above mentioned facts, but the problem is rather the practice. The strict 
conditionality of international organizations led to forced reforms, economic opening 
and too quick introduction of pluralist democratic expectations, which in some cases – 
like in Ivory Coast – contributed to the failure of the state. It is not obvious that a more 
poor economy will automatically converge to the rich world through faster economic 
development.23 
The economic experiences with national development show clearly that the internal 
quality of the states and the status of the economy in the international structures are 
interconnected. During the statebuilding process, it has to be emphasized that neither 
autarchy nor exaggerated liberalization leads to the wished aim. The interdependent 
international economic relations mean that a country closes the external borders of 
economy – such as Zimbabwe – it is harmful for either the given state or the sound 
functioning of the international economy. Nevertheless, it is true that interdependency 
does not mean as vulnerability for the developed countries, but the solution is not de-
linking, as it has been suggested by the radical, neo-Marxist and new-leftist streams of 
development economics. The solution is rather the mitigation of asymmetry. (Szentes 
2003) 
It is obviously not easy to develop the economy of a failed state that faces both 
external and internal challenges. Escaping from the vicious circles of underdevelopment 
is a “mission impossible” for these states, and unfortunately increasing the level of 
financial aid is not sufficient either, in some cases even counterproductive. It has to be 
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taken into consideration that the capacity for internal capital accumulation is negligible 
in these states, that partly comes from the limited quantity of foreign and domestic 
investments. The quality of workforce is low, due to the underdeveloped educational 
system, the cultural traditions and the dualism in the economy. Furthermore, dualism 
also means that input and output linkages within the economy are unable to evolve. That 
is, the increase of export in the modern sector is in vain, since it will not pull out the 
traditional sector from the trap of underdevelopment. (Szentes 2003; 2005)  
Asymmetric interdependence appears in almost every economic relation: 
international trade; relations in international capital ownership; international financial 
connections, especially in the debtor and donor relations; technology transfer; 
specialization and division of labor. The financial aids by themselves should not be 
blamed for the economic backwardness of these states, even if most of the statistical 
data suggest that aid dependency destroys a country’s economy. However, there are 
counter-examples, Paul Collier, in his recently published summarizing work, proved 
that financial aids mean 1% GDP increase in average in the recipient states. (Collier 
2007:99) Except, the aid behaves such as other abundant resource, and if its quantity 
goes over 16% of the given country’s GDP, the economy will rather retrograde. The law 
of diminishing returns says very clearly that additional unit of financial aid has lower 
utility. Furthermore, Collier also demonstrated in his work that the biggest danger for 
instable economies that went through violent events is the immediate inflow of not 
sufficiently enough foreign aid and income. Because the limited amount of aid, it is 
definitely not enough for rebuilding the state but sufficient for continuing the armament 
and the war. (Collier 2007:105-106) In case of failed states, the conditional nature of aid 
policies cannot work, as they are based on promises that the recipient state is evidently 
not able to fulfill. In turn, the problem with technical assistance is that the creditors 
usually aim at developing techniques that are smooth in a developed country but not 
appropriate in the recipient one. Forcing certain reforms with aids is not probable, 
either, because the donors will never take the risk for defending the achievements in 
cases where an armed intervention would be needed. 
The problem of the history with aid is that most of the aid dependent countries fell in 
a vicious circle, and the aid only offered legitimacy to corrupt and authoritarian 
regimes, and money for stay in power. These leaders have paid attention to the demands 
of the donors rather than to the real needs of the citizens of the country. The aid 
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evidently affects the investments and governmental consumption just like other natural 
resources that are abundant. The windfall of the resources damages the institutions, and 
easy revenue as aid increase the rent-seeking behavior of the governmental officials, 
and consequently the size of the bureaucracy. (Djankov et al 2006) In case of automatic 
aid allocations, the leaders of weak countries are interested in keeping the level of 
poverty to maintain the easy revenue. For number of governments the aid is more than 
50% of the government’s income, and overwhelms any other forms of revenue. In these 
states, the aid shapes the development, which is why the donors need to rethink the 
strategies and adjust the aid to the needs of the people. (Joseph et al 2009: 255-258) 
Good aid has to be transparent, and the important features are: specialization that 
means the aid is not fragmented; selectivity which secures that bad leaders cannot get 
new aids; cuts down the ineffective aid channels; and the administration costs are low. 
In reality the aid agencies are not transparent that is why the overhead costs are too 
high, they do not coordinate their activity with each other very effectively, that is the 
cause of the fragmented aid allocations, and ineffectiveness. (Easterly et al 2008) On the 
other hand, from the domestic point of view, the indebtedness of the countries is the 
major burden to economic development, but even in case of debt relief the fiscal 
institutions may be so weak that the government rather keeps the freed resources for 
rearming, or rebel leaders capture all the fiscal transfers. (Addison et al 2003) 
The foreign influence can be harmful not only because of the accumulation of 
“wrong-aid”, but the intervention and the presence of foreign actors in the country 
create parallel economic structures that are not healthy for the future. The foreign actors 
have to be more responsive to the local needs and trying to decrease the destructing 
effects of these economies. As we could see clearly for instance in Bosnia or in 
Afghanistan, the higher paying jobs around the foreign intervention makes university 
professors to become taxi drivers. That paradox “brain-drain” is counterproductive to 
the future. The situation is, however, unavoidable, because the countries after 
devastating conflict need the presence of foreign actors, and even the economic 
dimension could not develop without foreign help. The economic consequences of the 
foreign presence are strong and not always positive. After the first stage, where the 
administrative institutions, the basic infrastructure and important physical capital were 
reconstructed this stage has to address problems such as reviving production and trade, 
return the direction of capital flow, and repatriate human capital. Nevertheless, the 
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achievement of these objectives is risked even by the actors which aim at assisting in 
development. Due to the very strong effects of the foreign presence, alternative 
structures emerge outside of the formal economy. First, the international aid economy 
creates demand for hotel, transportation, luxurious goods and entertainment through the 
enormous number of international staff, which are way above the average quality of the 
countries supply. This economy has higher paying and legal jobs than any other 
economies that is why lot of skilled workers accepts to have low quality jobs. Second, 
the criminal economy stays to offer good livelihood for the people in the post-conflict 
period. Third, the informal economy also challenges the economic development because 
the goods being realized in this sector are invisible for the government, and the whole 
sector decreases the basis of revenues of the state. Fourth, the formal economy coexists 
with the other sectors, and in the most cases this sector is the less powerful. (Kamphuis 
2005) 
The ill-shaped economic structure by the foreign presence is the hotbed for corrupt 
practices.24 The corruption is still one of the key challenges in this stage and dimension. 
In post-conflict periods the corruption is endogenous to the political structure of the 
state and serves important role in political ordering. Philippe Le Billion (2001) aptly 
draws an illustrative picture about the causes and consequences of the different types of 
corruptions. The next figure shows the different dimensions.  
 
 
13. Types of Corruption and the Consequences and the Ways How the Society Sees It.  
Source: Le Billion 2001: 4 
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Legitimate and benign corruption can contribute to order, whilst criminal and illegal 
corruption clearly fuel conflict and increase violence. In an underdeveloped economy, 
the capital accumulation and eventually the general development depend on the 
available public resources and political power. Because of the scarce resources, the 
competition over the political power is fierce, which brings corruption, growing 
grievances and violence. 
The societal dimension is important in producing resources for development, namely 
the human capital. The quality of human capital depends on the ability of the society to 
deal with the post-conflict situation and to deepen coherence. The development of 
political culture is path dependent and is influenced by the social structure. Cohesive 
political culture contributes to the stability of the statebuilding. As Arend Lijphart 
(1969: 216) mentioned in his seminal article on consociational democracy, cohesive 
political culture can born when the elite have the ability to accommodate the divergent 
interests, to join in a common effort, and the elite are committed to the maintenance of 
the system, and prefer stability over political fragmentation.  
But on the other hand, the pact of the elite is not sufficient to maintain a stable 
democratic structure, because even if the elite reached an agreement over the future of 
the country the wide public may be not satisfied with settlement. Not addressing the 
root causes of the conflict, and letting the deeply embedded grievances being 
unresolved, building the political structure on the pact of elite will lead to explosion in 
the long run. Consociational agreements cannot last long without the consent of the 
wider society even if they are built on the broadest representation of all groups. For 
instance, Lebanon was named the “Switzerland of the Middle East” in the 1970s, and 
actually we do not have to stitch any comments to it to prove our argument above. The 
society needs to overcome the past to be able to live together in peace and work for the 
common future. In the post-war Germany one of the key features of the settlement was 
the large scale de-nazification of the German society and psyche. The removal of former 
Nazi influence from the media, business and financial life served the ability of the 
society to be able to face the past and begin a new and clear chapter in the history. 
Approximately 13 million Germans were interviewed only in the American sector, and 
three million persons were charged with collaboration with the Nazi regime. However, 
the occupying powers realized that around the half of the German population was 
compromised during the Nazi era, thus, the total de-nazification cannot be else than a 
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fiction. The real goal was to change the general master race attitudes of the German 
population by emphasizing the defeat in the war. (Dobbins et al 2004: 18-21; Jennings 
2003: 11-13) Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that simple humiliation of the 
society cannot be the goal. The statebuilding process has to be able to demonstrate the 
peace dividend and reject the notion of collective guiltiness of certain societal groups as 
it would only change the power structures in the society and make other groups 
marginalized. Justice and reconciliation are crucial to face the past, because they help 
address grievances and wrongdoings. Dealing with past abuses, by using 
institutionalized channels which is built on the rule of law, is the key for success. In 
general, the societal reconciliation needs certain institutional elements. First, there is a 
need for law enforcement instruments that are effective and responsive to civilian 
authorities and that respect human rights. Second, an impartial, open and accountable 
judicial system is necessary. Third, a fair constitution and body of law are the 
foundation of institutionalized judiciary system. Fourth, mechanisms for monitoring and 
upholding human rights are complementary tools of reconciliation. Fifth, human 
correctional systems help defend the society from deviant behavior. Finally, formal and 
informal reconciliation mechanisms, which deal with past abuses and resolve 
grievances, are built on the elements listed above. The interim stage of statebuilding 
have to contribute to the entire process societal-institutional connections by providing 
emergency justice measures to fill the indigenous gap; rebuilding indigenous judicial 
systems; establishing of international and national reconciliation mechanisms; allowing 
pre-deployment enablers, which facilitate rapid and effective international response. 
(Flournoy et al 2004: 90) 
The recognition is an important factor of choosing the appropriate means. The 
judicial design is the key for success, but it is only institutional contribution for 
reconciliation. It is easier to change laws, but the social behavior end the deeply 
embedded dynamics and habits of the society can be controlled only by permanent 
monitoring. The dilemma is how to maintain achievements of former stages if the 
mobilization of destructive forces is easier than to fill the gap between societal groups. 
In this sense, reconciliation and societal justice is crucial to defend the statebuilding 
process. The critical groups are the refugees, the internally displaced persons and the 
vulnerable groups of the society, especially the women and the youth. Humanitarian 
programs usually intend to have quick impact on these groups but in the second stage of 
statebuilding, focusing on these groups is even more important, because without 
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reconciliation and provision of security for them, the institutions designed in this stage 
will not last long, and disarmament and demobilization programs cannot be successful.  
There is wide agreement on the need of enhancing the cohesion of the society. 
Without finding the glue that can hold the whole society together, the development of 
the state will obviously fail in the long term. According to for instance Jean Jacque 
Rousseau that glue was nationalism in the 18th century Europe. In the 21st century, none 
of the statebuilding projects will meet with conditions that provide framework of 
building nations. Moreover, building a nation cannot be the task of external actors. The 
task is rather to promote a supra-ethnic identity for the groups that is reflected in all of 
the activities of the state, an identity that is connected with the existence of the state, 
rather than any pre-national ties at the first place. Nation is an imagined community, so 
in this sense the imagination could focus on the institutions, too. The manifestation of 
this kind of loyalty can be the institution of citizenship that provides legal right to 
participate in the decision about the common future, and represents an emotive 
psychological and sociological mechanism, the feeling of being part of a bigger 
community. “Civic nationalism” does not imply a common history, language, or culture, 
but demands the recognition of the common authority of the political framework. 
(Miller 2000: 129) 
Without some sort of nation-building, none of the statebuilding projects can succeed. 
Nation-building as part of the statebuilding process is rather the tool of ethnic conflict 
regulation, that is turning the former enemies to parties that can work together on the 
future. Nation-building means the incorporation of vulnerable groups and 
underrepresented minorities to the main social fabric of the state, because statistical 
facts prove (Hudson et al 2008) that for instance the security of women contributes to 
the security of the state. Enhanced equality in the society leads to increased stability of 
the politics and the institutions in general. The RAND Corporation (Benard et al 2008) 
published an entire book on the role of women in statebuilding as part of the nation-
building series which consists of five other publications now. This volume emphasizes 
that nation-building projects are still in the experimental phase. Furthermore, gender 
equality is not only important because in most of the societies women constitute more 
than 50% of the population but because the inclusion of women puts more emphasis on 
the human security in general.  
  
152 
 
The external factors influence the whole development of the political culture, and 
they consequently influence the societal conflicts, the stability of the institutions, the 
functioning of the economy and the security, too. The external actors’ presence 
simultaneously means the foreign push towards Western and universal standards of 
democracy, economic liberalization, liberal culture, and the rule of law. However, the 
hegemonic agenda can break very slowly the real features of the domestic politics, 
society or economic habits. Therefore, the domestic dimension influences more directly 
the success of this stage of statebuilding. 
In this stage, the statebuilding has to address the domestic sources of 
underdevelopment, too. The sequence is explained by the fact that domestic problems 
have to be solved by domestic actors and the ownership questions are crucial in this 
sense. Per definition, the states were not able to conduct a complex reform and 
construction process in the economic sector, due to the weak institutional capacities, 
low legitimacy, and the significant effects of the international and regional economic 
processes. In the 1950s and 1960s, the explanations of underdevelopment emphasized 
the external factors and the dependent development of the poor countries, which 
eventually hindered their development. Later in 1970s and more dominantly in the 
1980s, the new approach focused on the domestic problems, and overwhelmingly 
mentioned the importance of domestic factors in economic development. The failure of 
the developing world to converge to the North and the spectacular success of the 
developmentalist regimes in South East Asia underlined the argument on the decisive 
power of domestic “bad governance”. The truth is evidently between the two 
approaches: both the domestic features and the external conditions and processes 
influence the economic development. The domestic sources of underdevelopment are 
mentioned today mostly in connection with Africa. Peter Lewis (2008: 102-103) listed 
the domestic factors why the African countries cannot develop: neopatrimonialism and 
clientelist politics; growing inequality in the society; low capital formation and high 
level of corruption; weak opposition and civil society; rent-seeking elites; limited 
pressure on the government from below; weak institutions and legal system. These 
factors all contribute to the economic underdevelopment but the solutions are obviously 
found in other dimension, and in the interaction among the dimensions. The 
development helps the state gain legitimacy and maintain the achievements of the other 
dimensions, because the core values that the development provides are: sustenance that 
is the ability of the state to meet the basic needs25; self esteem means the ability of 
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people to live under “human” conditions; and freedom from servitude provides the 
opportunity for the people to be able to chose how they want to live their life. These 
goals are threatened by the general characteristics of the underdeveloped countries. 
These countries experience very low standards of living because of the low incomes, 
inequality, poor health and inadequate education. Due to the low quality of life, the 
productivity is low consequently. The situation is not promising in the future, either, 
because of the high level of population growth, the dependence on agricultural 
production and export of primary products, the prevalence of imperfect markets and 
limited flow of information, and finally the vulnerability in the international relations. 
(Todaro et al 2006: 41-48) The importance of finding the solution in the economic 
sector is high during this period of statebuilding, because the transfer of power to the 
local actors is impossible if they cannot sustain the economic growth. The key features 
of the solution are: decreasing inequality by alleviating chronic poverty through 
education, health care and strong institutions; family planning to control population 
growth; decreasing the imbalances of urbanization by developing the rural areas, too; 
increasing education that will develop general health, too; being conscious on the 
environment; balancing the relations between state, the market and the civil society.  
The underdeveloped countries lack human capital, business capital, infrastructure, 
natural capital, public-institutional capital and knowledge capital. The poverty creates a 
trap and because of the low level of savings there is no basis for investments and the 
state is not able to escape from this trap. The fiscal trap means that the government 
lacks the resource to maintain the infrastructure, or to provide public goods, because of 
its corrupt functioning, or low level of revenues and extreme indebtedness. (Sachs 2005: 
56-59) 
The domestic dimension also shows and influences how the local actors can 
contribute to the transition, and determine how long the transition will take. The 
outcome of the interim period is in ideal-typical case the emergence of the local 
stakeholders, that is the strengthening of the domestic dimension. The external 
dimension fundamentally challenges the capacities of domestic actors, whether they are 
able to handle the out-crowding effect of the external presence. The key objective of 
this dimension is to maintain and develop the local capacities. The dilemma is obvious: 
with weak domestic capacities the countries cannot avoid the need of external help, but 
with external help the domestic capacities may not develop. However, there are certain 
  
154 
 
domestic endowments that influence the domestic performance in other dimensions, 
whilst no external or domestic development can change them. In this case, the goal in 
this dimension is to elaborate the environment where the positive consequences of these 
endowments can be exploited, and the negative ones can be minimized. One of these 
features is the geographical landscape of the country. Hard environmental conditions 
affect the state’s economic performance, the political structure, the society, and the 
needed strategy of the intervention. Landlocked country with high mountains and little 
fertile agricultural soil needs additional investments.  
In the interim period, it is very important to find the local stakeholders on which the 
next step can be built. The emergence of civil society in some form is wished during 
this stage. During the first stage, or the period of war and state failure, the concept of 
civil society made no sense, but from this stage on it has important role to create the 
domestic capacities. The civil society has to call attention to issues that would be hidden 
without the civil groups, and more importantly, the civil society in post-conflict 
situations, when the governmental control cannot extend to all the aspects of 
development. The problem is that not only development NGOs can substitute the 
presence of the state but criminal gangs, terrorist organizations, which are also part of 
the non-state sector. Civil society can more easily develop in an environment where the 
trust is high. Positive outcome is only possible when the participants in the civil society 
make “goodwill” efforts to maintain the achievements of statebuilding, which is more 
probable in two situations: first, when the expected reciprocity from other groups or the 
state is probable; or when the members of the civil society enjoy sufficient selective 
incentives, for instance prestige, respect, or financial remuneration. The latter category 
can be provided by the external actors. Moreover, the external party has to create 
enabling environment by reducing the costs of social interaction, for example the costs 
of communication and by reducing the number of people who work against the success 
of development.  
Legitimate central government is crucial for development but without strong 
community level local governance the development will not be able to use the capacities 
that are hidden in the societies. National level development cannot exist without parallel 
grassroots growth and consolidation of the different dimensions. (Hohe 2005) The 
grassroots attitudes towards the leadership stiles are also important because they 
differentiate between success and failure of the different style of national governance. 
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We should not underestimate the power of these domestic constellations of attitudes and 
political culture, as autocratic style developmentalism may lead to spectacular success 
as in Singapore, but to painful failure as in Zimbabwe. Or the domestic conditions and 
the social make up are the decisive factors when certain institutions function differently 
in different countries. The institutions can be designed to respond appropriately the 
characteristics of the society, but the domestic conditions cannot be changed in a 
fortnight. The interaction between the institutions and the society and the final 
consequences of the interaction to the development differ according to the domestic 
dimension. For instance, when the geographical differences separate certain areas from 
the center, then these remote areas are more vulnerable for any change. Furthermore, in 
case the remote areas are the territory of minority societal groups the inequality between 
the majority and these groups can get a negative echo, which eventually enhances 
grievances and decreases the possibility of the integration of these groups and areas in 
the national level development plans. To sum up, that is why the local level 
development is a necessary ingredient of general development of the state.  
The indicator of success in this sequence is the level to which the local actors 
become able to bear the responsibility of development. Several conflicting arguments 
confront each other during this sequence. The external powers still have decisive role, 
but there is a need to let space for the local players, too. This sequence has to build the 
institutions of the state which help the external actors to prevent new conflicts but at the 
same time these institutions have to help the socialization of the local players to 
responsibility and democratic decision making processes. 
 
 
Assessing interim authority 
 
According to the logic of the sequences, the second stage of statebuilding has to 
contribute to the achievements of the first sequence. After securing the basis of 
development in all dimensions, the statebuilders have to prepare the local actors for the 
transition. As it can be seen, the external actors still have the final authority, however, 
this power should not be permanent, and the local actors should not be socialized for the 
trusteeship. The goal of this sequence is to identify the right directions of future 
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development. Using the Rubik’s cube analogy, it means that the statebuilders have to 
identify the right “edge groups” of development in each dimension. 
It is still less important to force the local actors to have a perfect performance, but it 
is crucial that they become slowly part of the process. It means that the external actors 
have to find the appropriate stakeholders of development, who will be the basis of 
power transition. The local stakeholders, “the edge pieces”, who worked separately, 
have to be made be interested in the joint effort, id est to form the “edge groups”.  
During this process, the most important goals are avoiding renewed fighting, 
strengthening the rule of law through a strong transitional authority, providing the key 
public goods and services, and beginning reconciliation. Furthermore, all of these goals 
have to be achieved through a mixture of external, in the form of a (neo)trusteeship, and 
internal, in the form of an interim government, efforts. The external actors have to pay 
attention to the importance of the local efforts, because the interim authority should not 
be based on a state which is only a collection of externally run institutions. 
Similarly to the first sequence of statebuilding, certain dimensions have closer 
relation even if we still have in mind that the dimensions can be separated only in 
theory. The security-military, the external and the institutional dimensions necessitate 
more synchronized development. Accordingly, the economic, societal and domestic 
dimensions are in closer relation. These groupings are easily acceptable if we think 
about the most important goal of this stage, which is avoiding renewed fighting whilst 
the domestic actors become able to be the real engine of development. However, in this 
stage, the presence of the foreign actors is still the key for development, because they 
can maintain security, and they shape the frames of the future institutions. The locals 
can have an organic role in the statebuilding process when the economy and the societal 
situation create a situation where the opportunity costs of development are higher than 
the motivation for renewed fighting or simply remaining free rider in the process. 
Winning the war does not lead automatically to sustainable peace. The appropriate 
interim solutions need the joint effort of the external and the local actors even if it slows 
down the process for a while. This stage can be only successful if the root causes of the 
former conflict are not present or they are weaker than the attractiveness of 
development. This is the key of the future because external actors cannot be present 
indefinitely. Consequently, the final indicator of success of this stage is the increased 
ability of the local actors to bear the responsibility of development in the future. 
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The third sequence: emerging local ownership 
 
 
The third sequence of statebuilding is the stage where the light at the end of the 
tunnel has to be seen. It means that international actors already prepared the 
environment for ownership transformation and the local stakeholders actually have to 
feel the stakes they have. Without that feeling the responsibility cannot be transferred 
from external to domestic players. The puzzle may still seem to be a little confusing but 
the goal of this stage is to create a situation where sustainable development is possible 
without major interference of external actors. It means, if we use the Rubik’s cube 
analogy again, that no matter how much variables (cubelets) were present at the 
beginning situation, this stage has to reach a level, where only simple, and in sound 
cases, automatic tasks are left. In case of an NxN cube it means that the in last sequence 
the cube has to be solved as it would be a 3x3 cube, the solution of which has the 
simplest algorithm among the different cubes. 
 
14. The Sound Composition of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d. 
 
In case of statebuilding, it means that variables which depend more on each other and 
the development of which correlate with each other more have to be treated as one 
group of tasks and focus on them only as a group and not individually. The individual 
tasks are the duty of the local actors and only the bigger set of tasks has to be monitored 
and sometimes managed by external actors. The individual task inside of small system 
of tasks will prepare the local actors to bear the responsibility and to be able to take over 
the ownership of the whole process in the next stage.  
Local ownership in development is the key for the sustainable future. In order to 
consolidate the achievements of the interim stage of statebuilding and continue the 
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parallel change in the six dimensions, the local factor of the process has to be increased. 
The following table collects the tasks which should be implemented in this stage. 
 
Security Institutions Economy 
Strengthening security 
institutions - legitimacy - local 
participation 
"Power sharing" local vs. 
external 
Local initiatives and 
investments 
   
Society External dimension Domestic determinants 
Civil society development Regional security local governance 
 
15. The List of Tasks during the Third Sequence of Statebuilding 
 
As Simon Chesterman point out in his article (2007), the question of ownership 
during statebuilding is not clear. In the literature, local ownership usually does not refer 
to real influence on of the whole process, it means rather a buy in and interprets the 
complex relationship between external and internal stakeholders. Ownership can range 
from loose attachment to a program, to actual controlling authority. In case of complex 
statebuilding, there is a need of excessive external involvement and responsibility in the 
first two stages due to the fact that the cause of conflict was the inability or 
unwillingness of the state to develop the country and provide better life for the people. 
In this stage, the increase in local ownership does not mean that the external actors have 
decreasing duties, we use here Chesterman’s (2007) argument again, the local 
ownership rather refers to the figurative use of the expression. Emerging local 
ownership indicates that the statebuilding process, and the external assistance are 
responsive to the local needs and consistent with the local capacities and priorities. The 
statebuilding exercise will only be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the people 
when the local factor is significant and sustainable. It does not necessarily represent real 
self-determination in all dimensions; it rather implies steps which are more than vaguely 
defined external prescriptions for local authorities to participate in the development. 
However, giving the real political ownership to the local actors is only the final step of 
statebuilding, managing the expectations of the people and the local stakeholders are the 
key of this sequence. The most important areas where the enhancement of local 
ownership is necessary are the administration of justice and the civil administration. 
Both postulates are only realizable if the security environment allows looser control by 
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the international forces, which obviously implies that local ownership in the security 
dimension has to increase, as well. Local participation and ownership needs broader 
consent of the society. Therefore, there are several technical tools which can help the 
process. For instance, the translation of materials and documents, which are related to 
the statebuilding process, and the media appearance are crucial. Trainers are important 
actors of this stage, who help locals understand the sequences and the needed 
participation better through consultations and trainings on political issues such as the 
demobilization and reintegration process, the security sector reform, or the recruitment 
for political offices. Concluding from personal experiences26 with programs in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan, an external actor can only work sufficiently where the local 
counterpart is also able to participate. We have to recognize that a talented, open-
minded and educated layer of young experts is emerging in all countries where the 
external community is present. It is because the young experts had opportunity to adapt 
certain knowledge from the external actors but at the same time these young experts 
understand the local dynamics better. They are the bridge between “neo-trusteeship” 
and full local independence in the statebuilding process. In this stage, it is very 
important to use these committed groups and persons, because the logic of employing 
always the same local experts and “saint cows” is rather counter-productive. It has been 
long known for the international development agencies that local ownership is the key 
for successful programs, but there has been lack of explanations why in several 
situations, the process of transferring the ownership fails. The answer is, that the always 
used local “experts” live from the international community and they are not interested in 
overtaking all the responsibilities. They have comfortable and well-paid jobs and they 
prefer to extend the international presence. 
From the external actors’ point of view, local ownership means the possibility to 
leave the country. The problem is that in reality the external statebuilders sink into the 
quagmire of mutually reinforcing dilemmas about the effectiveness of statebuilding 
when the locals have more space. The self governing local structures are not always 
effective and rather contradict the goals of the statebuilding process; the short term 
operational requirements and the long term needs are usually conflicting; and the 
identification of local partners is not always easy as the external actors do not want to 
empower the potential spoilers of the statebuilding process. Gradual ownership transfer 
is the way forward, when the short term requirements are reduced and the statebuilding 
means more investment in educational projects. (Narten 2009)  
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Maintaining peace – ownership transfer in the security dimension 
 
In the security dimension, the goal is still maintaining the peace, but a new element is 
emerging. The external providers of security have to prepare themselves and more 
importantly the local actors for the exit of the foreign powers. It includes the completion 
of the demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs by beginning 
effective reintegration projects and the creation of functioning security sector. Both of 
the tasks have significant influence on the other dimensions by decreasing grievances 
and enhancing unity in the society. Reintegration is always more difficult if the 
concerned group or persons were member of an abusive military force. But on the other 
hand, the reintegration of youth and women is not as difficult as it is thought generally. 
(Humphreys et al 2007) 
The DDR process is a social contract between the former combatants and the wider 
society that the former have right to integrate into the society and the later also have 
duties to make it happen. The society has great responsibility in the process, therefore 
the needs of the general society are more important in this stage. Without that the 
society allows the former combatants space in the process, the reintegration of them 
may turn backwards. Reintegration is a long term process, when the reintegrated 
combatants need the local help to be able to work for the same goals as the local 
communities have, and after the reintegration the external actors cannot have large 
influence on the rest of the process, therefore the local ownership and belief in the 
importance of reintegration of former combatants is a decisive factor from the domestic 
side of statebuilding.  
The establishment of national army is part of the security sector reform (SSR) and it 
creates a genuinely national institution which is important in enhancing the cohesion of 
the society. The SSR is the responsibility of the local actors and it is important that the 
national leadership is committed, the principles of the reform root in the countries’ 
history and culture, and the development in the security dimension is consultative. (Ball 
2007: 90) In a multiethnic environment, the most challenging task is to gain legitimacy 
for the army. The problem in a poor country is that the recruits from different groups of 
the society may not be able to work together, and these recruits are usually illiterate and 
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the communicational infrastructure is underdeveloped to disseminate the success if any 
in creation of “national unity” in the army. But the necessity of local army is beyond 
question, the maintenance of security after the leave of the foreign military is still 
crucial, and even if interstate conflicts are less likely human security necessitates the 
“national army”. According to the integrative approach (Simonsen 2007), it is suggested 
that an army which represents in rank and in personnel the society’s ethnic composition 
can help build up a sense of commonality across ethnic boundaries. Ethnically and 
religiously representative army may reduce the likelihood of military intervention in 
politics, or ethnic violence by military personnel.  
We argued several times during the analysis of former steps that peace and 
development is impossible without security. In many times, the lack of security is the 
outcome of weak or absent local security forces, but on the other hand the source of 
problems may be the remnants of wartime military and security sector apparatuses. The 
general characteristics of the security sector in weak states are the lack of civilian 
control over the security forces, the abundance of uncontrolled arms, weak internal 
security, and the lack of trust of the society in the government and consequently in the 
security forces, which are rather seen as an abusive power that make life harder for the 
people. The OECD-DAC guidelines on Security Systems and Governance Reform 
(2005) defines that “security sector includes all those who have the authority to use, or 
order the use of force or threat of force”. The security sector has the legitimate and 
exclusive role in using coercive power, all actors that have that role are subject of the 
security sector. The key elements of the security sector are the core security actors, such 
as the army, and the police forces, intelligence services, the security management and 
oversight bodies, the justice and law enforcement institutions, and the non statutory 
security forces, such as the liberation armies, guerillas, private security companies. The 
SSR has to concentrate to increase the peacetime capacities of the military and the 
police force. That includes, in case of the military accountability measures, balanced 
spending on non-military related issues, overcome ethnic divisions, change the 
perceptions in the society about the army, and reorientation of the military from 
domestic politics. In case of the police forces, it refers basically to the decrease of 
corruption and better quality services in border guarding and custom services, lower 
level of criminalization and participation in illicit trade, or human rights abuses. The 
SSR is crucial for the sustainability of statebuilding and it is an urgent task, however, it 
necessitates certain prerequisites without which the whole process of SSR would lead in 
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the wrong way in a one-way-street. It means that the  sound sequence of SSR is when 
these prerequisites are present: impartial and functioning judicial and penal system; 
local civilian expertise; human rights and rule of law; civil society, that monitors the 
functioning of the security sector; regional security; DDR; low level of proliferation of 
small arms; existing political dialogue and cooperation. (Schnabel et al 2005a,b) 
The SSR has evidently important connections with the other dimensions apart from 
the military- security dimension, where the most important tasks are capacity building, 
and finding the right size for the military and other security forces, by DDR programs. 
The main goals of SSR are that the former warring militaries do not regroup, that the 
corruption decreases in the security forces and transforming the sector to gain credibility 
and legitimacy from the people. (Andrelini 2004) The challenges here are the diversity 
and the transitions of the society. The reforms are important but the general attitudes of 
the society cannot be changed very quickly. The constitution is important in defining 
the role and place of the security sector, but in several countries the real providers of 
security are non-governmental. The inter-communal relations, the privatization of 
security and the multiplicity of security orders all make the SSR more difficult. In the 
institutional-political dimension, the key task is to establish democratic civil control 
over the security forces, keep them accountable, but these presume strong civilian 
government, which is challenged by the weak political legitimacy, the differing political 
strategic priorities when the political institutions are threatened. In the economic 
dimension, the important questions relate to the budget, the consumption of the security 
forces, and the revenue collection ability of the state, whilst corruption is present, and it 
is hard to define the acceptable rate of it. The international networks of organized crime, 
and the lack of accountability often motivate army leaders to pursue private profit from 
illicit activities. In the societal dimension the important players are the civil society 
groups, the independent media, the research institutions, because they serve the 
transparency. But there are questions that challenge the success, such as how to 
motivate the civil society if it is weak, or not democratic to deal with SSR; how to 
maintain SSR in a divided society. (Chanaa 2002, McCartney et al 2004) 
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Defects 
  
Consequences 
 
 
  
Government unable to control 
security actors 
 Coup d’etat; human rights abuses; 
democratic government unable to take 
root 
Government unable to control 
military expenditure 
 Public money wasted; corruption 
 
Repressive internal security 
measures for narrow political 
gain 
  
Growing  military expenditure; human 
rights abuses; democracy under threat 
 
Defense strategy based on  
unreal or inflated estimate of 
threats 
  
Growing military expenditure; possible 
inability to deal with the wider threats to 
security 
 
16. Defects and Consequences in the Security Sector. Source: Hendricksen 2002: 8 
 
 
 
17. The Three Overlapping Dimensions of Security Sector Reform. Source: Ball 2004: 46 
 
SSR includes, apart from the military, the (re-)creation of policing. (Call et al 2002; 
Neild 2001) The role of police forces in conflict societies and weak states were usually 
only the protection of the incumbent regime. In the post-conflict situation because of the 
friction of DDR and the low level of resources for the people, the crime rates are 
increasing drastically, and somebody has to build a barrier in front of it. There are 
several options to fill this part of the security gap. First, it is the opportunity to quickly 
install local civilian police, but this is ineffective because of lack of experience or 
financial means; second, the opportunity to build on preexisting local forces is not 
always legitimate as these forces often committed crimes against humanity; third, 
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however the international military forces are evidently more effective, because of the 
out-crowding effect, the statebuilding should prefer the local solutions; fourth, the 
employment of international civilian police personnel, to educate and train local police 
through joint action is the most sophisticated method.  
 
Emerging local ownership and democratization of the institutions 
 
In the institutional dimension, the goal is to create institutions which the locals are 
able to govern and maintain. The empowerment of local actors eventually serves the 
legitimacy of statebuilding in the long term and the possibility of maintained legitimacy 
of the national level government after the international actors leaved the country. 
Legitimacy in that sense means that the people and the elite see that the goals of the 
state are proper. (Papagianni 2008: 49) 
The reestablishment of faith in the institutions is crucial during this stage. Therefore 
the statebuilding process has to address the root causes of lack of trust. In most 
situations, the problem comes from the fact that the population does not have trust in the 
old elite. In this sense, the task is to elaborate strategies on the design of the role of the 
old elite in the new institutional environment. First, there is the possibility of criminal 
prosecutions and simply remove the key personalities from the old elite, that makes 
them less powerful and more cooperative in the future. Second, giving general amnesty 
helps the old elite keep the old position, but may help close the chapter of the past. 
Third, lustration means the disqualification of former elite, security sector personnel and 
political officers from the new administration and it gives the opportunity for a clear 
beginning. The problem here is to find suitable persons who are able to take their job. In 
most of the post-conflict situations, the main problem is that the country cannot produce 
skilled staff for the civil services. The success of the German and Japanese 
reconstruction followed from the fact that the occupying powers changed the personnel 
of the administration only in the key position and let the mid-level officers keep their 
job and work for the new development. Fourth, conditional amnesty necessitates the 
investigation of past abuses trough truth and reconciliation commissions as it happened 
in South Africa. That solution helps face the past and decrease the possibility of revenge 
ad renewed grievances. (Chesterman 2004: 154-160) 
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Transforming power first to the local communities means decentralization of 
political power, too. The advantage of this process is that it makes use of local 
knowledge more effective because the decisions are made at the same level where the 
demand was born. Decentralization develops the feeling of citizenship, because on the 
local level the people can easier feel the weight of political decisions, and 
responsiveness of politics. Finally, the local level is the best training ground for 
politicians and it makes the radical movements more moderate because it makes them 
realize the everyday necessity of compromises. That is the explanation that radical 
Islamists for example in Morocco can govern cities and that local governments do not 
try to confront the central government.  
In the institutional dimension, there are three pillars that constitute challenge in 
transferring the ownership: the institutions that serve maintained security; the stability 
of the polity; and the governance issues. In the next pages we intend to analyze the 
challenges and opportunities in details. 
The institutions that secure the maintenance of order and security are related mainly 
with the security sector. The challenges of and the opportunities for transferring the 
power from the external actors to the local stakeholders during the process of SSR were 
discussed above in the security dimension. 
The stability of the political institutions depends on the process how the local actors 
receive more and more responsibility in the management of these institutions and how 
they can have the institutions for themselves. The first dilemma considering the stability 
of the political institutions is the composition of new ownership. The question is real In 
deeply divided societies as the different groups are not always able to work together for 
the common future. The power-sharing debate has been a live discourse since the 
seminal article of Arent Lijphart (1969).  
The executive power needs to lay down the frames of sustainable institutional system 
during the interim period and institutional transition. Usually, this system is codified in 
the constitution, but the challenge is that the constitution must bear the consent of the 
whole society in order to serve as the final cornerstone for sustainable development. In 
order to secure legitimacy, the designer of the constitution has to pay attention to the 
ethnic, religious, political, or cultural cleavages of the society, which does not seem to 
be feasible in a deeply divided society. The literature on this topic (Bogaards 1998; 
Horowitz 2002; Lauth 2005; Lijphart 1969; Norris 2002; Reynolds 2002; Solnick 
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2002:204) debates on the opportunity and consequences of power-sharing within the 
society. However, power-sharing is a two-blade sword: the constitution can settle 
perfectly the different interests, but in case that the local elite are unable or unwilling to 
agree ex ante, or to follow the constitution ex post, the power-sharing settlement will 
rather reignite hostilities.  According to Arend Lijphart’s groundbreaking study on 
“Consociational Democracy” (1969) the careful implementation of power-sharing 
agreements focus on wide participation in the executive power and expanded autonomy 
of the different groups. The vision of elite-cartel by Lijphart failed in practice because 
the division of power according to group-identities rather deepened the cleavages in 
most of the weak or unprepared countries. Let alone the fact that the consociational 
agreement for instance in Northern Ireland27 was followed by a 10 year-long political 
agony, or even in Belgium the consociational system blocked the creation of 
functioning governments, in other countries, such as in Lebanon consociationalism was 
a dead end. Furthermore, the critics, such as Donald Horowitz (2002), or Pippa Norris 
(2002), call the attention to the fact that the loosened control of the central government 
over particular groups may motivate the groups to secede completely from the political, 
or even the territorial authority of the state. 
The basis of institutional stability is the political unity of the state. Several examples 
prove that power-sharing agreements rather weaken the unity and effectiveness of the 
institutions. (Spears 1999:105) Moreover, the elite who are responsible for the 
maintenance of the power-sharing system are often altruistic and are interested in 
postponing political reforms and defend the not functioning institutional structures. 
According to Arend Lijphart’s consociational approach, the democratic functions of 
the state can be secured only if all groups of the society become part of the power 
structure. The reasoning is based on the argument that certain groups are not satisfied 
with relative autonomy but they will compete for central power. In Lijphart’s theory, 
consociationalism provides this power because via the institution of mutual veto even 
the smallest groups can effectively protect their interests. Lijphart believes that elite 
possess the ability to agree in the final decision which in turn leads towards moderation 
of conflicts. Moreover the elite are interested in preserving the democratic institutional 
structure since that is the basis of their power and they understand the threats which 
come from the fragmentation of the society.  
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The integrative approach of power-sharing questions the effectiveness of “elite-
cartel”. The firm basis of democratic development is rather built on incentives which 
motivate the whole group to be loyal towards the institutions. Donald Horowitz (2002) 
argued several times that it is only possible through enhancing the inter-group 
cooperation. The likelihood of real cooperation among the members of different groups 
is bigger when the power of the groups is territorial, the inequality among groups is not 
significant, or when the political coalition of groups is independent from the elections. 
Nevertheless, the consociational and integrative approach shares the conviction that 
majority rule election systems cannot serve power-sharing as they cannot represent the 
societal composition of the society. 
Federative state structure is also an alternative for consociationalism. The supporters 
of this discourse emphasize that power-struggles will first appear on the local level 
which moderates the conflicts on the national level. The drawback of federative 
structures is the emerging controversies of competency among the local and central 
institutions, which easily leads in a fragmented society – simultaneously with the 
decreasing centripetal forces – to stronger secessionist movements. The federative state 
structure may transform national inter-group hostilities into local power struggles and 
alleviate the national political institutions from the pressure of deep divisions. On the 
other hand, it is not clear whether the holders of local powers will be always supportive 
or loyal to the central political decisions, which may lead parallel to the decreased 
centripetal political powers to the increase in secessionist feelings. (Sisk 1996) 
However, not differently from the consociational or the integrative argument, 
democratic institutions may improve the quality of cooperation among the groups. In 
turn, power-sharing also increases the stability of democratic institutions with 
maximizing the number of winners through the proportional election system.  
In Lijphart’s consociational vision, the way to secure the democratic functioning of 
the state divides up the power among all groups of the society. That is sometimes even 
more important than securing autonomy, because certain groups rather fight for the 
central power than they have motivation for secession. This is what we can experience 
in Afghanistan where none of the groups strived for breaking up with the state. 
Consociationalism, however, is more than power-sharing, because beyond groups’ 
autonomy it provides mutual veto for the groups in executing central political decision 
which significantly affect the life of that group. On the other hand, consociationalism 
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presumes the ability of the elite to cooperate and the clear intention that will help 
development the unity in the long run. It is also an oversimplified assumption that the 
elite are always interested in maintaining the created democratic structures because they 
understand the negative consequences of political and societal fragmentation. The 
integrative approach criticizes consociationalism even in that sense. The solution is to 
focus on enabling conditions that motivate the whole group rather than only the elite to 
adhere to the institutional arrangements. For instance, the culture of tolerance and 
cooperation among the groups will increase when the territorial power of the groups and 
the inequality among the groups decrease, or when the parties or party coalitions 
represent not only a single group. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the electoral 
system fundamentally determines the future of power-sharing. “Winner-takes-all” 
systems never reflect the interests of all groups in a divided society. However, 
proportional representation is not a panacea, either.  
The common ground of the above mentioned alternatives for divided societies is the 
belief that the democratic institutions enhance cooperation among groups. Power-
sharing strengthens political stability by maximizing the number of winners of political 
competition, furthermore, proportional representation increases the support of the 
anyway underrepresented minorities, too. The real problem, however, lies in the fact 
that power-sharing is inherently undemocratic, because the groups have ex ante agreed 
places in the parliament or in the government, and the elections easily become sheer 
formality. 
In contrast with the theory, empiric researches (Binningsbo 2005) prove that power-
sharing is not always the solution in a divided society, it is even counterproductive for 
democracy-building. Power-sharing cannot work as a real incentive for extremist 
elements to maintain democratic institutional structure due to the logical fact that they 
are not interested in stability and order. The empiric disquisition shows that criticism of 
power-sharing reflects on the reality better. This institution intensifies and conserves the 
political and societal cleavages in the anyway fragmented society. Furthermore, there is 
little empiric proof that grand-coalition in the government correlates with the stability of 
democracy. It is a complex question whether the newly established democratic 
institutions have to incorporate the interests of the extremist groups during the decision 
making process at all.  
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Despite of the criticism, according to statistical facts civil wars that were resolved by 
power-sharing agreements were more likely to stay peaceful, and the more dimensions 
of power-sharing were specified in the peace agreement, the higher the likelihood of 
enduring peace was. The explanation is that power-sharing increases the sense of 
security among former enemies by encouraging conditions conducive to self-enforcing 
peace. The antagonist hostility has to be decreased as the economic, political and 
territorial power is shared in the frame of the power-sharing agreement. (Hartzell et al 
2003) 
The power-sharing structures are similarly decisive for the functioning of the 
political institutions as the constitution. In the post-colonial period the newly 
independent countries simply copied their colonial masters, but today there is a broad 
agreement that the constitution has to reflect the realities of the given country. The 
constitution influences the electoral system and the legislature; the choice between 
parliamentary or presidential system; the power-sharing structures in the executive 
branch; the stability of the cabinets; the administrative structure of the country, such as 
federalism and decentralization; non-territorial autonomies; power-sharing in non-
administrative institutions. The constitution is very important in the maintenance of rule 
of law, the constitution is the final legal document that helps decide legal dilemmas, the 
connection among different levels of the legal system, and different laws. The 
constitution has to enjoy supremacy, which may be secured by the establishment of an 
independent constitutional court.  
It is a popular view that underdeveloped states, especially in Africa, are not prepared 
for full pluralism and democracy. Therefore, the democratic institutions need a guard in 
the person of a strong leader, who bears the final responsibility of development. 
Furthermore, the presidents need the constitutional guarantee to be able to overrule the 
legislature in certain cases, because the debates in the parliament would only paralyze 
the political institutions. (Prempeh 2008)  
On the other hand, the experience for instance in Africa from the last twenty years 
shows that presidents are less powerful; however, some would think that 
democratization has lost its momentum. The presidents obviously became more 
sensitive to the opinion of the external actors, especially the donors; and to the public 
opinion. The growth of the civil society, and the emergence of independent media help 
this trend, too. During constitutional design, despite of this positive trend, the 
  
170 
 
parliamentary system should enjoy primacy. The problem with presidential system is 
that it makes the politics a zero sum game, that may cause even violence around the 
elections, as we could see in Kenya at the end of 2007. Presidencies all around the 
world can be characterized by neo-patrimonialism, namely the modern bureaucracy is 
completed with informal personal ties, therefore the logical goal of generating public 
goods cannot overrule the old tradition of providing personal private goods for the loyal 
servants. (Diamond 2008b) 
Connected to power sharing agreements and the design of the institutional and 
political system, the next dilemma is the method of designing the electoral system of the 
country. Introducing free and fair elections is too simple and will not lead to sustainable 
structures. The goal of electoral design is to shape a system that helps broaden 
participation in politics, which eventually strengthens local ownership of the institutions 
and the endurance of them. The electoral system is the most specific manipulative 
instrument of politics. (Lijphart 2008a: 161) The necessary elements of adequate 
electoral system are universal, there is a need of elected officials, frequent and free and 
fair mechanism to elect them, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, 
associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship. (Dahl 2005) These basic requirements 
appear under different conditions in several constellations, and the electoral system has 
to be adapted to these constellations. The choice between proportional representation 
and majority rule has to be made according to the need of the institutional system. The 
electoral system also has to pay attention about the general laws of electoral behavior. 
The process of statebuilding gives a special framework for the general development, 
and it needs, sometimes such long term reforms, that do not pay off in the short term. 
The problem is that majority rule electoral system tends to pay better for the winner. It 
means the political actors will tend to take short term decisions in order to stay in 
power. The problem with representative system in a deeply divided society is the too 
high number of parties that are emerging and try to compete for seats in the parliament. 
The moderation of the representative system is possible by creating certain thresholds, 
that excludes the smaller parties. The question with this solution is the lost 
representation of several small groups. It is true that a majoritarian system creates more 
stable political structures, because the development tends towards two party system, a 
one party executive and executive domination over the legislature. (Lijphart 2008c) But 
on the other hand, the two party system cannot represent credibly the different interests 
in a divided society. And the fact that the governing party, especially the person of the 
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president is inevitably represents the interests of the bigger ethnic, religious, or political 
group over the others. The choice of the electoral system is crucial as the elections give 
always space for manipulation, and the goal is that the widest interests can be 
represented, that balances the effect of manipulation the political system into a less 
sustainable way.  
The dilemma of political power can even overrule the problem of the electoral 
system. There are cases when the elections are simple formality because the political 
power stays with the same group or person. In underdeveloped countries the personal 
ties are more important than the institutions, and consequently the electoral design 
cannot have the same effect either on the changes in political power. Despite of the well 
designed electoral systems, the incumbent leaders and governments almost always win 
at the elections in Africa. The real value of the well written constitution is that it 
facilitates partisan contestation and guarantees the rights of those who disagree with 
certain decisions. The right comes from the institutional uncertainty about the 
distribution of power in the future, that is the opposition can believe in the opportunity 
of winning. The constitution can shape the effective balance between an effective and 
strong state and the dividing power of elections, that puts constraints on the state, too. 
The central power has to be balanced also by strengthening the local communities and 
the civil society. (Domínguez 2007: 12) 
A pluralistic political environment builds on parties, that is a good electoral design 
has to analyze the real opportunities for party creation, and evaluate the existing party-
system. The problem with party creation is that in the new democracies the parties are 
the least respected institutions. (Carothers 2006: 4) Consequently, the parties are 
inadequate representatives of the different interests because of the struggling and 
corrupt party elites that mobilize the party and the voters only at election times. The 
statebuilding, however, needs instant electoralism, because there is no time for 
evolution. The problems that have to be addressed during building the parties follow 
from other dimensions, too. The weak rule of law leads to poor legislatures, and the 
self-interested rule of the government. The poverty of the society and the weak 
economic performance represent major burden for the parties because they are unable to 
collect funds, and the few business persons who are generous and support political 
movements have significant influence on the party policies. In weak states, the 
presidential system is common and there are serious constraints on policy choices, 
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moreover the anti-political legacies of these countries are not favorable for the 
strengthening the parties, either. (Carothers 2006) In weak states, the style of party 
competition and the stakes are different, the parties fight for building revenue yielding 
constituencies. (Bates et al 2001) 
The final dilemma considering the stability of political institutions during the transfer 
of external power to the local parties in statebuilding is the question of effectiveness of 
reforms. It was proved (Helman 1998) by the experiences of Central Europe in the 
1990s, that the real problem is not the weakness of the winners of elections to maintain 
the reforms against the losers of them, but the fact that the short term winners are 
interested in the prolongation of the reforms. In parliamentary systems, the “voters’ 
vengeance” did not influence too much the reforms, because according to the Central 
European experiences again, the new governments continued the same reforms. The 
reformist elite in the society are important to sustainable reforms. The elite are more 
important during the power transfer because the elite-negotiations, which supposed to 
represent the whole society, give place for the elite in the transition.  
Regarding the process of transferring the power from the external actors to the local 
players the key is to define who is eligible and adequate for taking the responsibility of 
continuing statebuilding. The external actor has to find the local stakeholders, which is 
not always easy in the post-conflict situations. The statebuilding process needs to build 
stakes in the societal dimension. The statebuilding can only be successful when 
powerful agents agree with it, which have to see the formation of the new system of 
institutions as an opportunity for development and personal gains. That would create the 
stakes which means that these agents have deep interest in the state. They accept the 
idea that the state is a foremost public good and are confident in the state as a primary 
institutional structure. (Meierhenrich 2004: 154) 
The last pillar of ownership questions is the problem of governance. Good 
governance is as important as development, because it balances the different interests of 
the societal groups and keeps the political institutions functioning. Governance consists 
of the selection process of the governments, the capacity of the governmental 
institutions, the general respect for the rule of law. It is proven by statistical methods 
that good governance decreases the possibility of economic and political restrictions, 
and it means the good management of civil conflict. (Dorusen 2005)  
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Governance, per definition, is the system of rules, institutions, processes that form 
the nexus of state-society relations. (Brinkerhoff 2007: 2) The quality of governance 
affects the development of other dimensions, because governance is the method how 
societies organize policy issues to pursue collective goals and interests. The creation of 
sustainable governance structures is the responsibility of local actors, and the external 
statebuilding can only assist in it, because it is exclusively about the relation of the state 
and the society.  
Governance is the conscious attempts to shape and influence the conduct of 
individuals, groups and wide populations in a furtherance of particular objective. 
(Dupont 2006: 2) the non-state entities are providers of governance, but not only on 
behalf of the state.  
The effectiveness of the government, responsiveness and legitimacy are intertwined 
and the common dynamics are reflected in the governance. (Beuningen 2007: 52) the 
responsiveness of the government helps to stabilize the institutions. It is not surprising 
because responsiveness refers to the relation between the state and the society when the 
government is induced to do what the citizens want. The chain of responsiveness is 
represented by the following figure and table.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
18. The “Chain of Responsiveness”. Source Powell 2005: 65 
 
According to this model we can talk about high quality of responsiveness when this 
chain provides sustainable institutional arrangements supporting each of the linkages. 
Obviously, the functioning of the chain is influenced by simultaneous negative and 
positive factors which in fact hinder or enhance the quality of responsiveness. The next 
list briefly collects the subversions and the facilitating conditions in each linkage. 
 
Stage 1 
 
Citizens’ preferences 
Stage 2 
 
Citizens’ voting 
behavior 
Stage 3 
 
Selecting policy 
makers 
Stage 4 
 
Public policies 
Linkage 1 
 
Structuring 
choices 
Linkage 2 
 
institutional 
aggregation 
Linkage 3 
 
policy making 
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Linkage 1 
Subversions informal control 
 
choice limitations 
 
party incoherence 
Facilitating conditions education, media 
 
stable party competition 
 national disclosure 
Linkage 2 
Subversions vote-seat distortion 
 
vote-executive distortion 
 
“Condorcet winners” lose 
 
party switching 
 
deadlocks/decree power use 
Facilitating conditions parliamentary PR 
 
party coherence 
 inclusive policy making 
Linkage 3 
Subversions bait and switch 
 
constraints 
 
corruption 
Facilitating conditions partisan accountability 
 horizontal accountability 
 bureaucratic capacity 
 
19. The Subversions and Facilitating Conditions of the “Chain of Responsiveness”. 
Source: Powell 2005: 62-75 
 
“Good governance” is usually mentioned as a general requirement for sustainable 
development, but the real meaning is not clear. The above introduced chain of 
responsiveness is a less abstract model of good governance. Good governance means 
the appropriate place and weight of the executive and the legislative branches in the 
system of institutions. In case that the executive is too strong, it tends to overrule the 
legislature, and to disregard the decisions in the parliament that are not in favor of the 
goals of the government. Executive power without the system of checks and balances 
may continue in a less democratic way, as the functioning of the government is not 
accountable for the citizens. In this sense, accountability is a key for maintaining the 
legitimacy, responsiveness and effectiveness triangle. Furthermore, accountability of the 
government is not possible without the appropriate counterweights, most importantly 
the legislature. Apart from exercising oversight over the executive branch, the strong 
legislature is important because it is the mechanism through which the society makes 
representative governance real on a day-to-day basis, and through which the society 
finds the best collective outcome despite of the competing and sometimes confronting 
interests. The legislature is the basis of the rule of law, because it passes the laws and 
exercises constituency services in order to define the needs of the people. (Barkan 2008) 
Finally, the strength of the legislature is the institutional key to democracy. It is 
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statistical evidence that post-communist countries that adopted constitutions that 
protected strong legislatures scored better on Freedom House surveys than those failed 
to do so. The explanation is that the legislature is a reliable guarantor of horizontal 
accountability and better generator of party creation. Eventually, parties are the best 
agents of vertical accountability. (Fish 2006) 
Concluding the examination of the institutional dimension, we have to accept that it 
is still true that democracy is not the antidote of conflict but in the third stage of 
statebuilding the focus has to be moved more and more on the participation of the local 
population. The first step of this process is the transfer of power from the external actors 
to the local stakeholders after the period of jointly managed institutions. The external 
presence is still important to avoid the serious consequences of deficiencies, but the 
final responsibility should be laid step by step on the local players. The devolution of 
power needs to offer a clear sense of direction to the local population and political elite 
through accommodating their preferences. The inclusion of all political, ethnic, 
religious, or cultural groups of the society is necessary at this stage. The consultation 
with all groups is the only way to find the functioning way of power-transformation. 
(Herrero 2005: 52-55) The consultation is crucial because of another phenomenon, too. 
After a state collapses, authority and governance never disappears completely. It only 
changes face and form and emerges in a less formalized form maintained by non-state 
actors. These structures may still exist during this phase of statebuilding and the goal is 
not to destroy them, as they represent the local knowledge and reflect more to the local 
needs, but to incorporate them into the existing political institutional dimension. The 
way of power transfer should follow certain logic, the power should be transferred first 
to the local level, while the national level authority is still the external actor. That has 
two reasons, first the previous stage was responsible for creating functioning local 
governments, that is the institutional basis is ready for it, second, the national level 
power change would mean complete ownership transfer that may be too quick in certain 
cases.  
The limits of political and institutional engineering without the participation of the 
local stakeholders are clear, but it is also naïve to think that the local elite and the 
external actors always share the same ideas about development. The crowding out effect 
of the foreign presence may slow down domestic statebuilding, thus the ability of the 
local powers to take over the responsibility of the whole statebuilding process. 
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(Englebert et al 2008) Using the African example, in order to help the transfer there is a 
need to define the local stakeholders who can have the final responsibility in the 
statebuilding which means finding the local elite that are reform-minded and enhancing 
a broader coalition of change among them. The continued institutional development is 
necessary as well, the improvement of the legal environment and the decreasing 
corruption is crucial for the successful power transfer between the external forces and 
the local actors. (Lewis 2008: 106) 
 
 
Societal and domestic dimensions: the empowerment of the 
stakeholders 
 
The societal dimension plays an important role in this stage because it contributes to 
the achievements of other dimension. But any severe deficiencies in this dimension may 
turn the direction of development. At this stage, every step in other dimensions have 
societal effects, because the goal of this stage is to transform the power to the local 
stakeholders, and this goal is obviously easier to achieve when the process can build on 
societal unity. It does not necessarily mean that statebuilding is only possible when a 
new nation was already born, but the cohesion of the society is necessary, at least in a 
form that the societal conflicts stay in a controllable channel and these conflicts do not 
hurt the development and accept the state as the final mediator of these conflicts.  
The effects of power-sharing agreements vary according to the characteristics of the 
society. Features and elements of power-sharing, such as decentralization and 
federalism may encourage mobilization along ethnic lines if the society is receptive to 
ethnic populism of the elite. Furthermore, the connection and policy mechanisms 
between the federal and the local governments depend also on the social makeup. 
Summing up, the society provides the favorable, or the limiting environment for power-
sharing agreements. 
Successful reconstruction of Germany and Japan proved that the coherence and 
homogeneity of a society is an important factor of statebuilding. In case of these 
countries, the effective linkage was the national identity. It is clear that external power 
cannot build nations referring to this process as creating societal, cultural, or historical 
  
177 
 
ties. However, the indicator of success during statebuilding is the viability of the new 
institutions which presumes the existence of a relative unified society. But the unity of 
the society can only be maintained through common identity.  
Unfortunately, the requirement of eliminating societal differences motivated several 
radical responses, which were discussed in the previous chapter of this work. The 
behavior and attitudes of the elite also influence the modernization of a society. In many 
parts of the world, modernization has meant the acceptance of Western norms and ideas 
unifying the society along social ties rather cognitive processes. (Shah 2003: 167) This 
phenomenon is often referred to multiculturalism, which builds on the equality of the 
different groups. Eventually, the equality is the identity building factor and this identity 
manifests towards the central institutional structure which maintains the framework of 
multiculturalism. (Wallensten 2002: 198-202) 
The society creates the source of legitimacy for development and the most important 
objective is to find the opportunities for unification of the society. The differences in the 
society must not risk the process of power transfer, and the development in other 
dimensions, like the SSR, or the economic development have to serve this goal, too.  
One of the effective tools of unification or alleviating antagonistic differences is the 
education. However, it creates the wished outcome only in the long term. Education is 
able to address the root causes that triggered the conflict in the past, and it contributes to 
the recognition of different identities of groups whilst creating an identity that is 
connected with the state. Education helps the distribution of resources, the access to 
political power for the different groups and ideological orientation. In education the 
language policy, which is connected fundamentally with the societal dimension, is 
crucial factor, because linguistic groups underrepresented in education may feel 
themselves disadvantaged and become opposition of the statebuilding process. The 
language is the medium of future opportunities and through language the education can 
contribute to the consolidation of a common national unity. (Dogu 2005) In several 
multiethnic and multinational societies, the supra-group tie is the language. In big 
melting pots, such as the United States, or Australia, the common language is crucial in 
the development of the society and gives a common feeling and creates more tangible 
ties to the state. In other situations, mostly in former colonies, the countries kept the 
language of the former colonial master. For instance, in India the English is still an 
official language that helps the realization of same standards all over the country, 
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moreover, it gives a common nexus to the different groups, or at least to the elite, 
despite of the different linguistic and ethnic roots. Another example that is worth to be 
mentioned is the pragmatic decision of Rwanda. The government introduced English as 
an official language few years ago because of pragmatic reasons. Apart from the 
unification of the different groups, the goal was to be integrated more in the East 
African Community where the official language is English.  
Furthermore, the education helps not only create common ties through language, but 
enhances social mobility and strengthens the middle class. The formation of middle 
class depends on the ability of the state to give opportunities to the people to be able to 
participate in higher education. In case it is open for all groups of the society, the higher 
education contributes to the emergence of a new middle class, that is based more on the 
common opportunities given by the state than on the ethnic, religious, or cultural 
differences, that is the education helps overcome the social conflicts, or helps manage 
them in peaceful ways. Providing equal opportunities is crucial not only in the 
education. Social policies that cut across gender, ethnic, or religious lines enhance 
stability in the society by giving the feeling and hope for a common future of becoming 
citizen of the same state, which eventually means the consolidation of national unity. 
(Ghani et al 2008: 144-147)  
Societal unity can also appear through the state institutions. As we argued earlier, 
citizenship can be a unifying factor, too. This approach of institutional homogeneity is 
supported by other arguments of modernity. First of all, identity lost to be exclusive in 
the modern world. Accordingly, it is possible that national identity is overshadowed by 
other cognitive ties in the society. Second of all, loyalty is the most important factor 
which acts as a glue within a societal group. The loyalty, however, can be stronger 
towards the institutions which protect the rights of the persons or give the opportunity to 
participate in decision making processes. Eventually, the state is that clamps these 
institutions. (Linz 2004:289-290) Despite of this argument, the experts on the field of 
democratization and statebuilding (Bali 2005; Etzioni 2004; Fukuyama 2004a, 2004b, 
2004c; Ottaway 2002) are agreed that none of the external powers are strong and sound 
enough to serve as catalyst of nation-building. A foreign power is only a supporting 
factor in creating the environment which favors the strengthening of societal ties, trust, 
or loyalty. Sound environment means the opportunity for the societal groups to live 
together on the same territory despite of the differences.  
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In the literature of democratization, there is an ongoing debate whether a stable, 
inclusive society is the precondition or the result of successful democratization 
processes. Whatever theoretical reply one may give to this chicken-egg problem, in 
practice it certainly requires conscious efforts from all those concerned to protect 
vulnerable groups at any stage in the development of the democracy. The dictionary 
defines “vulnerable” as “capable of being hurt or wounded”. The human rights literature 
uses “vulnerable groups” to denote those particular groups who, for historical or other 
reasons, are weak and, therefore, they are in need of special protection to further their 
equal and effective enjoyment of human rights. The Budapest based think-tank, the 
International Centre for Democratic Transition28, launched a project in 2007 which 
aimed to enhance the protection of rights of vulnerable groups with the final aim to 
strengthen the democratization process in the involved countries, Mali, Morocco and 
Mongolia. The project concluded, that however, vulnerable groups will always exist, 
given the heterogeneous nature of such societies, it is required a continuous reform of 
relevant legal and other frameworks in ways that are responsive to conceptions of 
liberal democratic governance.  
Despite of the fact that the former two steps of statebuilding tried to mitigate and 
alleviate social conflict by addressing the root causes of conflict, there are still societal 
challenges at this stage. First, societies after violent conflicts, especially in cases when 
the conflict looks back to decades, the society is socialized to the context, and it is not 
easy to change the deeply embedded attitudes, traditions and daily routines. Past 
conflict is the best indicator of future problems and violence. Concluding, post-conflict 
societies are conflict prone. It is almost impossible to eliminate all elements of 
destructive private actors from the society, so the danger of reemergence of warlords, 
terrorist groups, or violent criminal groups is a real threat during the entire statebuilding 
process. The decisive factor in the societal dimension is whether the society, or certain 
groups of it represent supporting basis for these groups. Unfortunately, in most of the 
cases the development is invisible for most parts of the society, and the hope for change 
in the future is also very slight. In this sense, the importance of power transfer and local 
ownership is very important, because in this case the local groups can feel the stakes 
and become less prone to accept radical ideas. Second, the danger of sub-nationalism 
risks the emergence of common identity and the cohesion of the society. The emergence 
of sub-national movements is even more dangerous where the state tries to share power 
by creating a federal structure and by the provision of regional autonomy of certain 
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groups. The challenge is that the state is still weak during the statebuilding process and 
easily loses the influence on the peripheries that enhances secessionist feelings in the 
society, and increases conflicts and struggle on the distribution of central public goods, 
and the budget. Behind the spread of sub-national movements, there usually are policy 
errors and social confrontation. The failure to implement meaningful decentralization 
reforms in practice increases the hostility against the central government, because that 
means no or not sufficient allocation of resources, or political power to the remote areas. 
The inadequate dialogue with local communities and the ignorance of civil society or 
the uncontrolled economic development that leads to interregional economic 
inequalities all increase the feeling of the local communities that the central government 
is unable to serve their goals and the creation of a new political entity may change this 
situation. (Forrest 2007) Third, the emergence of sub-national ties is not only the 
consequence of policy failures but they come from the lack of cohesion in the society 
and the weak ties that bind the society to the central state and institutions. The ties mean 
the opportunity to participate in state governance that creates legitimacy for the state 
and behaves like the glue in the society. In case the participation is not real, or 
legitimate, the different identities risk the cohesion of the society and eventually the 
statebuilding process. 
The challenges in the societal dimension can be addressed with focusing on several 
tasks. First, the reintegration of former combatants is still an important task in this stage. 
This project depends on the willingness of the former combatants to reintegrate and the 
general society to be able to reset them. In this sense, ideological reorientation is 
necessary not only for the combatants but for the society at large. Second, the 
emergence of strong civil society is an important factor that balances between the policy 
choices and governance techniques of the central government and the real needs of the 
different communities. The civil society can represent the interests of the different 
groups and interpret these interests to the political class, which influences the outcome 
of the political decisions. The existence of civil society increases the level of trust in the 
society and the feeling and norm of reciprocity. (Posner 2004: 246) However, civil 
society in itself is not a guarantee for democracy or emergence of sustainable structures. 
During the statebuilding process the pillarization, the privatization of the civil society 
has to be avoided. The lack of “civilism” is a great danger, too, that is the civil society 
organizations do not respect the same norms as the society, or the statebuilding process. 
(Ekiert 2007: 28) Having in mind that the NGOs do not represent the whole society, we 
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have to admit that the local NGOs play a critical role in mobilizing citizens for common 
goals. The NGOs assist the governments in providing social services and foster group 
reconciliation on the grassroots level. On the other hand, NGOs mobilize the social 
demands putting pressure on the governments, monitor the state, and convene issue-
specific dialogues between the state and the society. The creation of healthy civil 
society depends more on the local dynamics than the general lessons from 
democratization. (Lund et al 2006: 3-4) Third, as it was mentioned several times, the 
protection of the vulnerable groups is the key for avoiding deep social conflicts in the 
future. There is no clear evidence of positive consequences of enhanced protection of 
vulnerable groups, but there are plenty of negative experiences, when the state failed to 
protect the underrepresented and vulnerable groups of the society. 
In the statebuilding process, the task of transferring the power depends on the 
international community but on the different actors of the domestic scenes, such as the 
role of the ordinary people, the elite, and the local communities. The concept of human 
empowerment (Welzel et al 2007) rests on the idea that any change can be stabilized 
only if it is vested in the people. Furthermore, the changes are only possible if the 
willingness of the ordinary people increases to struggle for them. The statebuilding and 
the ownership transfer can only be successful if the local elite are interested in them. 
Even if we can experience the fortunate event that the rules and institutions become 
more important in politics (Posner et al 2007), the role of the elites and leadership is still 
decisive in shaping the future. It means that the public is still receptive to the populism 
of the elite, namely, as a first step the elite have to understand the importance of 
statebuilding better than the general public. The involvement of local communities is 
also important because it increases confidence that the new system will not be able to 
marginalize them that is why the self-interested autonomy demands are less powerful, 
and the idea of an integrated country has more followers.  
Further question is in the domestic dimension whether the environment and the 
domestic endowments allow the process of transforming the power to the local actors. 
The challenges are first the crowding out effects of the foreign presence, second the 
internal limits of development. These two challenges mutually enforcing each other and 
easily push the country in a vicious circle of domestic incapacity and ineffective 
external assistance. That outcome is the worst case scenario because it would mean the 
unavoidable downward move on the slope of state failure. The presence of foreign 
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actors does not push the local stakeholders to rush with statebuilding because they are in 
a comfortable situation of not bearing the responsibility of failures but the possibility of 
being visible in case of spectacular success. It is important to avoid the situation when 
the local population is already socialized to the protectorate and they are tired or simple 
unwilling to try to overtake the task of statebuilding. The presence of the foreign actors 
is necessary but in case it is too long it becomes part of the burden of development. The 
domestic geographical endowments, the culture of the society, the environmental 
conditions all have significant effects on development, which the people could 
influence, but only in case when the state, the economy and the society are able to work 
together for development in harmony. The domestic vicious circles of 
underdevelopment (Todaro et al 2006: 239-576) have to be broken. The inequality gives 
birth to poverty, and inequality comes from the fact that the decisive portion of the 
society is poor. In part, the ineffective social insurance system causes the high number 
of births, but the increased life expectations and the decreased infant death rates cause 
booming population growth in the poorest parts of the world, whilst family planning is 
mostly unknown. The underdeveloped and impoverished rural areas cause the 
movement of young people to the urban areas, but it means only “infinite supply” of 
unskilled labor, which keeps down the price of work force. This problem can be 
modeled by the next simplistic figure. It shows that in reality the supply is not infinite, 
but it is always bigger than the demand. In this sense, the solution is to increase the 
demand, which in turn will raise the wages and offset the situation. The challenge for 
the designer is rather where the inflection point of the supply’s curve is. 
 
 
20. The Nexus of Demand and Supply of Work Force in Impoverished Societies. 
 
  
183 
 
This last problem is also connected with the limited provision of health and 
education. Furthermore, in poor countries, there is the culture of acceptance that the 
state influences the market and the society whilst the politicians are not expert of these 
issues and are not really interested in them. 
The historical experiences of successful statebuilding exercises show that the 
importance of the domestic dimension in transferring ownership of the process is 
crucial. Both in Germany and Japan the high level of education, the sizable middle 
class, the high per capita income, and ethnic homogeneity helped the statebuilding 
process, and secured the quality of local ownership. 
 
 
The economy and external influences: who will finance the 
development? 
 
The economic dimension has to provide the material basis for the empowerment of 
local actors and for the process of transforming the power.  
The weakness of the state and the underdevelopment of the economy have several 
causes in the external dimension. The external sources of underdevelopment was 
overemphasized in the 1950s and 1960s when the new radical and reformist economic 
theories became influential in the economic planning and more importantly in several 
international institutions. It is clear today that the external factors in themselves cannot 
be blamed for the calvarias of the developing countries, but the negligence of these 
factors during economic planning is also false. During this phase, when the final 
responsibility of statebuilding still comes from the external actors, the management of 
negative external influences on the economic development is an adequate timing. Until 
the country is not completely independent the external powers can prepare the 
institutions and the structure of the economy to be able to stand the competition of the 
interdependent and globalized world economy. The weak states have limited space for 
taking independent policy choices because of the enormous influence of donors even on 
the domestic policy decision making mechanisms. However, the idea of conditionality 
in aid provision seemed to be a good solution when it was introduced, today the 
structure of conditionality does not make the outcome of local programs predictable. 
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Furthermore, the big amount of aid, and the aid mechanisms made the governments 
recognize that they only have to prove a little effort, and they can still maintain the level 
of the inflowing financial resources. Moreover, the developed countries protect their 
markets, and even if an aid program turns to be successful in developing the local 
agrarian sector, or the industries, the trade and further investments are not automatically 
will grow. (Lewis 2008: 104-106) On the other hand, even if the trade increases growth 
the economic development is not secured, that is free trade and the promotion of liberal 
values without reference to the local conditions is not the way to development. The 
asymmetry of trade relations cause disproportional outcomes, the developing countries 
earn less profit on trade. One of the causes is that the international demand is manifested 
to labor intensive manufactured goods, which is eventually the barrier of development. 
(Todaro et al 2006: 577-619) The globalization of trade and finance caused growing 
interdependence in the world which is asymmetric. The asymmetry is present in every 
aspect of economic relations, and not only in trade or finances, such as the indebtedness 
of the poor countries. The asymmetric coexistence of the weak states with the developed 
world is characterized with unequal relations in know-how, technologies, price of labor, 
and information, too. 
The stability of development helps the power transition, but it is still not self-
sustainable. The statebuilding has to pay attention to some focal issues. First, the 
national economy has to expand to the whole territory of the country and has to include 
all economic activities. The gray areas of economy decrease the speed of growth and 
eventually of the development. Second, the legitimacy of development can be only 
maintained if the people can feel the change of the living standard and have hope in the 
future. In order to achieve this objective, the creation of employment opportunities is 
necessary. From the point of view of economic effectiveness, the job opportunities have 
to be open for all segments of the society, the youth, women, refugees, internally 
displaced persons, and not only for former combatants as part of reintegration programs. 
Creating jobs is not only the duty of the state, the task is rather to create an enabling 
environment where the private sector is able to produce employment opportunities. 
Important factor in stabilizing jobs are micro-financing and according to verified 
experiences from Angola, Rwanda, or Cambodia, the development of the informal 
economy has to be exploited rather than destructed, because it also can stabilize 
economic development. (Mendelson et al 2007: 14-15) Third, addressing economic 
inequality is important to avoid self-reproducing structures of inequalities in other 
  
185 
 
sectors, most importantly in politics. (Rueschemeyer 2005) Inequality in politics means 
that the elite are able to influence all aspects of the life and the less fortunate majority of 
the society is turning into an automatic receptive mass of hopeless people. In turn, 
hopelessness is one of the most dangerous enemies of development and statebuilding. 
Fourth, fostering the development of the private sector is important as the state in itself 
cannot control and lead all the aspects of the economy effectively. The Soviet style 
command-economy proved to be very successful after the Second World War, and the 
countries that followed that model experienced more quick economic growth and faster 
reconstruction, but it turned out that central planning is not effective during peacetime, 
because of the fact that the information accumulated on the free market cannot be 
substituted with even the best prepared plans. Similarly, the economic development 
generated by the external actors and by the creation of strong central state institution 
cannot be sustainable after the ownership transition, only if the private sector is strong 
enough to carry the burden of the economic development. However, the importance of 
the state is not decreasing, it has to set and enforce the rules that enable the optimal 
functioning of the market and strengthen private commercial activity. The state is 
responsible for supporting the operation and continued development of private 
enterprises, and obviously for intervention in the market when the market fails to carry 
the wished outcomes. (Ghani et al 2008: 149) 
In a contradicting manner, the external dimension of this stage is important because 
the process necessitates the decrease of its dominance it played during the former 
stages. Obviously, there are factors that cannot be simply “switched off”, but the goal is 
not to eliminate the external conditions, which would be impossible, but the control of 
them. The interaction between domestic and external events is important feature of the 
complex reality and the state has to be able to function in the interdependent 
international environment. During the former stages of statebuilding, the foreign 
presence was the most influencing factor of this dimension. Therefore, the objective of 
this stage is to reduce this influence on the domestic events. As we argued, the 
emergence of local ownership means for the state to be able to develop less dependently 
in the economic dimension, and create own revenues apart from the international aid. 
For (re-)gaining this independence the state needs legitimacy, that is a complex issue, 
because in case the intervention was legitimate, the shrinking foreign presence may 
question this legitimacy, and on the other hand when even the intervention did not enjoy 
the support of the wider public, why do we expect that the new government can gain 
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legitimacy on its own. From the necessary capital that was accumulated after the first 
two successful stages of statebuilding, the state has to be able to maintain legitimacy 
after the power transition. (Suhrke 2009) Having in mind that argument, a contradiction 
is revealed. An external intervention is used to foster self-governance and legitimacy of 
the domestic government, but as the several experiences proved the international 
assistance is unavoidable to strengthen local ownership of development.  
One of the important capitals of development is security. Until this stage of 
statebuilding the final responsibility laid on the foreign military that is the external 
dimension was more important than the domestic one. In turn, after this stage due to the 
power transition, the security of the state becomes predominantly domestic question. 
The state has to overtake the tasks that the foreign actors managed during the interim 
period: maintenance of order; managing the security forces; further facilitation of SSR; 
protection of the elections and other important state institutions; protection of the 
human rights. (Schnabel et al 2005a: 3) More importantly the state has to find the 
appropriate role of the military forces in the peacetime development. The military sector 
has to be accountable, socially inclusive, depoliticized, and must not consume the 
majority of the security sector budget. The peacetime role of the police forces are also 
crucial, the criminalization and corruption of the police may represent problem even in 
the more developed states, therefore this is a tangible challenge of the weak and newly 
developed states.  
After the decreased importance of the foreign actors, the state loses its protection, 
too. The interdependency in the world means new challenges for the state. It has to 
manage the domestic issues, continue statebuilding and satisfy the domestic demands 
whilst several external factors negatively influence the development. However, we 
cannot possess the final truth on the effect of democracy, broad participation and free 
economy, the experience with other forms of political and economic structures suggests 
that democracy is the only way when a state is able to satisfy the demands of all 
dimensions of the complex system of reality. Obviously, the goal is to overcome the 
foreign protectorate, but the external actors still have the responsibility to provide 
monitoring and less direct assistance to the state. The external actors still have role in 
the last stage of statebuilding, too. They have to assist the state and help control 
deficiencies during the political opening.  
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Strong and decisive local ownership is still not the goal of this sequence. It is an 
appropriate outcome if the local actors and stakeholders are strong and developed 
enough to be able to take over more and more tasks. The foreign presence is still crucial, 
but the external powers should not influence each single question. They have rather the 
role of monitoring and assisting bigger set of tasks and giving advice for the local 
players on how to implement certain steps. At the end of this sequence, the local actors 
have to be mature enough to implement the rest of the statebuilding process, however, 
in order to secure the achievements of the three sequences, the external players are 
present as a final assurance. 
 
 
Assessing the emerging local ownership 
 
The third sequence of the statebuilding process began in a situation where the 
external actors prepared the environment for power transition and the local stakeholders 
are identified. This stage is for making these stakeholders feel the responsibility for the 
statebuilding process. The goal of this stage of statebuilding is to develop an 
environment in which the local stakeholders are able to continue the development 
without major interference of external actors. Using again the analogy of the Rubik’s 
cube solution method, the stage has to reach a level after which a simple 3x3 cube is 
present which can be solved more easily in the future. 
In all dimensions, the most important goal is to increase the ownership of the local 
actors. It means that in the security-military dimension, the local participation has to 
increase the legitimacy of the institutions which eventually will lead to a stronger 
institutional system. In the institutional dimension, the greatest challenge is to manage 
“power-sharing” and let more space to the locals. Similarly, in the economic dimension, 
the local initiatives and investments are more important even if the externally led 
processes were more effective. In the societal dimension, it is not enough that the 
hostility is controlled, there is a need of the development of the civil society, because it 
is the only way that all groups of the society are represented in a certain way. Civil 
society is a key for democratic development which is eventually the basis of 
sustainability during the statebuilding process. The relation between external and 
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internal players is still complex. Whilst the external players should rather focus on 
regional problems, the domestic counterparts have to be responsible for the events in the 
country. This is extremely important because the local actors will accept the 
statebuilding process legitimate only if the local factor is significant. The increased 
local ownership of the statebuilding process also means an opportunity for the external 
actors for designing an exit strategy. From a more technical point of view, the 
ownership transfer means also an increase of effectiveness of governance, because the 
decisions are made on the local level by the locals. The quality of governance will 
influence the other dimensions because it is the method to pursue the collective interests 
of the society. Consequently, “good governance” means the intensive participation of 
locals in the decision-making process. The limits of external political and institutional 
engineering are clear, but it is also false to leave too much space for the locals as there 
are fractions inside of the local political forces as well. The key is to find a good 
constellation of external and local ownership, and during this stage of statebuilding, the 
locals have to bear greater responsibility. To sum up, the goal of this stage is not to 
switch off the external influence but to increase the ability of local actors to control the 
process of statebuilding and to make them able to continue with the next sequence of 
statebuilding. 
 
 
 
The final sequence: national level development 
 
 
The final goal during the last sequence is a state which is able to develop with the 
help of its own resources and is able to stay on the sustainable path. The statebuilding 
process may seem to be solved already at the beginning of the stage, however, some 
tasks are still undone and some variables of the development are still missing. With the 
cube’s analogy it means that the cube is otherwise solved but for instance two edge 
groups are not in the right position, however, it is easy to orient them to the right places. 
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21. The Composition of the Rubik’s Cube Before “the Last Move”. Source: Hardwick n.d. 
However, it is clear that the final goal of this stage is not the perfect solution or a 
final make up. The model and the analogy also suggest that the development is not 
static or linear. The statebuilding process is a permanent and dynamic development of 
the state, which also includes temporary setbacks when some tasks are not implemented 
perfectly but the domestic mechanisms have to be able to correct them. Nevertheless, it 
is only a utopian and naïve expectation that any state will work perfectly. In the reality, 
the statebuilding rather has to aim at creating synergies among the different dimensions 
and at making the state able to survive and develop despite of the challenges it has to 
face in the security-military, political, economic, societal, external and domestic 
dimensions. The last stage of statebuilding has to focus on this very fact and provide the 
state with the respective mechanisms and means for controlling the interconnected 
dynamics of the dimensions. From the external actors’ point of view, the last sequence 
is the stage when they eventually have to transfer the ownership and responsibility to 
the local stakeholders even if they are not moving in the same directions as the external 
actors would have anticipated prior the transition. However, the above argument is not a 
statement against all foreign and external roles in a country’s development, but in a 
healthy situation it is reduced to the level, which directly influences only the external 
dimension. The following table shows briefly the tasks in each dimension. 
 
Security Institutions Economy 
Consolidate local capacity - 
exit point Participation and democracy Sustainable development 
   
Society External dimension Domestic determinants 
"Nation-building" Integration in the globalized 
world national governance 
22. The List of Tasks during the Last Sequence of Statebuilding 
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The final goal of the stage of national level development and eventually the 
statebuilding process is to put the country on the path of sustainable national 
development, where the country becomes the member of the coherent and 
interdependent international networks and where the institutions of the state are able to 
exploit the domestic endowments and the security of the state, the economy and the 
society are in a sound harmony. This sequence aims at preparing the country to be 
integrated in the global economy, which eventually serves the security of the given 
country and the international community. Statebuilding obviously cannot aim at 
building a developed state from a failed state, but we can say that a statebuilding 
process is successful, when the state is able to maintain its internal and external 
security, possesses functioning institutions, it is able to manage its debt, provides 
economic growth, manages the societal conflicts in a peaceful way, and balances the 
external interdependency and its domestic capacities. To sum up, the outcome of the 
statebuilding process is in an ideal-typical case a state which is able to develop with the 
help of its own capacities and is not overly dependent on the external conditions. In the 
final sequence, the main question is not how to create or maintain physical stability, but 
how to preserve institutional stability of the state which is the final guarantee of 
security, too. 
The dilemmas of the last stage are different from the ones of the first three, since the 
main problems follow from the quality of the institutions. The main question is how 
much state we need, and what the role of free automatisms in the development is. This 
is the sequence when questions and dilemmas emerge on the extent of liberalization, 
decentralization, privatization or marketization of the economy. Francis Fukuyama 
(2004) characterized this problem in two dimensions, the scope of the state and the 
strength of the state institutions. According to the complex development and 
interdependent effect of the different dimensions, the countries in different context do 
not necessitate the same constellation. In certain situations, the stronger state is more 
desired than an interventionist and vice verse.  
The conflict management ability of the state is also a crucial characteristic in this 
sequence. It is generally accepted that states with democratic institutions and 
functioning democratic mechanisms are more able to handle societal and economic 
conflict peacefully. Therefore, the participation of the wider public in development is 
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necessary. This sequence is the appropriate time to expand participation in decision-
making processes, because the institutions are strong enough, and the societal 
grievances will not hold the same possibility of renewed conflict than democratization 
in former stages. Democracy is not the only possible outcome, but without the feedback 
from the people the state is not able to sustain development in the complex 
interdependent world, because it is unable to collect all the information needed without 
the real participation of the people. 
 
Sustainable democracy: democratic institutional development, the 
security dimension and better economic performance 
 
Divided societies that experienced violent conflicts require conciliation and 
compromise in order to be able to peacefully coexist. The most suitable institutional 
form to provide opportunity for peace is democracy. Obviously, democracy not 
automatically comes from development. Democracy needs several other factors, too, 
such as the state’s capacity to maintain public order, the sound level of citizens’ 
participation, the appropriate extent of democratic representation, the responsiveness of 
politics to the needs of the people, the quality of the economic performance and the 
macroeconomic management. (Lijphart 2008a: 165) 
Despite of the several controversies and criticism of democratic peace theory and its 
relevance in intrastate problems, democracy is indeed the best form of conflict-
management in the long term. In that sense, the democratic peace theory is true, and it 
can give policy advice to the international community. However, the key is patience. 
Sequencing statebuilding signals the place of democratization in the complex process, 
and gives answers to the transitology, too. Democratization without a functioning and 
responsive state causes conflicts. The tradeoff between development and democracy is 
not clear, but it is true that democracy in itself or simple economic development will not 
automatically create the missing parts. However, it is a common knowledge that 
democracy offers opportunity to sustainable development, and sound economic 
performance is needed for a functioning democracy. 
The ultimate question of institutional design is the dilemma whether democracy is an 
appropriate choice. In order to be able to answer it, we have to understand first what 
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democracy really is. Before trying to define democracy, we should not forget that 
democracy is a Western concept, similarly to the other concepts we used in the 
dissertation. And as it is, we cannot secede from our civilizatory and cultural prejudices. 
As Guillermo O’Donnell (2007: 2) notes, democracy is the historic trajectory of 
Western countries. Democracy is the political core of civilization, which the West offers 
to the rest of the world. With this fact in view, we still must not neglect democracy as a 
universal norm. Taking into consideration the basic political meaning, democracy is the 
opportunity for the people to govern their own lives. In this sense, democracy is 
undoubtedly universal value and basic human right. Democracy is not only a form of 
polity but the permanent opportunity that roots in individuals to take the ideal decisions 
for and by the society. Democracy is simultaneously a form of government and a widely 
accepted value, as it provides the opportunity to improve the practical circumstances of 
life and to escape from any forms of coercion. Democracy as John Dunn (2005: 16-24) 
defined it, is a word, an idea, and several manifested and latent practices that are 
associated with that idea and word. It is not only associated with liberalism and 
freedom, but with human rights and economic prosperity. It is a generally accepted 
belief that democracy’s final triumph lies in the evident political justice, that it is the 
only form in which human beings accept the indignity of being ruled, and in the ability 
that it can protect the fluent operation of free market. This last observation also shows 
that by today, democracy has welded unbreakably with liberal thoughts. If we talk about 
democracy promotion, it is clear that the goal is not only the transport of democracy but 
the encouragement of liberal institutions. The very important restriction comes from 
that: not all country is democratic that claims itself as democratic. 
Democracy is a long term preventive strategy of conflict and as that the integral part 
of post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding. Democratic states are less prone to 
violence against their own citizens due to the fact that the legitimacy of the regime rests 
on the people. (Evans 2001) Even if democracy is not the perfect form of societal and 
political regime, it is the only regime that is sustainable in the long term, because it is a 
self-correcting system in a way that none of the other regimes can produce.  
The security of the state depends on the stable continuation of the statebuilding 
process. The security dimension of this stage is influenced by the political order and 
stability more than by an actual armed threat of sub-state actors or international armed 
challenge. The previous stage served as the preparation of independent development in 
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this sector. The goal of the SSR was to create the state capacities to maintain security 
and order. Obviously the SSR also meant to help the exit of the foreign military forces 
that gradually transferred the responsibility of maintaining security and order to the 
national army and police forces. However, the gradual withdrawal of the foreign forces 
should not risk the outbreak of new fight for the control of the established and 
functioning institutions. In this sense, the foreign actors still have responsibility to 
maintain the peace after the ownership transit, but rather in the form of assistance to the 
local security forces, than direct actions. The newly built state is still fragile and the 
presence of the foreign military may threat the state’s legitimacy. Therefore, there is a 
need to find the healthy balance between total withdrawal and heavy presence. Even 
though Germany represented a different situation, and the American military presence 
has not only aimed at maintaining the achievements of the statebuilding process, but 
deter the Soviet leaders from the invasion, it shows that there is an opportunity to 
maintain military presence without spoiling the legitimacy of the state. The obvious 
solution could be the same method that was used in Germany, the integration of the 
country in regional or international security regimes. Furthermore, the complex 
interdependent world means that the dense transnational networks and economic 
development increase the opportunity costs of the deviant behavior, which in the long 
term also contribute to the security and stability. The interdependent world means that 
inside of the regimes the issue of military power lost its relevance, but in case of 
countries that are surrounded by weak states or hostile regimes, the opportunity of 
maintaining peace is only possible through using the military. It becomes clear that 
statebuilding in one country in a chaotic region is difficult, if not impossible. At least 
the security dimension has to be expanded to the regional level. Consequently, the 
newly established state institutions are not strong enough to maintain domestic order, 
defend the state from external problems and induce regional security, therefore the 
international community has important role in the security dimension in the last stage of 
statebuilding. Just to reflect on the importance of this role, the “Af-Pak” region is the 
best example. After almost 9 years the international actors begin to accept the fact that 
the statebuilding project in Afghanistan is only a dead end without finding the solution 
for Pakistan. However, a complex statebuilding mission in Pakistan is impossible, but 
increasing security and control over the border regions is not an unrealistic expectation 
of the international community. The feasibility of the governmental offensive in 
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Pakistan against the Taliban strongholds, and the possibility of international assistance 
are not clear. 
In connection with the above argument, apart from the exclusively military threats 
the security dimension of statebuilding has to prepare the state for unexpected external 
threats. The “new security threats” already challenged the state and they are not the side 
effects of the statebuilding process, but the military element of the security has been 
overwhelming during the first three stages.  
There are factors that facilitate democracy. These factors are the outcome of the well 
implemented stages of statebuilding, such as law, order, and peace; the generally 
adequate level of education, civil education and literacy; economic development and the 
separation of economic from political power; developed middle class; rule of law; and 
developed civil society. (Etzioni 2007: 42) Apart from the facilitating factors in general, 
two of the most important institutions influence significantly the design of democracy. 
First, the form and regulations of the constitution are the skeleton of the general 
system of laws, the basis of sustainable rule of law and consequently the starting point 
of democracy as they fundamentally shape all political institutions. A constitution that 
defines democracy as the political regime for the country has to draw on the neutrality 
of the military and civilian leadership, it necessitates the effective channels of 
communication with the public and effective economic performance. All these factors 
may be defined in the constitution, too. Further experience is that the strength of 
legislature is one of the guarantees of functioning democracies. For instance, the 
experience is from Central and Eastern Europe, where the constitution defined strong 
legislatures, that the democratic transition was more quick and sustainable. (Fish 2006) 
Effective democracy is based on a constitution that balances between the strong and 
effective state and other institutions. A good constitution also delegates, decentralizes 
state power through the electoral system and administrative decentralization. 
(Dominguez 2007: 12) The constitution has to satisfy several conflicting goals. First, 
the constitution as argued above, has to serve the goals of democratization. Second, the 
constitution has to focus on the effectiveness of the regime, considering the interrelated 
effects of policies in all dimensions. Third, the regime has to accommodate all the 
different interests and represent the groups having those interests. Fourth, the traditions 
and culture of the society needs to be reflected in the basic rules laid down by the 
constitution. Furthermore, the constitution has to regulate the issue of citizenship, 
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because it provides certain political, social and economic rights to the citizens, whilst 
excludes the others; secures access to political institutions and in political participation 
for citizens; finally creates identity through enhancing the feeling of shared fate. 
(Simeon et al: 2007: 82-84)  
Second, the power-sharing institutions significantly influence the future development 
of the state. Without going into details of power-sharing, and examining the 
opportunities and limits of it again, we have to accept that in deeply divided societies 
power sharing, however imperfect it is, is the mean of consolidating development 
without creating deep conflicts among the different political groups. Ethnically diverse 
societies are highly sensitive to the political design, therefore democratization, id est 
freeing the antagonist feelings of the society makes the polity fragile. In that sense, 
power-sharing is the assurance because it means that all the groups have stakes in 
maintaining the created system. The goal of power-sharing is to make the former 
antagonist enemies to be able to work together on the future. 
Third, the national level elections are the direct mean for participation. Similarly to 
the former stage of statebuilding, the elections have to play the same role, but the basic 
difference is that the local candidates already had time to “practice” during the local 
elections, whilst the final responsibility of development were based on the central 
government. But, in the national elections the stake is the central government. That is 
the national level election can decide who can and have to continue the statebuilding 
and democratization. In this sense, not only the stakes and the sizeable power but the 
responsibilities are higher, too. The elections are the mechanism of power-transfer, the 
strengthening of democratic institutions and the promoters of reconciliation. (Bjornlund 
2007: 66) 
The wished outcome of the institutional development in this stage is the enhanced 
quality of politics, which means the consolidation of the functioning institutions. The 
quality of the political institution depends on the extent how the rule of “3Rs” can 
fulfill, which means that: first, the politics and the institutions are responsible and do 
not give space for radical extremism; second, the government is responsive and 
accountable for the general public; third; the institutions are representative, and nobody 
is excluded. (Dominguez 2007: 24) In order to that a system can be called democratic 
the following conditions has to be present: universal adult suffrage; recurring, free, 
competitive and fair elections; more than one serious political party; and alternative 
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sources of information. These conditions, however, only are the minimal requirements, 
and do not answer the question how to measure the quality of democracy. Larry 
Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005) elaborated a list of factors with which the 
quality can be measured more adequately. The quality of democracy depends on the 
extent of freedom, the political equality, the popular control over public policies and 
policy makers through legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions. The 
result of qualitative democracy is a broadly legitimate regime that satisfies citizens’ 
expectation on governance. It means that citizens, associations and communities enjoy 
extensive liberty and political equality. The basis of procedure represents the fact that 
the citizens have the sovereign power. The quality of democracy can develop in eight 
dimensions: the rule of law, participation, competition, horizontal accountability, 
freedom, equality and responsiveness. (Diamond et al 2005) Accountability of the 
government and the political institutions is one of the most important conditions. Per 
definition, vertical accountability is the basic brick of democracy, however, in the 
reality and in many societies, this is not self-evident. Vertical accountability can only 
fulfill its role when the elections in the country are free and fair, and consequently the 
voters are able to punish “bad” politicians. In turn, horizontal accountability has not 
been always handled as an important ingredient of democracy, but lately there are more 
and more studies (Diamond 2008a; O’Donnell 2007; Whitehead 2002) on its 
importance during democratic transitions. Horizontal accountability refers to the 
existence of state institutions that are legally enabled and empowered, and more 
importantly willing to take actions even against the state in case of unlawful events and 
actions. To enhance horizontal accountability the government has to give opportunity to 
opposition parties to direct those institutions; provide independent budget from the 
judiciary; deal with the underrepresented groups; provide reliable and timely 
information; let the international organizations, the NGOs and the media function. 
(O’Donnell 2007: 50-67) The important institutions of horizontal accountability are the 
judiciaries; the parliamentary committees; the public audits; the ombudsmen 
institutions; the electoral commissions, the anti-corruption bodies. (Diamond 2008c: 
300) 
As there is no clear and consistent corpus of democratic theory, there is no coherent 
and final definition of democracy, either. Democracy can be a set of governing norms, a 
system of a regime, and certain type of institutional method. Reflecting more precisely 
to the reality we should note that democracy is all those together. Georg Sorensen 
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(2008) points out in his book: who wants to understand the meaning of democracy, 
needs to look at and behind the debate on the necessary economic, institutional and 
societal conditions. Having in mind that, it is not surprising that during the last decades 
were been born several competing views on democracy. Moreover, attempts to catch the 
notion of democracy are as old as the human political thinking. The works of ancient 
Greek philosophers, such as Plato or Aristotle, are still compulsory for every scholar in 
political science. It is a common place, that democracy meant the rule and power of the 
demos in ancient Greece, which was, however, purely a form of regime and not a norm 
that penetrates every aspect of human activity. Later on, due to the Great French 
Revolution and the birth of the United States, the meaning of democracy gained new 
aspects according to the intellectuality of the Enlightenment. The concept of 
representative democracy, introduced by John Stuart Mill (2004), already connected 
democracy to liberal values, as stated that the core of democracy is proportional 
representation, in other words: equality. Additionally, today’s democracy is connected 
not only with liberalism, but with several other dimensions, too, which make the 
elaboration of a consistent definition even more difficult. Larry Diamond noted aptly in 
his newest book, that defining democracy is like interpreting the Talmud. (2008c: 13) 
The literature of democratization recognizes several dimensions and factors, which 
help define democracy. According to the minimalist definition, which is generally 
known as procedural approach, the positivist logic dictates that the system of 
institutions is the constitutive element in a democracy. This approach is also called the 
Schumpeterian definition, and states that a democratic country is characterized by the 
permanent competition of the elected officials, who are held accountable by regular 
elections. (Schumpeter 1962) However, most of the scholars handle this theory as a 
standard minimum, it is clear that we have to go beyond it. Today, a democratic country 
faces the popular demand to have a government that is responsive to the needs of the 
citizens. It inherently stipulates the opportunity that citizens can express their 
preferences that are signified by an individual or collective action and the government 
weights equally these preferences. (Sorensen 2008: 27) To secure the opportunities, the 
democratic regime has to satisfy several criteria. Robert Dahl (1998: 37) collected a 
comprehensive list of criteria, which is now widely accepted as a starting point of 
analysis. These criteria are the institutional guarantees of democracy. The success or 
failure of democratization finally depends on the realization of these criteria: effective 
participation; voting equality; enlightened understanding of voters; control of the 
  
198 
 
agenda and inclusion of all adults. The satisfaction of the criteria gives the floor to the 
development of stable democratic institutions: representative government that is 
responsible to the elected officials; free, fair and frequent elections, where the 
possibility of coercion is not present; freedom of expression; access of the citizens to 
alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; inclusive citizenship. (Dahl 
1998: 85-86) Furthermore, Dahl also notes that full inclusion of citizens also needs their 
understanding of public matters, which usually has to be provided by an effective 
schooling system, open public debates and discussions. In addition, as long as we can 
agree that the goal of democratization is to establish a liberal democracy, the following 
broad list of conditions has to exist in a country to be labeled successful in 
democratization: individual freedoms (belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, 
broadcast, assembly, demonstration, petition, and nowadays most prominently the 
Internet); freedom of minority groups; right of all adults to vote; an open and 
competitive electoral arena; equality of all citizens under the rule of law; independent 
judiciary; freedom from torture, terror, unjustified detention, exile, interference in 
personal life; institutional checks on executive power; real pluralism; control over 
military and security apparatus by civilians. 
Democracy, however, is not an end in itself, it is rather a mean during the complex 
process of transition, a mean for protecting the citizens from the state, or from each 
other; democracy makes the elite – that should be capable and accountable – able to 
take the right decisions; helps protect the liberty of all citizen, and maintains public 
goods at least at the minimal level. It is a commonly cited phrase from Amartya Sen 
(1999) that in democracies there is no starvation. On the other hand, today there are 
several problems that are associated with democracy, such as the question of 
sovereignty in face of the effects of globalization. (Held 2006: 291) We can easily 
imagine situation in that decisions of elected officials affect not only their constituency, 
but the life of others who did not participate in the electoral process. For instance, the 
decision to allow the construction of polluting factories can affect people outside of the 
border. Or the decision of waging war affects the citizens of the attacked country, too. 
Due to the globalization, the chains of political, economic and social activity became 
worldwide, and the levels of interaction within and between states and societies 
intensified. Consequently, another aspect of globalization that called for urgent 
reorganization of our knowledge is that countries that failed democratization pose 
enormous challenge for the democratic states.  
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Some would think that the slowed wave of democratization is due to the fact that 
countries are more or less democratic, and those which remained intact, are inherently 
not able to become democratic. The most commonly mentioned condition is Islam. 
However, it seems that Muslim countries lag behind because of the nature of the 
religion; the Islamic orientation has a very limited impact on views about democracy. 
On the other hand, Islam has significant influence when it comes to social questions. 
(Diamond 2008c: 34; Zakaria 2003: 127) Furthermore, the wave of democratization did 
not only stop, but it became clear that new democracies are less effective. They usually 
share the following straits, which hinder the development of democratic quality: the 
inequalities in distribution of rights; failures of checks and balances; disenfranchisement 
of minorities and low governmental accountability, and even if the different branches of 
power are separated, they are competing for power. The last element shows, too, that 
representative democracies not automatically secure the checks and balances, as all of 
them have the tendency of centralization of executive power. (Armony 2005) 
Considering the experienced problems in democratization, the question is obvious, 
how to proceed? The “wave of resistance” to democracy promotion is worrisome as it 
has emerged not only in countries where democratic elements of politics have been 
oppressed from the beginning, but in countries that already realized some promising 
achievements in the past. The resistance is the byproduct of hybrid regimes, that claim 
to be democratic, but the fundamental deficiencies do not permit the development of a 
truly democratic state. The reality is that they are moving rather backwards, especially 
considering the state of the free media, or civil society. To respond the recent problems, 
there is a need of a more coordinated strategy on the political and the tactical level. 
Several donor agencies already realized this problem and began to promote programs 
that try to develop the real local civil society or promote the environment that allows the 
functioning of free press. Unfortunately, these programs have not fulfilled the 
anticipated hopes.  
Building democracy needs not only sound institutions but new set of norms, namely 
the people have to value the essential principles of democracy. Experiences from 
different transitions also prove that the role of institutions is also crucial in several 
ways. Institutions can influence norms and believes of the people, and shape finally the 
outcome of every policy decisions or actions. However, institutions are also influenced 
by conditions and factors that shaped democratization. That is the reason why certain 
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institutions contribute to the success of democratization, whilst other rather to the 
failure. The explanation is: institutions transmit the effects of conditions under which 
they emerged and endured. (Przeworski 2004) 
The institutional dimension of statebuilding in the last sequence confronts with the 
same question as the scholars in transitology did when they tried to define the real 
prerequisites of democracy. The difference between transitology and the Rubik’s cube 
analogy is, that this model gives the answer to the question how the prerequisites 
develop, and when they are present. The debate which is completed with the analogy 
has a long tradition in the literature. The real debate on the factors and conditions that 
help in the birth of democracy and contribute to its functioning began in the 1950s. 
Martin Lipset (2004) stated that substantive elements of democracy, such as economic 
development, or legitimacy, do not appear as definitive conditions, but as factors that 
secure the societal environment for sustainable development. In this sense, a system that 
cannot serve the interests of the society can be democratic, but will not be able to 
survive in the long term. Dankwart Rustow (1970: 1), yet recognized the importance of 
these factors, recalled the attention to the enabling conditions, as he stated that factors 
that help the future development and stability are not equal to the conditions that finally 
allow to unfold the democratization process. The fundamental differences in 
democratization processes showed that several countries are not able to go along the 
same path. Later, Robert Dahl identified several societal and institutional factors that are 
important for a country to be able to democratize. He labeled these factors as “essential 
conditions” (Dahl 1998: 27), which are: the institutional control of military and police 
by the elected officials; existence of democratic beliefs and a certain level of political 
culture; and no strong foreign control or influence that is hostile to democracy. 
However, Dahl also notes that these essential conditions are necessary but not always 
sufficient stipulations of a democratic success as there are several factors that are 
favorable for democratization. A modern market economy and society and weak sub-
cultural pluralism – that is, relative homogeneity in the society – all contribute to the 
increase of probability of the democratic process’ survival. 
There are several factors that were or are thought to be prerequisites for democracies. 
The minimum level of economic development is in the focus of modernization theories. 
Following Martin Lipset’s (2004: 1) reasoning we could believe that in wealthier 
society politics matter less because the redistribution – that is finally depends on the 
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form of government – matters less. In other words, in a wealthier society losers accept 
easier the results of elections as their life does not depend only on staying or getting into 
power. In addition, Adam Przeworski (1995) amended this argument stating that the 
level of development is important only in sustaining democracy. The political 
legitimacy of democratic leaders, the socio-cultural cohesion and the consensus on the 
territorial form of the state have equally important share in the success. (Kraxberger 
2007: 1056) 
The most commonly held idea is that rich countries are most likely to become 
democratic than poor ones. This theory obviously possesses logical contradiction, not to 
mention that the reality cannot prove clear causality between wealth and democracy. 
The misleading element was that generally a rich country has several other favorable 
conditions, too. Przeworski proved in several works that the endogenous theory – 
economic development increases the likelihood of democracy – fails on the trial of 
reality. Contrarily, according to the exogenous theory, as also Przeworski showed, 
democracies will not fail in case they are able to maintain the level of economic 
development. (Przeworski et al 1995: 39) The economic development decreases 
inequality in the society, and because the median voter favors the process of 
redistribution that is connected in his or her eye with democratic system will not work 
against democracy. At the same time, due to the economic development and increase in 
income, a sound tax structure helps increase the revenue of the state, and the powerful 
economic elites also feel profitable that more people are able to consume on the 
markets. To sum up this argument, we can step forward and state that according to the 
exogenous theory not economic development and the increase of income is decisive but 
the lesser inequality in the society. That is, not development in itself that helps maintain 
democracy but the processes behind it. 
The latter argument sounds more convincing but still does not cover the whole 
complexity and there are still several unresponded dilemmas left. In general, we can say 
that a democratic regime will not fail if it is able to maintain its legitimacy, whatever the 
source is. (Goldstone 2008: 285) Enhancing economic development and increasing 
standards of living are good bastions of a regime’s legitimacy. Andrew Richards (2007) 
collected the economic variables that are thought to have effect on democratization and 
the quality of the outcome. It is stated in the transitology literature that the level of 
economic development influences the transition. Countries over 6000 USD per capita 
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yearly GDP are more likely to become democracies and countries under 1000 USD are 
very fragile. The general economic performance also can determine the success or 
failure. The best indicator is the macroeconomic efficacy, for instance low inflation in 
the long run correlates with increased sustainability of a democratic regime. Equality in 
economic terms seems to be more decisive than the former two. It is easily acceptable 
that democracy can develop better in case of lower inequality in the society. Despite of 
this fact, the constraints often cannot hinder the democratic transition. In Central and 
Eastern Europe, adverse economic situation appeared to be the rule rather than the 
exception, as democratization began in all countries with severe economic crisis. The 
countries of the region went through a deeper economic recession after the system 
changes than during the Great Depression. However, it is generally thought to be a 
natural consequence of the transition from “plan-economy” to free market – that is what 
János Kornai, the distinguished scholar of transitional economies, calls 
“transformational regression” (1997) – the legitimacy of the new systems were under 
great stress, as the danger of increased nostalgia towards the old regime would have 
been a logic societal answer. The lesson of the Central and Eastern European transitions 
is that the heavy short term costs of reforms are unavoidable, the economic scenario is 
to make things worse before they can develop. Summing up, according to the economic 
theories of democratization, the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should 
not have been able to survive. The fact, that it is not true, shows clearly that there are 
other factors which have decisive effect on democratization. In these countries, the 
public expectations of a better life in a long term were very strong, and the new 
governments did not lose legitimacy. But on the other hand, there are the contradicting 
examples. For instance, even a fast economic growth could not withhold the coup d’état 
in Thailand in 2006 or in 2010. 
The above argument is more strikingly clear when we compare cases that were 
thought to resemble. At the first sight, Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe 
seemed to be similar so the expectation is that they reach the same outcome after the 
reform of the former socialist institutions. Let alone the fact, that Central Asia was part 
of the Soviet Union, which is fundamental distinction between the two regions, talking 
about the similar condition is superficial. Initial conditions, domestic and external 
factors all have influence on the success of a transition, which is finally manifested in 
the different abilities for development. The literature of democratization has long 
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analyzed and evaluated the effects of initial conditions on democratization, but it is rare 
to include the role of external factors at the same time.  
The uniqueness of the post-socialist region, especially of the Baltic States and 
Central and Eastern Europe lies in the nexus of favorable domestic conditions and wide 
international support. The organizational abilities and courage of democratic activists 
and political leaders were obtrusive from the beginning of the changes, which coupled 
with the weaknesses of the incumbent authoritarian regimes. The lucky constellation of 
other factors – such as the lack of politicized military, experience with elections, high 
level of education29, informed society that is familiar with the idea of civil and political 
liberties – also made the success of the transitions possible. (Bounce 2006: 5) The 
procommunist level of development, the political culture and ethnic homogeneity have 
correlated closely with the level of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. 
(Janos 2001: 240) We can easily verify this argument: the multiethnic Czechoslovakia 
and more violently Yugoslavia, broke up during the transition, and the democratic 
development was slower in Romania and later in Slovakia, too, where the proportion of 
national and ethnic minorities is high, and consequently populist voices found more 
followers from the majority. However, regional character of the wave of system changes 
in Central and Eastern Europe let the way to the effects of diffusion’s dynamics. (Grey 
1997: 258) The similarities in system changes mutually strengthened and feed each 
other. The incumbent regimes – except Romania – did not use violent tools to oppress 
the serried demonstrations. The diffusion of ideas and techniques among dissident 
groups and opposition groups were easy and the democratic political leaders realized 
that they can learn from the experiences of the neighboring countries, which eventually 
materialized in the wave of “revolutions”. It is commonly said that the wave is best 
reflected in the time frames: the process from authoritarian rule to democracy took ten 
years in Poland, 10 months in Hungary, 10 weeks in Czechoslovakia and 10 days in 
Romania. 
Furthermore, even the socialist party elites, most significantly in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and in Poland, were afraid of being dropped out from the European 
integration. In 1986, with the signing of the Single European Act, the leaders of 
countries from the “happier side” of Europe decided to lift the integration for a next 
level. The promise of common market meant the opportunity of faster economic growth 
for the members of the European Economic Community, but on the other hand it 
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appeared as the danger of marginalization for the socialist countries. This feeling was 
present also in the heart of the societies until the final accession of the European Union. 
This is one of the reasons why the societies remained loyal to the new regimes despite 
of the very though economic situation. Furthermore, the conditionality, the Copenhagen 
Criteria that was basically set up only vis-à-vis the new candidates, had enormous effect 
on the stability of the reforms. The “willingness of fulfillment” was the engine of 
reforms and was not questioned even by the losers of the process. This is a main 
difference between the Central and Eastern European transitions, where the parties 
wanted to accept the Western conditions, and the recent democratization attempts in 
countries where the population is deeply divided and hostile with the idea of increased 
foreign influence.  
Finally, the transitology literature in general has taken for granted the existence of a 
functioning state. The renewed debate on the role of the state in a democracy, and more 
specifically during the transition, is emerging among the academic discussions. As the 
problem with the recent wave of democratization is that in parts of the developing 
world, statehood, the fundamental requisite of democratization is in recession. The 
effectiveness of the state is crucial in democratization, as a fragile state does not 
facilitate the conditions that are necessary for the sustained survival of a democracy. A 
state that already is or is able to become democratic seems to be also defining factor, if 
not a prerequisite, in the process of democratic transition. The effective state is 
important as the success of transition also depends on the effective balancing among the 
colliding interests of different actors in the process. If the state is too strong, the civil 
society and the market institutions may remain underdeveloped, but on the other hand, a 
too divided power structure would not favor the transition, either. Transition from 
authoritarian rule – and we have to turn to the Central and Eastern European experience 
again – needs simultaneous decentralization, privatization and bureaucratic 
modernization, but if the state capacity cannot be strengthened in parallel of declination 
of its power, the whole transition will fail. The dilemmas on statecraft in democracy are 
one of the most important dilemmas that the democratizers have to solve. Several 
dimensions attached to the state are in question during the transition: time, the terms of 
regular elections and power changes; function of the state in the government and in the 
institutions; territory, regarding not only the borders of the country but the power of 
central authority and decentralization; scope, where the power of the state is restricted. 
(Mendez 2007)  
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Although democracy is the optimal outcome of the statebuilding process in the 
institutional dimension, the connection between democracy and development is not 
always the same. It is generally accepted that democracy has a positive role in economic 
development. It is also widely accepted (Beuningen 2007) that democracy is the best 
form of government to facilitate decision making that provides the conditions for social 
and economic development and the reduction of poverty. Democracy in itself does not 
necessary require prior economic development but does need the existence of a 
functioning state. Consequently, the answer is less complicated, because as we could 
see in the former stages of statebuilding, the real prerequisite for democracy is the 
functioning state. According to the developmentalist point of view, democracy means 
more socioeconomic equality, than democracy as a value in itself. The dynamic of the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth is not clear at the first sight, 
because authoritarian regimes produce at least as quick economic development. The 
main difference is that democracy in the long term always produces economic growth. 
Democracy influences economic development in different dimensions, which eventually 
explains the sustainability of democratic development. These channels of influence are 
the physical capital, human capital, social capital, and the political capital, which all are 
accumulated because of the democratic functioning of the institutions. (Gerring et al 
2005) The role of the state in economic development is significant. The state has to 
manage the public assets, such as the sustainable use of natural capital, environmental 
protection through controlling certain agricultural, commercial, or industrial activities. 
The role of the state is also critical in the functioning of the banking sector, because 
weak state institutions may lead to the indebtedness of the country and ineffectiveness 
of the banking system. (Ghani 2008: 156-163) 
The problem with the nexus between democracy and development is that new 
democracies are fragile and the economic policies of the external actors who 
participated in the statebuilding are not always consistent with the local needs and 
conditions. That fact emphasizes the importance of the third stage of statebuilding 
again, that the transfer of power and ownership from the external actors to the local 
stakeholders has to anticipate the political opening to democracy. The general 
conclusion of comprehensive analyses of economic performance of new democracies 
(Richards 2007) concludes that the adverse economic situation in the new democracies 
appears to be the rule rather than the exception. On the other hand, the challenge is that 
the demand of the people for better life is high, and the heavy short term costs of the 
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reforms make it difficult to continue with democratization. The role of the state here is 
enormous, it has to continue the reforms and accept the fact that it has to make the 
standard of living and the economic performance worse before they can get better.  
The outcome of sound development of the economy and parallel democratization is 
the birth of self-sustainable structures. That also includes the environmental conscious 
policy decisions and the long term planning of development. It is a statistical fact that 
democracies perform better in protecting the environment. (Thiesen 2008) In countries 
where the source of conflict was the competition for a scarce natural resource, the 
democratic institutions help solve the allocation problems by cooperation and 
consultation rather than by violence. It is also a fact that where participatory, read 
democratic, and inclusive resource management exists there are more institutionalized 
techniques to solve the conflicts peacefully. (Martin 2005)  
 
 
Sustainable democracy and the societal, external and domestic 
complex 
 
Democratization means opening in the societal dimension. The challenge is to 
maintain the sometimes fragile cohesion of the society and the loyalty towards the 
statebuilding process. The interdependent international environment carries several, 
sometimes contradicting, effects that influence the development of the society. The state 
is not able to control these effects, but it would be a false conclusion that the state 
should not free the society. Moreover, the free society is the prerequisite of sustainable 
democracy. From the institutionalized point of view, the civil society and its 
development can profit most from the opening. Consequently, due to the effects of 
globalization it is not possible to keep the civil society in a strict territory. The civil 
society in a healthy democracy is part of the transnational networks which also 
empowers it and serves as alternative source of information. It does not mean that the 
state is not useful in this context, because the civil society can only function well if the 
state is able to maintain the democratic conditions. The globalized network of civil 
society organizations is the channel of NGOs who are lobbying for the same rights in 
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each countries, in this sense the role of the civil society is bring the societies closer to 
each other, and to enhance uniformity of demands vis-à-vis the state, too.  
Democratization and societal opening reformulate problems like ethnicity questions, 
and ethnic conflicts. However, ethnic composition of the society influences the chances 
of democratization indirectly by interacting with the development of other conditions, 
such as the economic growth, performance of the government, strength of the civil 
society, or the institutional design. According to statistical evidence (Beissinger 2008) 
ethnic diversity of the society significantly lowers aggregate economic growth rates, 
affecting negatively the government’s performance, which decreases the usable 
resources for the provision of public goods. Ethnic diversity is also challenging in the 
sense that in a democratic competition ethnic based parties may gain strength and 
decrease the general cohesion of the society by reemerging the ethnic conflicts and 
ethnic questions. But there are contradicting opinions (Fish et al 2004), according to 
which in non-wealthy countries the societal divisions does not have significant effect on 
the democratic or the economic performance. Having in mind that, countries like 
Singapore, Malaysia, or Uganda cannot refer to the lack of democratization as a 
necessary defense against the unpredictable consequences of democratization in a 
multiethnic environment. And these arguments should not be accepted by the Western 
leaders.  
There is a general belief that democracy increases the cohesion of the society 
because it helps satisfy the needs of the people. It implies that democracies are happier 
places than any other countries with different political regimes. Surprisingly there is 
growing evidence (Weiner 2008) that happiness does not grow simultaneously with 
democratization, that is the number of people who are satisfied with the political-
economic-societal system is not growing as quickly as the democratic institutions 
develop. The problem is that the satisfaction of the people is the cornerstone of the 
legitimacy of the system. In turn, it means that the happiness of the people can keep 
non-democratic parties in power as it is the case in China or Singapore. The new way of 
thinking about the cohesion of the society is not the fostering of nations, rather the 
enhancement of the culture of being the citizen of the state, that is the ties with the state 
institutions have to be the glue in the society. Civic nationalism is not equal with the 
definition of modern nationalism.  
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In the complex process of statebuilding, the state is the normative order that 
symbolizes the existence and unity of the political community. (Papagianni 2008:54) 
The double compact of the state is the source of legitimacy and the basis of civic 
nationalism. Civic nationalism does not imply a common history, language, or culture, 
but merely recognition of the authority of a constitutional or political framework. 
(Miller 2000: 129) Nationalism in that sense is not a given identity, but the outcome of 
the trust in the state that stems from this compact. Double compact is the “network of 
rights and obligations underpinning the state’s claim to sovereignty” (Ghani et al 2008: 
6) The compact is made between the state and the citizens and between the state and the 
international community to ensure the state’s willingness and ability to adhere to 
international norms and standards of accountability and transparency. (Ghani et al 2008: 
8) 
The important brick of modern nationhood, or civic nationalism is the trust in the 
state and in the other groups that cooperation helps to reach better goals. As John Rawls 
formulated in the Theory of Justice (2005), the conception of common trust keeps the 
community together. The trust in that sense refers to the joint acceptance of the 
members of the society that being part of the community means not only rights but 
duties, which have to be fulfilled. In societies where the level of trust is low the state 
has to introduce more institutions or cannot open for wider participation in the decision-
making process.  
The external dimension has the same importance as during the former steps, the main 
difference is the source of influence. The external dimension was decisive in the 
statebuilding process because the presence of the foreign army and the external actors 
could not be circumvented in any questions. After the transformation of power and 
ownership from the external actors to the local stakeholders, the importance of the 
external dimension definitely decreased. However, due to the consequences of opening 
and democratization, the country is more coherently integrated in the global network of 
political, economic and social connections, and from this point of view the importance 
of this dimension increased. Having in mind this argument, the effect of the external 
dimension is less predictable than in the former stages, that is why the goal of 
statebuilding is to make the state able to control the vulnerability to the external side 
effects of the globalized interdependency. The strong institutions, the functioning 
economy, the institutionalized mechanisms of peaceful conflict management in the 
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society and security and order all help the state balance the vulnerabilities. Today, 
national security is the aggregate of capacities of the state and the different effects 
coming from the different dimensions. The territorial security of the state has to be 
mentioned together with the complex interdependency of the states. (Keohane et al 
2001)  
The role of the state is not to erase interdependency, rather to alleviate the 
asymmetry in the external relations. Even the failed states are connected to the world, 
and the states undergoing complex statebuilding project have to be aware that the threat 
of negative spillovers from other weak states may reverse the development process, 
especially if there are “bad neighbors” in the region. The weak states may provide 
important resources, such as market for export of goods and services, and source of 
import, including not intended trafficking of illicit goods and arms. Furthermore, the 
international migration flows challenge the states whether they can manage the newly 
arrived and vulnerable population. On the other hand, as statistical data shows, 89% of 
the migration is limited to close regions and neighboring countries, and the “pulling 
effects” may significantly increase as the state is getting more stable, and developed.  
The presence of democracy promoters in the country is also decisive factor of 
connection with the international community. Simultaneously with increasing stability 
and security in the country, the number of NGOs and foreign initiatives that promote 
democracy and democratic values increases. The “new” phenomenon after the Cold 
War is that democracy became a universal value in itself and the ideal form of 
government, therefore democracy promotion is an acceptable foreign policy goal 
throughout the entire international community. The experience also proves that 
democratization without external incentives may lead to mixed and not favorable 
outcomes. (Brown 2001; Bounce et al 2006) Russia without the same and active 
presence of democracy promotion NGOs as it was the case in Central Europe or the 
Baltic states became a guided democracy with authoritarian features.  
The development of the state, the successful statebuilding process and 
democratization in a country also affect the region, the importance of positive spillovers 
in a region is definitely larger than we know today. The topic is rather underdeveloped 
in the literature of transitology, however, there are some experiments (Bounce et al 
2006) that try to explain the effect of regional spillovers. The power of diffusion effects 
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is decisive because the demonstrational effects work more directly in a close proximity, 
and the intersociety relations influence the behavior of the elite and the people.  
Besides the positive effects in the region, the interconnected international relations 
mean significant connection to the “Western” world through economy, geopolitics, 
social processes, communication and transnational organizations. (Levitsky et al 2004) 
During the first three stages of statebuilding, when the state was vulnerable to the 
external pressure, the “Western leverage” meant the direct control by the external 
actors. In the last stage, the importance of “Western linkages” means the density of ties 
with the external countries and institutions which influence significantly the decisions 
made by the country.  
Unfortunately, transitology has not paid too much attention to the effects of external 
influences during democratic transitions.  
From the experiences of the Central and Eastern European states, we have to 
conclude that the presence and the conditionality of the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
signaled the most important directions of the transition. However, it is also true that the 
transition process had domestic, political, societal and institutional dimensions at the 
same time. In Central and Eastern Europe, the “Western” economic institutions were 
one of the most influential factors of development since the beginning of the 1960s. 
This is one of the reasons why most of the socialist countries tried to reform their 
economic system. Furthermore, from the 1980s on, there emerged a new group of 
experts in the socialist parties, who pushed the party towards some kind of institutional 
integration into the “Western” system. (Zaborowski 2003: 9) The more developed 
countries of the socialist block joined for instance to the symbols of the capitalist world, 
the IMF and the World Bank, well before the fall of the bipolar political system. 
The system change in itself is a consequence of sound constellation of international 
political factors. Without the fall of the Soviet Union and the role of Michail 
Gorbatschow, the history might have had a different direction. Moreover, after the 
events in 1989, a power-vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe increased the fears of 
the “Western countries”, which culminated in their enhanced effort to influence the 
transitions. (Janos 2001: 234) In 1989, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact still 
existed, even if their future was not clear, the Western countries began to propagate 
their norms and political, economic and societal system in the former socialist countries.  
(Grey 1997: 256) Thus, the ideological and theoretical basis of the program of 
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convergence to the West did not stem from the domestic process of change. It is a 
generally accepted argument in the international political theory that the attractiveness 
of the “Western-style politics” overshadowed the contradictions of accepting ready-
made “transformational recipes”. This is one of the reasons why the countries in 
transition could achieve so different results. 
Furthermore, the elite of the post-socialist countries tried to prove that they are able 
to fulfill the conditions of the Euro-Atlantic organizations, due to which the integration 
became the real engine of transition. The countries unconditionally accepted even the 
toughest conditions and initiated difficult reforms. The Euro-Atlantic norms and model 
met no or low institutional resistance in the post-socialist countries. The purposefully 
vague agreements, such as the Europe Agreements, forced the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to prove permanently their achievements and willingness to accept the 
conditions. The motivation was the gap between the opportunity costs of the future 
membership of the Euro-Atlantic organizations and of the possibility of being left out. 
The elite of the post-socialist countries were the key player in both the transition and 
the integration; therefore it is easy to understand that the two processes developed 
simultaneously. It was a general phenomenon that the elite were more supportive of the 
integration than the general public. Eventually, from the mid 1990s, the legitimacy of 
the elite rested on the fact that they enthusiastically strived for the full membership of 
the Euro-Atlantic organizations. 
The domestic dimension shows how the country can adapt the new techniques of 
development from the external dimension, and how challenging is the participation in 
the global network of political, economic and societal relations. Each of the countries is 
different in the sense that they developed different abilities to be able to exploit the new 
opportunities given by the liberalization and democratization. The development of the 
state depends on this ability, because, as we argued above, development in a country 
cannot be separated from the outside world, but the effect of the external dimension is 
not always positive. From this point of view the domestic ability of the country 
influences the countries sensibility and vulnerability for the interdependent world. One 
of the most important factors of this ability is the cultural attitudes of the people how 
they receive the new and changed environment, and how they imagine their own place 
in the interdependent network of different relations. In a democracy, the will of the 
people significantly influences the political outcome of the decision making process, 
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therefore the domestic dimension will shape the path of the last stage of statebuilding. 
There are even opinions in the transitology literature which emphasize that 
democratization and the possibility of development is determined by the domestic 
conditions and factors. (Zaborowski 2003: 5) 
The local capacities of governance obviously have been shaped by the institutions 
built up by the statebuilding process during the previous stages, but the domestic 
determinants are still important. In the Western history, the democracy as a form of 
government, the state as a geopolitical entity and the nation as a political community 
developed together, in that sense the state and democracy were connected to the unified 
identity in the society. In weak states and states that failed in the Western political 
sense, the problem is the split balance of the three factors, because the state failed to 
create unity and the lack of unity generates limits on democracy and state performance. 
The statebuilding process tries to reestablish that connection, but differently, because 
the simultaneous development of the three factors is impossible because of the inability 
of the state in the first place. The key is the development of the state that in the three 
stages of statebuilding becomes strong enough to carry the burden of managing the 
challenges of democratic opening and the task of unifying the political community at 
the same time. It does not mean that the last stage of development can only begin when 
the country has a “new nation” and functioning democracy, rather it refers to the 
situation when democracy, the state and the political community can develop gradually 
and simultaneously. The domestic dimension is crucial in this sense because the 
political community needs to be committed to this development by: perceiving a 
collective interest or common good in this development; being able to match the 
individual interests with the collective interest; complying with established democratic 
principles, procedures and outcomes. The viability of the development depends on the 
fact to which extent the citizens are prepared and willing to cooperate. This extent stems 
from the moral attitudes of people, the level of civic engagement, and the level of trust. 
The statebuilding process has to focus on facilitating them because the government in 
itself is not able to force the change of them. (Beuningen 2007: 54-55) 
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Assessing national level development 
 
During the last stage of statebuilding, democratic structures have to become 
dominant in all dimensions. Democracy is also reflected in the logic of synergies among 
the dimensions, which means that none of the dimensions has absolute primacy over the 
others. We would easily think that the institutional dimension is more important because 
of the institutional nature of the last stage but it would lead to false conclusions. The 
main problem with most of the international mechanisms is the simplistic conditional 
nature of such programs. One good example is the logic of the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund, which presumes that institutional change can reform the 
whole state. In this sense, the greatest advantage of using the Rubik’s cube analogy is 
the possibility to analyze the different dimensions in a single model. Accordingly, the 
analogy helps understand that one dimension in itself is only complex but imperfect 
slice of the whole and all dimensions influence the others. 
The main goal of the last stage is to strengthen the state to develop from its own 
resources. The challenge is the fact that the statebuilding process may seem to be 
already completed at the beginning of the stage because the conditions are ripe for the 
external actors to leave the country. Nevertheless, it is important to continue the process 
because some developments in one dimension may negatively influence the 
development of another for a certain period of time which necessitates the continuous 
process in all dimension, id est the presence of the external actors, as well. The Rubik’s 
cube analogy suggests that the development is neither static nor linear. Consequently, 
the development of the state is dynamic and includes not foreseen setbacks. The goal of 
the final stage is to create the system of mechanisms which help correct these setbacks. 
Furthermore, it is only a utopia to have a perfectly working state in the end. In the 
security-military dimension the above argument means a consolidated local capacity 
and an exit point for the foreign military forces. The security apparatus of the state has 
to be able to cope with most of the challenges which would threaten the basis of the 
state. The development in the institutional, economic and the societal dimensions all 
contribute to the sustainability of the process. Participatory democracy, equal economic 
development and a strong society which allows the people to live together despite of the 
  
214 
 
differences are the key indicators of success in this stage. The state has to be able to 
govern the dimensions while the globalized world will permanently create new 
challenges. To sum up, the goal is to create and strengthen a state which is fed by the 
domestic resources, uses domestic endowments to participate in the interdependent 
international networks. 
In cases of failed states, the final aim of the statebuilding process is not to build a 
developed state. The statebuilders can be satisfied if the state serves the security of the 
given country and thus the international community. Statebuilding obviously cannot aim 
at building a developed state from a failed state, but we can say that a statebuilding 
process is successful, when the state is able to maintain its internal and external 
security, possesses functioning institutions, is able to manage its debt, provides 
economic growth, manages the societal conflicts in a peaceful way, and balances 
between external interdependency and its domestic capacities. 
 
 
 
Summary of the alternative model 
 
 
Statebuilding necessarily means more than the simple reconstruction of narrow state 
functions because the design and the prescriptions for state failure are born in the 
“North Atlantic design center”. Having said that, it is important to build a state which is 
legitimate and effective, id est a democratic and functioning structure. Statebuilding in 
this sense rather means shaping the environment which allows and strengthens “good 
state functions” by maintaining a healthy balance between legitimacy and effectiveness 
of the institutions. Furthermore, the state has to become able to influence not only these 
institutions but the environment, as well.  
Consequently, statebuilding is complex and sequenced. It is a gradual development 
but through certain stages. The process is dynamic and not linear, that is some setbacks 
do not always indicate the failure of the process. The literature of democratic 
development introduced a fierce debate on sequencing a development process and 
disseminated the ambition to find the necessary prerequisites of final success. The 
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alternative model which uses the analogy of the Rubik’s cube solution methodology 
contradicts the arguments of both the gradual and sequencing “school”. The reality 
shows that a statebuilding process is a permanent and dynamic development, but on the 
other hand the designers of a statebuilding exercise have to follow some steps in a 
certain order. This is also an answer why different statebuilding exercises showed 
different outcomes. The steps, the dimensions and the variables which influence the 
final outcome are different in each situation which posed an enormous challenge in 
creating a model that could help understand, explain and forecast the outcome of such a 
process. Consequently, the Rubik’s cube analogy is not a blueprint but a new schema of 
thinking about the complexity. It did not intend to criticize existing models or practical 
experiences. It only aimed at providing a method of thinking about the different 
dimensions and steps in a single model having in mind that the process is dynamic. 
The sequences reflect the timely dynamic of statebuilding and do not prescribe 
functional priorities among the dimensions. Each dimension develops gradually and 
simultaneously during the sequences. In this sense, the statebuilding process is a gradual 
transition through reaching certain sequences from a failed state to a self sustainable and 
effective and interdependent structure of security, institutions, economy, society, 
governance and external conditions. The process of transition is a power transfer from 
the external actors to the local stakeholders. The challenge is to find the balance 
between legitimate local ownership and effective external actions. 
When Ernő Rubik invented his cube it was held impossible to solve. Today, only a 
few months ago, there was published an algorithm which solves the cube in 20 moves 
from every possible beginning situation. It is strikingly similar to the general thinking 
about statebuilding and democratization, according to which it is impossible to describe 
every statebuilding exercises in a single model which handles all the dimensions and 
steps together. We are not stating that similar algorithms can work in social sciences, 
but it is beyond doubt that the Rubik’s cube analogy can be used as schema for thinking. 
Furthermore, the model can help understand, explain and forecast the interconnected 
development of the dimensions in a dynamic way. Concluding from the solution 
methodology of the cube, a basic rule of sequencing can be formulated. The center 
cubelets have fixed position on each face, that is the basic conditions in each 
dimensions have to be created and the basic demands have to be satisfied. Statebuilding 
can be successful only if the basic conditions are in each dimension ripe for the 
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continuation. The algorithms are the general and well defined instruction on the 
challenges and necessary tasks in each dimension from a given initial situation to the 
desired outcome. The instructions pay attention to the fact that each move influences the 
other dimensions, and the strategies do not intend to rewrite the rules of development in 
the later stages they only try to reform it. 
The sequences of statebuilding represent the different stages or better to say the logic 
of the transformation of authority and power from the external actors to the locals. In 
the first sequence, the foundation of future lies in the state’s ability to stop fighting and 
decrease violence. It is only possible if the basic needs are satisfied in each dimension. 
Creation of an environment which helps future development is a necessary feature of 
the first sequence. In the second sequence, the external actors need to take a bigger role 
in development because they can create a certain stability and peace because the 
greatest challenge in the second phase is the opportunity for renewed hostility. In each 
interim situations, an “interim recession” may occur, but it has to be kept under control. 
Furthermore, the locals have to hold bigger stakes. In the third sequence, the external 
actors still have to be present but the role of the locals is crucial. Without significant 
local ownership of the statebuilding process, the development cannot become 
sustainable and the external actors easily stuck in the quagmire of failed development. 
Pumping aid in the local economy is not enough, the state has to become able to use its 
own resources and the external actors have to play rather the supporting agency of 
development. In the fourth sequence, the goal is to create and maintain a coherent 
complex structure of the interdependent dimensions. The external actors have to 
decrease their presence to a minimal level, whilst we have to admit that the external 
dimension is still important but in a different way. The state has to be able to cope with 
the challenges of the 21st century which basically stem from globalization and the 
interdependent world structure.  
In addition, the model pays attention to the interaction and development of the 
different dimensions in each sequence. Differently from other normative models which 
overemphasize the role of a single dimension, such as security, the Rubik’s cube 
analogy introduces the dynamic and simultaneous development of six dimensions: 
security-military; institutional; economic; societal; external and domestic. The 
connection among the dimensions is different in each sequence and the beginning 
situation is also not the same in case of different countries. Therefore the complex 
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system can be understood better by using the Rubik’s cube analogy. It is impossible to 
elaborate a set of needed tasks but it is possible to highlight the important problems in 
each dimension in each sequence. The dimensions are rather sets of different factors 
which influence the development of each other and eventually the success of the state. 
Differentiating among the dimensions is possible only on the theoretic level. This is due 
to the fact that the factors are overlapping and their relation and interconnected 
development can be explained as the solution of “edge pieces” and “edge groups” of the 
Rubik’s cube. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
It is general knowledge that the characteristics of international relations changed 
ultimately after the end of the Cold War. The security architecture which provided 
stability for the system was designed to cope with the realities after the Second World 
War. During the Cold War, the antagonistic ideological opposition of the two blocks 
hindered the recognition of the problem of state failure. The state-centered international 
relations could not give answers to problems coming from weak and failed states. 
After the end of the bipolar world system, the weak performing states lost their 
donors. Because the Third World lost its strategic importance the superpowers stopped 
pumping aid into the not functioning systems. Thus, anarchy, which was envisaged by 
Thomas Hobbes, became the rule in the weak states. Simultaneously, the scholars 
celebrated the victory of democracy in the post-modern world. The gap between the pre-
modern states and post-modern democracies has grown constantly. The manifestation of 
the latent challenges coming from the weak states was only matter of time. After the 
simultaneous terrorist attacks and the intervention in Afghanistan, the international 
politics witnessed a new system change, because there occurred a radical shift in the 
perception of the problems stemming from weak statehood. 
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Although, there were several techniques to address state failure most of them were 
ineffective. The restoration of order in weak states became the self-interest of the entire 
international community. Today, it is clear that the consequences of state failure are 
more expensive than the costs of an intervention. However, there remained a serious 
problem. The theory and practice of interventions fought against the challenge of 
ineffectiveness. The main feature of state failure studies has been the unclear definitions 
and vague policy recommendations. Consequently, there is no single prescription for the 
problem of failed states. State failure as an independent science was born with the study 
of Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner and the comprehensive volume edited by William 
Zartman in the middle of the 1990s. First, the motivation for managing the 
consequences of state failure was rather humanitarian but soon after the events on 
September 11, 2001 the approach shifted towards the security concerns of the 
international community and the developed world. 
In order to understand the complexity of state failure and the necessary response to it, 
we only need to try to answer three questions. Why is it necessary to deal with failed 
states? What should be done with failed states to diminish the negative effects? How 
should be done it? Connected to these questions, we can elaborate several arguments 
and build up several premises. These premises and arguments help understand the 
complexity of the topic even if they do not lead us to find the perfect answers. The goal 
is to overcome the linear thinking on the development of the state because the word 
failed state inherently suggests a continuum on which the failed is the negative and the 
Weberian ideal type is the positive extremity. 
The dissertation’s main aim was to address the above mentioned questioned and to 
find answers through the hypotheses. We are aware that the problem of state failure is 
not a new phenomenon, but the events after the Cold War called the attention to the fact 
that there are no functioning and comprehensive frameworks which could help 
understand, explain and forecast events associated with it. Similarly, the decisionmakers 
cannot use a coherent model. The dissertation aimed at contributing the international 
literature by re-conceptualizing existing definitions and at constructing a new theoretic 
framework using the achievements of former models of statebuilding. 
It is not complicated to formulate an appropriate answer to the first question because 
failed states are not able to manage the humanitarian and security challenges and the 
consequences of neglected state failure are unpredictable. Although, the problem affects 
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the entire international community, and it is clear that a reaction is needed, the debate is 
not settled whether the reaction should be real intervention or the international 
community has to find new techniques. However, it is accepted in the literature that 
statebuilding is some sort of “aurea mediocritas”. Thus, the answer to the second 
question is that statebuilding is the appropriate answer, which is complex and 
multidimensional because it includes simultaneously the strengthening of state 
institutions, the reconstruction and development of the economy and the reform of the 
society. The third question refers to the implementation of the statebuilding. It is a 
highly disputed issue in the literature. Due to the ambiguous definitions and the high 
number of different suggestions, there is no agreement on the final goal of statebuilding. 
The basic presumption of this work is that the aim of statebuilding should be to build up 
both a functioning institutional structure and a democratic environment. The dissertation 
aimed at elaborating a comprehensive and comparative picture on the different practical 
and normative statebuilding models and at creating an alternative schema of thinking in 
which all the different sequences and dimension of statebuilding are taken into account. 
In order to do so, the dissertation followed deductive formal logic to rethink and 
reconstruct existing theories and models. This logic helped avoid redundant information 
and even if there were some factors which stayed latent, the enormous complexity of 
state failure and statebuilding demanded to formulate hypotheses in advance. The 
dissertation built on the belief that each model and theory on state failure and 
statebuilding has useful elements which were incorporated in the alternative model after 
careful revision. Consequently, the real added value of the dissertation was the creation 
of the new theoretic schema which reorganized the exiting knowledge and obliterated 
the borders of sub-disciplines such as international political theory, international 
development, or transitology. The outcome of the schema helps understand, explain and 
forecast the challenges related to state failure. On the other hand, the empiric 
verification of the new model was not the goal of the dissertation. Despite of this fact, 
the model is a god basis for further researches because it is a method to analyze the 
success of statebuilding and to estimate the influence of certain factors and dimensions 
in different situations. 
The first hypothesis stated that state failure is a trap of humanitarian and security 
threats from which these states are unable to escape by themselves. Here, the main task 
was to find the appropriate definition by re-organizing the existing knowledge in the 
literature.  
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the worrisome events, manifested in form of violent 
civil conflicts, famines or human rights abuses, appeared on the headlines of the 
World’s (Western) media causing increased attention to state failure events. As the 
people in developed countries did not have to fear of the global contestant’s attack, their 
awareness to “third world events” became more intensive. Politicians, experts and 
scholars shortly had to experience that neither the international organizations, nor any 
existing political instruments are prepared to respond sufficiently the problem of state 
failure. It is true that on systemic level democracy became “the only game in town” 
defeating, or losing its counter-alternative organizing principle. But the anarchy of the 
international system, which penetrated in several weak performing states, encumbered 
the realization of the “end of history”. 
All the relevant international organization, leading think tanks and research groups 
and many scholars devoted energy and effort to find the definition of state failure, but 
the result was the birth of many competing views rather than a comprehensive 
terminology. The complexity of the phenomenon and the abundance of factors, 
conditions made the generalization almost impossible. Although, there are useful guides 
on how to conceptualize the phenomenon, such as elaborated by the State Failure Task 
Force, the Fund for Peace or Robert Rotberg’s research group, there is still space for 
“definition-seekers”. The studies and researches on state failure and statebuilding still 
begin without exception with categorization and conceptualization what state failure 
really means. The competing views, however, show obviously that there is no final 
truth.  
However, the early works on state failure already called the attention to the 
uncontrollable consequences that are dangerous for the whole international community, 
the primary motivation for seeking the definition remained humanitarian until 2001. 
The simultaneous terrorist attacks fundamentally changed the motivation of analysis 
which aimed at explaining the causes behind and the consequences of weak state 
performances. National security became the new motivation. The definition that the 
present work endeavored to formulate is also based on this recognition, namely, that the 
activity of the relevant international actors is enhanced by events which challenge 
security, id est a “selfish definition” is more appropriate. The re-conceptualization of 
state failure builds basis for further researches. 
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The definition used in the dissertation re-conceptualizes state failure on the basis of 
security and in theory justifies international interventions. Because of the fact that per 
definition state failure is an international phenomenon which does not know borders and 
spills over neighboring countries, creating regional and in the worst case scenarios 
international instability. In the world of sovereign states, sovereignty protects all states 
from intervention under the aegis of the international law, but “cooperative sovereignty” 
means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to the state. The territory of the world 
is the common good of the world’s population and the states have the duty to protect the 
population living on the given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a right but a 
duty to control the sovereign portion of the world’s territory. The definition of state 
failure is the failure of the control of this territory which puts the population of the 
country and the population of other countries in danger. 
The second hypothesis stated that the logical answer to state failure is statebuilding. 
In order to verify this statement, the dissertation examined the different possible 
solutions. The fact that failed states are not able to develop by themselves does not 
necessarily mean that external actors cannot give useful assistance. In line with 
“cooperative sovereignty”, the external actors become responsible for the reinstallation 
and maintenance of the control over the territory. Statebuilding also means the 
rebuilding of the state’s capacity of control the sovereign share. The different tasks 
during statebuilding process are not clear and they seem to differ case by case, there are 
common straits along which the complex process can be characterized. It is generally 
recognized that alternative opportunities, such as redrawing state borders, or letting 
territories develop without governments, are not viable under the conditions of the 
recent international system. Per definition, failed states are not able to step on the road 
of sustainable development by themselves, that is why the active participation of the 
international community is needed. Cases which would prove that a country with weak 
state performances can carry out an internally driven development are rather exceptions 
than the rule. Due to the effects of globalization, the countries are highly interconnected 
in every aspect, and weak states are not exceptions, either. Assuming that a weak or 
failed state is unable to cope with internal pressures, it is improbable that it becomes 
able to handle the even bigger external forces. Summing up, it means that some form of 
international intervention is inevitable, and considering that weak statehood is 
connected with the lost of the monopoly on violence on the territory of the state, this 
intervention has to have a military dimension, too. Supposing that the international 
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community is ready to intervene in all cases that constitute humanitarian danger for the 
people living on the territory of a country is too idealistic. However, it is probable that 
all the countries that perceive security interests in the intervention will act. 
The complexity of challenges and the obscure conditions for statebuilding led to 
different definitions of the process, which is reflected in the ambiguous terminology. 
The process is labeled with several different expressions: peacebuilding, nation-
building, post-conflict reconstruction or statebuilding. It is beyond doubt that the terms 
are synonyms, but as they unavoidably refer to a different focus, there is a need for 
clarification. In our definition peacebuilding refers to the foundation of conditions of 
sustainable peace by creating several institutions and helping avoid the renewal of 
conflict. Whilst, nation-building refers to building a common identity. It is generally 
true, that foreign powers are unable to build nations, and the process would not happen 
in a fortnight, either. In our point of view, the most appropriate expression to apostrophe 
the complex process is statebuilding. It is adequate, because the problems stem from the 
failure of the state. However, the practice of statebuilding, namely the question of how 
to implement it, gives floor to fierce debates in the literature.  
Several studies were born on the analogies between statebuilding experiences in the 
past and present. The historical examples help understand the complexity of the process 
but are unable to provide clear and copyable blueprints. On the other hand, it is evident 
that normative models and logical frameworks of statebuilding draw conclusions from 
the historical examples. Thus, these examples are indeed necessary because they lead us 
to deeper understanding that statebuilding is influenced by the complex constellation of 
different latent and manifested factors, dimensions and sequences. Analyzing different 
factors which made statebuilding projects successful can give advice regarding the 
recent theoretical debates on statebuilding. It is true that after the Cold War modern 
statehood experienced recession but the state is still the central unit of international 
politics even if we recognize that several other actors, such as international 
organizations, NGOs, or even certain personalities can influence international political 
events. States are still the eventual frames for providing the institutional structures for 
development in several dimensions of life. However, there are some comments 
according to which the decline in statehood is the normal evolution of politics and the 
international community should accept that certain territories will live without states the 
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reality is different. As long as states have sovereignty over certain territories the failure 
poses significant security threat.  
On the other hand, the question was still open, what kind of state the international 
community should build? The ideal case, of course, would be the modern nation-state 
that was born after long wars in Europe. Today it is hard to imagine that the 
“Westphalian creation” can be remade as neither the birth of new nation that can seize a 
state, nor a state that gives birth to a nation are real opportunities. Colonization of 
stateless territories by European powers showed that artificial creations will conserve 
latent conflicts of weak statehood and never existed nationhood. The decolonization 
only gave floor to permanent crises that were swept under the rug during the Cold War. 
The destroying events in the 1990s proved that these conflicts were not solved, as the 
new problems of state failure are natural continuums of conflicts of decolonization. 
Soviet style statebuilding resembles with colonization as it forced artificial identities on 
the states and nations that could not take roots giving place for violent secessionism in 
several parts of the post-socialist world. Commonly cited successful statebuilding 
projects were the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. 
However, the two cases have some useful advice on the favorable factors of 
statebuilding but cannot serve as a model for recent projects. Germany and Japan had 
been functioning states with homogenous society; the failure of statehood was only the 
result of the destroying and decisive defeat in the war.  
After the experiences in Afghanistan and more importantly in Iraq, there were born 
several theoretical contributions to the literature of statebuilding. Furthermore, the 
relevant international organizations and research groups created their own 
comprehensive checklists of the necessary tasks during statebuilding. Consequently, the 
large number of different models called the attention to the necessity of a 
comprehensive, complex but new schema which incorporates in a single framework all 
dimensions and steps which are present in the different models.  
Statebuilding is necessarily sequenced process but the gradual development of the 
different dimensions at the same time. The third hypothesis stated that the alternative 
normative model of statebuilding explains the steps and factors in six dimensions and 
four sequences which mutually influence each other. The greatest challenge in verifying 
the hypothesis was the high number of independent variables and the difficulty of 
incorporating them in a single and coherent model even if the goal of the model was not 
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the introduction of a dogmatic blueprint of development. The proposed model is 
necessarily normative because the definitions unavoidably build on the existing 
knowledge on this field. The model did not intend to criticize the existing models. It 
rather aimed at constructing a new schema of thinking by using the existing knowledge 
and experiences. The analogy of the Rubik’s cube’s solution methodology helps 
understand and explain the interconnections of the dimensions and the sequences. 
Statebuilding is complex and gradual development through different sequences. 
Thus, the possible interim setbacks cannot indicate the failure of the dynamic process. 
The Rubik’s cube analogy is a proof that neither the followers of the “sequencing” 
school nor those who believe that the development of the state is gradual are right. In 
the reality, statebuilding is dynamic but the wished outcome can be reached only 
through certain sequences. The analogy with the Rubik’s cube solution methodology is 
a new schema of thinking about the complexity in which the sequences interpret the 
timely dynamic of statebuilding and all six dimensions develop simultaneously and 
gradually during the sequences. At the same time, the dynamics of statebuilding are 
reflected in the gradual transition of power from the external actors to the local 
stakeholders.  
During the first sequence, the most important task is to satisfy the basic needs of 
people and statebuilding, that is to fix the centerpieces. The creation of the environment 
which is the basis for the future development is the key during this sequence. The 
greatest challenge during the second sequence is the recurrence of violence and conflict. 
Thus, the external actors still have to maintain their presence and keep bigger role but 
the stakeholders need to be identified, too. The role of the locals becomes crucial during 
the third sequence because without significant local ownership of the process the 
external actors will be only “tilting at windmills”. During this stage the state needs to 
become able to generate and use own resources whilst the external actors play the role 
of ultimate assurance. In the last sequence, the main goal is to maintain the complex 
structure which was created during the other stages. The state and the domestic 
stakeholders need to be able to cope with the challenges of the interconnected and 
globalized world whilst the external actors should not be present as direct decisive 
factor in development. 
The Rubik’s cube analogy is different from other statebuilding models because it 
does not overemphasize the role of a single dimension. All dimensions are present 
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during each sequence and they are in dynamic relation. The nexus among them is 
different during each sequence and in different countries but the logic of development is 
the same. Instead of writing down the needed tasks of statebuilding, the model helps 
highlight the important problems in each dimension and sequence.  
The model is not a perfect blueprint of development but it is a theoretic crutch for 
further researches on this field. The aim with the initiation of a new model and with 
using the analogy was to reconstruct thinking about state failure and statebuilding. The 
model intended to alleviate the problem of incorporating all factors, dimensions and 
sequences in a single model. 
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Notes 
 
 
1
 See for instance: Seymour Martin Lipset (1959); Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillip C. Schmitter, Laurence 
Whitehead (1986); Dankwart Rustow (1970) 
2
 Normative in a political context because it uses the shared values of the “Western political community” 
about democracy, state, society or good governance. 
3
 Gergely Romsics, the research fellow of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, used this 
expression to characterize the way how we use political terms such as democracy. 
4
 Iran and more clearly North Korea also fall under this category, that is why it is very sensitive what is 
going to happen in the next few months or years. 
5
 In the time of publication of the „Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy” Kosovo was the target of an 
international intervention, and similarly as of today, Somaliland was part of Somalia, just to highlight two 
examples. 
6
 These questions are: how to deal with warlords, whether they should be included in the future 
development; what is the role of democracy in the process; what is or should be the relation of new and 
old power structures; what is the sound ratio of international and local judges; how much emphasis should 
be placed on infrastructural development; what is the impact of the media on the conflict; what should be 
the language policy in multiethnic, multilingual societies; how long is the healthy international NGO 
presence that is still not harmful for local initiatives; what should be the environmental concerns of the 
statebuilding process; who has enough resources left for sponsoring the future economic development, 
since usually the political power meant economic power, too; what is the right balance between domestic 
revenues and public finance and international financial assistance; with whom should the international 
actors cooperate during the process; what should be the structure of politics that helps the most the 
development. (Junne at al 2005b: 223) 
7
 See for example Thomas Carothers (2007); or  Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2007) 
8
 See Francis Fukuyama (2004); Amitai Etzioni  (2004; 2007); Andrea Kathryn Talentino (2002) 
9
 This human behavior is characterized by the Maslow-pyramid.  
10
 According to our opinion, these leaders already lost their credit. They are often mentioned among the 
worst dictators, and in that sense Marina Ottaway was wrong with the prediction in 1999. 
11
 When we mention Germany, we refer to West-Germany, similarly to most of the studies in the 
literature. 
12
 See for instance: Kornai 1997 
13
 We have to keep in mind that China’s recent behavior in Africa does not prove that theorem.  
14
 Somalia is number one on the 2009 and on the 2010 ranking of the Fund for Peace’s Failed States 
Index. 
15
 We would like to refer here on the famous speech of George Bush on the eve of the end of Cold War. 
16
 Based on personal discussions of the author with university students from Kabul on the subjective 
feelings, it is worth to mention a simple example: high school students from Kabul during the 1990s had 
to face different periods that changed their habits in the school or the free time activities. The students 
even had to change their habits how they went to school, because during different periods, different parts 
of Kabul were considered safe. Or they had to change their physical appearance, for instance during the 
Taliban rule the male students all had to bear beards without exception, and the female students were not 
allowed to spend their free time with the fellow male students. 
17
 Obviously the possibility of irrational elements in the motivation of rebel forces is not completely 
excluded from the explanations, as there is the opportunity that leaders with sanity problems emerge. 
Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord Resistance Army, which operates in Northern Uganda, is beyond 
doubt insane, with reports of behavioral problems even from his childhood.  
18
 The Chinese expansion in Africa, with the goal of satisfying the growing Chinese demand for natural 
resources, is dangerous in this sense, and has unpredictable consequences; however, the Chinese 
investments brought rapid development in Angola, or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well. 
19
 For example in Ireland the population speaks the original Gaelic only as a second language. 
20
 The Security Council of the United Nations released the Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001 which 
established the legitimacy of Afghanistan’s rebuilding and the creation of the International Security 
Assistance Force. The ISAF has been deployed since January 1, 2002, and had the mission to assist the 
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Afghan government in the statebuilding tasks. The Security Council Resolution 1510 expanded the 
authority of the ISAF over Kabul. Before the expansion, from August 10, 2003, the NATO is in charge 
for the ISAF. Besides the security dimensions of the ISAF the United Nations created the UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan, which had to observe the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. In that sense, 
the UNAMA has been assistance in the political dimension.  
Afghanistan has been the place for experimenting new structures which may be more efficient in 
rebuilding the country. The United States drafted the plan of the Joint Regional Teams during the summer 
of 2002. The Joint Regional Teams would have to secure the environment for the aid workers. As a 
consequences of Hamid Karzai’s suggestion, the name was changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
and the scope of the task expanded to complex reconstruction tasks. The official mandate of the PRTs has 
been to strengthen the legitimacy of the central government on the entire territory of the country and the 
first PRT was set up in Gardez January 2003 under American command. Tangible achievements have 
been experienced only after the NATO overtook the command of the ISAF and began to set up NATO led 
PRTs. 
The PRT supposed to be able to assist the central government to expand its authority, protect the aid 
workers and create a secure environment in general for statebuilding. Originally it was planed the PRTs 
can react flexibly to the complex situation by enhancing civil military cooperation. On the other hand the 
last years proved that the small seize enables flexibility, but means weakness at the same time. The PRTs 
are not able to conduct intensive military action. 
21
 During the verification of the second hypothesis, we already analyzed the question of trusteeship 
among the possible answers for state failure. In this regard, the present chapter will only repeat arguments 
which are directly connected to the present chapter. 
22
 See for instance the volumes edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillip Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead. 
23
 See for instance the theorems of the post-keynesian development economics, such as Gunar Myrdal, on 
the effects of the “big push”.  
24
 A recently published monitoring report on the relations of the governmental and economic sectors in 
Kosovo highlighted a similar argument. External actors pushed for stronger institutions, which in fact 
created opportunity for the government officials to obtain bigger power and have bigger influence on the 
economic processes, as well. 
25
 Sustenance was the value and outcome of the first stage of statebuilding in the economic sector.  
26
 The author has worked for the International Centre for Democratic Transition since 2007. The ICDT 
has programs related to Afghanistan and the Western-Balkans. 
27
 The Good Friday Agreement in 1998. 
28
 As it was mentioned earlier, the author of the dissertation worked for the ICDT as project manager in 
the mentioned initiative. The respective experiences and arguments are drawn from that project. The 
project enhanced the democratic dialogue in target countries, Mali, Morocco and Mongolia by increasing 
the understanding of journalists and NGO representatives of those institutions and mechanisms. Experts 
from Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, who have first-hand experience with successful 
democratic transitions, presented their experiences through conferences, workshops and site visits. They 
particularly emphasized mechanisms that have been developed to provide access for marginalized groups 
to the institutions providing legal protection. All events focused on how these can be adapted in new 
democratic contexts, and how those new mechanisms can enter the democratic discourse. For more 
information, visit: www.icdt.hu  
29
 The educational system is one of the most important legacies of the socialist political culture. 
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